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Abstract
This thesis examines Iran's relations with Britain from the 1979 revolution to the end of 
Rafsanjani's presidency in 1997. It analyses the pattem of the relations using a two-pronged 
approach: through exploring objective developments and pressures inside Iran, in the Middle 
Eastern region and globally, as well as uncovering perceptive and psychological problems 
existing between the two countries. The thesis identifies the causes of tensions and instability 
in the relations by examining post-revolutionary Iran's foreign policy, the Iranian perception 
of Britain as a conspiratorial power, and Britain's special relationship with the United States.
This study represents the first attempt to produce a systematic study of Iran's relations with 
Britain in the post-revolutionary era. Iran's relations with Britain are assessed in the context of 
interaction amongst a number of variables: British policies towards Iran, Iran's activism in the 
international arena, and the dynamics of Iran's domestic politics.
This thesis is a case study in the foreign policy-making of a revolutionary state; however, it 
provides conceptual constructs and empirical observations that may be useful for the 
examination of relations between Iran and other Western countries.
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1Introduction
Ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979 relations between Iran and Britain have remained 
volatile and have suffered from tension, instability and upheavals. Neither reconciliation, nor 
normalisation, has been achieved between the two sides. While Iran's relations with the two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union were predictably hostile, Tehran's ties 
with London could have been expected, at least by the end of the first tempests of the 
revolution, to be better and more stable. Why did Iran's relations with Britain deteriorate from 
the beginning, as distinct from other West European countries? What were the origins of Iran's 
resentment towards Britain? Which forces were behind the hostility between them? Why have 
relations still not been normalised? What are the prospects for future relations between these 
two countries? These are but a few questions, the answers for which can only be explored by a 
study of Iranian-British relations.
Many works by Iranian and Western scholars have examined pre-revolutionary Iran's relations 
with Britain. Amongst them are 8 volumes in Persian of Tarikh-e Ravabet-e Siyasi-e Iran va 
Englis dar Gham-e Noozdahom-e Miladi by Mahmoud Mahmoud1 and The Persians Amongst 
the English; Episodes in Anglo-Persian History by Denis Wright.2 However, apart from a few 
scattered articles,3 a systematic exploration of Iran's relations with Britain since 1979 has by 
and large been neglected by Iranian and Western scholars for two main reasons. The fact that 
"most analyses of Iran's foreign relations have focused either on Iran's interaction with its 
neighbours in the Middle East, or on its relations with the two predominant powers of the 
1980s, the United States and the then-Soviet Union"4 has overshadowed the significance and 
necessity for study of Iranian-British relations. Also the initial expectation that Iran's relations 
with Britain would not follow the course of its relations with the two superpowers created a 
mindset whereby scholars tended to view Tehran's ties with London as not dramatically 
different from those of other Western European countries. Not surprisingly, during the 
nineteen years since the Iranian revolution, the exploration of trends, events, roots of hostility, 
patterns of upheavals, and the vector of tension and instability in Iranian-British relations
1 Mahmoud Mahmoud, Tarikh-e Ravabet-e Siyasi-e Iran va Englis dar Gham-e Noozdahom Miladi (in Persian), 
[History of Anglo-Iranian Political Relations during the 19th Century], 8 Volumes, Tehran: Eqbal Publications, 
1958.
2 Denis Wright, The Persians Amongst the English; Episodes in Anglo-Persian History, London: I. B. Tauris, 
1985.
3 Anthony Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe", Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1989; Fred 
Halliday, "An Elusive Normalisation: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution", Middle East Journal, Vol. 
48, No. 2, Spring 1994; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran and the European Community" in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991.
4 Halliday, Op. Cit., p. 309.
2have remained ignored, overlooked or reduced to examination of pretexts rather than genuine 
causes.
This thesis attempts to produce an analytical study of Iranian-British relations since 1979 by 
employing an overarching conceptual framework and relevant information. The thesis not 
only explores why and how the relations between the two countries unfolded in their specific 
pattern in the post-revolutionary era, but also attempts to shed light on fundamental elements 
of Iran's foreign policy, affecting the conduct of Iran-Britain relations. In a sense, it reflects 
the coexistence of Iran's ideological and revolutionary foreign policy-making with a more 
realistic approach in the context of the dynamic interplay of domestic politics and foreign 
policy. While examining the factors involved in the ups and downs of the relations, the thesis 
endeavours to trace the historical and perceptual roots of the conflict between Iran and Britain. 
Three factors have been instrumental in influencing Iranian-British relations. They are: 
perception and misperception, conspiracy theory, and the British-US special relationship.
GENERAL CONCEPTS AND ARGUMENTS
Perception and Misperception
Robert B. McCalla has remarked that a distinction should be made "between a psychological 
environment -  the decision maker's image of the setting in which decisions are carried out -  
and an operational environment -  the actual setting in which they are carried out".5 While the 
first part of McCalla's statement constitutes 'perception', 'misperception' is a situation where 
there is a mismatch between perception and reality.6 7Yet, perception and misperception play a 
major role in the outcome of states' foreign policy making. Their influential role in 
international politics has been debated by Robert Jervis in his ground-breaking book 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics7 whose ideas have been utilised in this 
thesis.
The way Iranians, particularly their leaders, perceived the British has had a great impact on 
the formulation of the Iranian attitude towards Britain. Jervis has stated that "what matters in 
sending a message is not how you would understand it, but how others will understand it".8
5 Robert B. McCalla, Uncertain Perceptions; US Cold War Crisis Decision Making, Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1992, p. 20.
6 For another explanation of misperception, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of 
International Crisis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 90-91.
7 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976.
8 Ibid., p. 187.
3Since perception "plays almost as important a role in international relations as does objective 
reality",9 Iranian-British relations have been greatly influenced by how Tehran and London 
have perceived and interpreted each other's policies and messages. E. Ted Gladue has noted 
that "the clearer and more accurate the perceptions that each party has of the other parties, the 
greater are the chances for constructive communication, dialogue, and negotiation" .10 Iranian- 
British relations have been no exception.
What determine decision-makers' perceptions of another state are their images and beliefs 
concerning that state. The presence of pre-existing images and expectations influences a 
state's perception. Amongst the variables that influence the degree to which historical 
experiences affect a nation's perceptual predispositions are the importance of the 
consequences for that nation, and if it has affected many members of an organisation, a 
process Jervis refers to as 'organisational learning' . * 11 The long history of British intervention 
in Iran during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as British penetration of Iran's 
economy through different concessions during the Qajar dynasty, have led Iranians to view 
Britain as a meddling, conspiratorial power. This image has compelled Iranians to view 
British policies towards their country as intrinsically opposed to its progress and 
independence.
Naturally, the more established the perception of other states, the more significant it is in 
determining the decision-maker's response to their policies.12 The Iranians' reactionsto British 
policies have largely stemmed from a perception of the British rooted in the long history of 
Iranian-British interaction. Yet ossified perceptions can create a kind of 'tunnel vision' which 
leads decision makers to notice some things and neglect others, to see evidence that conforms 
to their hypothesis and exclude alternatives that corroborate competing hypotheses, and to 
attempt to assimilate discrepant information to pre-existing perceptions.13 In its extreme form, 
whereby actors reject incoming information which contradicts their predispositions, and even 
consciously search for information that supports the pre-existing perception, the process leads 
to a situation called 'premature cognitive closure' . 14 Thus, it is not unnatural when Iranian 
decision makers have been unable to distinguish between hostile and positive British policies. 
As a result, those policies have been ignored, dismissed or interpreted by Iranian foreign 
policy-makers in ways which have been compatible with the pre-existing perception.
9 John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America, New York: Random House, 1971, p. 4.
10 E. Ted Gladue, China's Perception of Global Politics, Washington: University Press of America, 1982, p. 7.
11 Jervis, Op. Cit., pp. 238-9.
12 Hendrik Van Dalen and L. Harmon Zeigler, Introduction to Political Science; People, Politics, and 
Perception, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977, p. 62.
13 Jervis, Op. Cit., pp. 145, 181, 195 and 212.
14 Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz, Perception, Attitudes and Images: A Study of Japanese Foreign Policy Behaviour, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973, pp. 54-55. Also on 'cognitive closure', see Gladue, Op. Cit., pp. 
10- 12.
4Furthermore, there is a common tendency "to see the behaviour of others as more centralised, 
planned, and coordinated than it is. This is a manifestation of the drive to squeeze complex 
and unrelated events into a coherent pattern. .. . They [decision-makers] suspect that well-laid 
plans give events a coherence they would otherwise lack" .15 The Iranian perception of the 
British and events associated with Britain has been no exception to this pattern. The Iranians 
have perceived British policies in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf region, as 
having a centralised, Machiavellian, anti-Iranian tilt. This view of Britain has been strong 
amongst many Iranians, because "perceptions of overcentralization and over- 
Machiavellianism are more apt to occur if the two sides are in conflict".16
From the British side the issue of perception and misperception has also been influential in the 
formation of their policies towards Iran. Since little attention is devoted to "how policy­
makers appear to think -  to the styles of reasoning they use in examining and justifying their 
views to others" ,17 British policy-makers sometimes have failed to examine carefully the post­
revolutionary Iranian leaders' style of political reasoning. While much of Iranian foreign 
policy, especially in the first decade of the revolution, was ideologically driven, British 
decision makers believed that the Iranians' policies stemmed from their economic and political 
interests. This misperception caused the British to pursue a policy behaviour towards Iran 
which achieved nothing except to exacerbate tensions.
Meanwhile, miscalculations concerning the relative degree of influence of internal and 
external forces on Iran's foreign policy making have played a major part in the British 
approach towards Iran. Deborah Welch Larson in her Anatomy of Mistrust has remarked: 
"When foreign policy makers . . . explain the other state's behaviour, they overestimate the 
contribution of internal sources and underestimate the impact of external forces. Leaders 
attribute the other side's hostile or aggressive behaviour to its ideology or national character, 
and they overlook that the other side may be responding to their own actions. . . . When the 
adversary does something good, . . . they assume that the enemy's conciliatory actions were 
forced by external pressures or by the exigencies of domestic political weakness".18 This has 
been the nature of most Western countries' understanding of Iran's policies. British leaders 
have attributed, in one form or another, Iran's generally anti-Western or specifically anti- 
British policies to Iran's domestic politics, whereas they have perceived Tehran's conciliatory 
approaches as resulting from either Western economic and political pressures or Iran's own
15 Jervis, Op. Cit., pp. 319-21.
16 Ibid., p. 329.
17 Philip E. Tetlock, "Cognitive Structural Analysis of Political Rhetoric: Methodological and Theoretical 
Issues" in Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire (eds.), Explorations in Political Psychology, Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1993, p. 380.
18 Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust; US-Soviet Relations During the Cold War, Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 23-24.
5internal problems. At the same time, the British have failed to understand that to a large extent 
Iran's activism in its foreign policy generally, and Tehran's anti-British approach in particular, 
have been a direct response to British moves and stances in the Persian Gulf, the European 
Union, and the United Nations Security Council. In addition, Tehran's anti-Western 
inclinations have been an outcome of the Iranians' sense of being under threat by the West -  a 
threat characterised by a challenge to their preferred political values, beliefs, and system of 
government.19
Related to the issue of perception and misperception has been the British failure "to extract the 
conciliatory message from the surrounding noise"20 when viewing Iran's signals. While in the 
1980s Tehran was sending the former to the outside world and using the latter for domestic 
consumption, Britain sometimes could not distinguish between them. Although "mixing 
signals -  that is to say, combining coercion and accommodation in an uncoordinated, ad hoc 
fashion -  can undermine the credibility of both signals",21 Britain, on many occasions, 
misconstrued the situation and was not able to respond positively to Iran's constructive 
messages. In sum, as much as the reality and objective environment acted as a source of 
tension between Iran and Britain, perceptions and misperceptions have also had a heavy 
influence on Iranian-British relations since 1979.
Conspiracy Theory
Jon W. Anderson has described conspiracy theories as forms of entextualisation, "a process by 
which information which is specific to an event is recast or reglossed in increasingly more 
solemn language, abstracted terms or through other linguistic-performative means that move 
from the particular instance toward more general, less particular categories".22 According to 
Dieter Groh, conspiracy theories are not restricted to a particular culture, political system, or 
specific class of people, and "one can find adherents of such theories in all 'camps': right and 
left, reactionary and progressive, fascist and communist".23
Iran has not been an exception to this universal phenomenon. However, the fact is that 
"although there have been conspiracy theories implicating all Western powers, . . . those
19 Richard K. Herrmann, "Perceptions and Foreign Policy Analysis" in Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Ghan (eds.), 
Foreign Policy Decision Making; Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1984, p. 31.
20 Larson, Op. Cit., p. 30.
21 Ibid., p. 31.
22 Jon W. Anderson, "Conspiracy Theories, Premature Entextualization, and Popular Political Analysis", The 
Arab Studies Journal, Spring 1996, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 97.
23 Dieter Groh, "The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory, or: Why Do Bad Things Happen to Good People? Part 
I: Preliminary Draft of a Theory of Conspiracy Theories" in Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), 
Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987, p. 11.
6involving the British have been most popular among members of the ruling and middle 
classes" in Iran.24 Iranians have depicted the British as Rubah-e Makkar [cunning], their 
policy as Dast-e Panhan-e Siyasat-e Englis [The hidden hand of British policy], development 
of major events as Kar-e Englisiha [Staged-managed events by the British], and influential 
friends of Britain in Iran and in the Persian Gulf region as Noukar-e Englis [British agent]. 
The term Siyasat-e Englis [British policy], is comprehensively and widely used by Iranians to 
present their perception of Britain as a power behind all events in their country, and of the 
British as manipulators and meddlers who have always conspired against Iran. Although the 
boom period of conspiracy theories especially involving the British was in the nineteenth 
century during the Qajar dynasty, still in a period of relative decline since the 1979 revolution 
they have been employed by Iranians to explain the world generally, and the pattern of the 
British policy towards their country in particular. The Iranian weekly Kayhan Havaie, under 
the title of British Conspiracies', in November 1996 wrote:
The British have long since become the talk of the world through incessant 
interference in other countries' internal affairs, and the majority of the current 
troubles of various nations stemmed from the policies of this 'old fox'. And even 
now, if a window of opportunity presents itself to emulate the infamous deeds of 
their predecessors and foment trouble somewhere in the world, they take delight in 
this.* 2^
The Conspiracy theory is so dominant in Iran as the basic mode of understanding Iranian 
politics and history that Iran Daily was prompted to question its efficacy in solving Iran's 
problems. The daily, under the title of 'A Word on Enemies’, wrote in May 1998:
"'The enemy', no doubt is pleased to know that he occupies such significant space 
on the frontal lobes of the very brains that are supposed to lead the nation into the 
future. This translates as a lot of creative energy being diverted from solving 
bedrock problems at home. But 'the enemy’ is so firmly entrenched in our psyche 
that he gets blamed for purely home-grown shortcomings too".2^
Yet, the roots of the tendency to revert to conspiracy theories in a certain society should be 
"traced to a wide variety of causes, some of them deeply rooted in the psychological history of 
given individuals".27 Accordingly, the origins of Iranians' view of Britain as a power
24 Ahmad Ashraf, "Conspiracy Theories" in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. VI, California: 
Mazda Publishers, 1993, p. 139.
2~> "Touteahay-e Mosalematamiz-e Sehyonisthay-e Englis", Kayhan Havai, 13 November 1996.
26 Hassan Abdul Rahman, "Perspective: A Word on Enemies", Iran Daily, 23 May 1998.
27 Ronald Inglehart, "Extremist Political Positions and Perceptions of Conspiracy: Even Paranoids have Real 
Enemies" in Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, New York:
7conspiring against their country are premised on a history determined by the machinations of 
foreign powers and their rivalry. In this history Britain has played a major role. "The fact that 
the great powers have in fact intervened covertly in Persian affairs has led ordinary people, 
political leaders, even the rulers themselves to interpret their history in terms of elaborate and 
devious conspiracies".28 However, the predominant position of the British in Iranians' eyes as 
plotters has been due to the nature of British interventions in Iran. It was Britain which signed 
the 1907 treaty with Russia that resulted in the division of Iran into two spheres of influence. 
"The bitterness" towards this British action, writes F. Kazemzadeh, "felt by the Iranians has 
never disappeared".29 The British attempted to conclude the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement, 
which if they had succeeded, would have achieved "a paramount position of control over the 
financial and military affairs of Iran".30 The British played a major role in the coup d' etat of 
1921 which brought Reza Khan to power. "This undisputed fact lies at the centre of a 
mythology in which every event and every action by Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) is believed 
to have been controlled by the British".31 And his replacement in 1941 by his son, 
Mohammad Reza, during the Second World War, was also attributed to British designs. The 
British role in the Anglo-American coup of 1953 which overthrew the nationalist government 
of Mohammad Musaddeq and restored Mohammad Reza Shah's autocratic role was the latest 
event in which the British conspired against Iran and determined the course of Iranian history.
While the British were behind these events, there are many others which Iranians on the basis 
of conspiracy theories and "speculation with too few facts"32 also attribute to them.33 Ronald 
Inglehart has remarked that conspiracy theories are more likely to be believed "when certain 
groups experience repeated frustration in their attempts to attain important goals".34 This is 
the case for Iranians, who since the nineteenth century have attempted in vain to liberate Iran 
from the influence of foreign forces and their rivalries, and to experience security and freedom 
under different dynasties and regimes. Meanwhile, a conspiracy theory is appealing to a group 
of the populace if the content of the theory "signifies some desirable state of affairs and if it 
logically coheres with other relevant beliefs to which the group may adhere".35 Not 
surprisingly, the past history of British behaviour in Iran has made it easy for Iranians to point 
the finger at the British in order to explain the misfortunes which they experience. However,
Springer-Verlag, 1987, p. 231.
28 Ashraf, Op. Cit., p. 138.
29 F. Kazemzadeh, "Anglo-Iranian Relations: The Qajar Period" in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia 
Iranica, Vol. II, London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p. 50.
30 N. S. Fatemi, "Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919" in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. II, 
London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, p. 59.
31 Ashraf, Op. Cit., p. 140.
32 Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 96.
33 For these cases, see Ashraf, Op. Cit., pp. 139-42.
34 Inglehart, Op. Cit., p. 231.
35 Arie W. Kruglanski, "Blame-placing Schemata and Attributional Research" in Carl F. Graumann and Serge 
Moscovici (eds.), Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987, p. 228.
8by viewing all British policy towards their country in the context of conspiracy, Iranians are 
able to find a simple answer to Groh's question: "why do bad things happen to good 
people?".36
But what distinguishes conspiracy theories from other forms of political analysis is "their 
quick turn to . . . focusing on intentions or motives as their terminal abstractions".37 This is 
closely related to the issue of how states view each other. "Whether states view another's 
action as cooperative, hostile, or neutral depends on how they construe its motives".38 Iranian 
perceptions of the anti-Iranian nature of British intentions, and of the British themselves as a 
people not to be trusted, have caused Britain to be regarded as a hostile country. This 
perception has led Iranian leaders even to ignore, or discount any conciliatory British gestures 
as a trick.
Dean G. Pruitt has concluded that conspiracy theories are "resulting from escalating conflict 
and contributing to further escalation. . . . Once in place, a conspiracy theory . . . tends to 
strengthen hostility toward the adversary, encouraging more contentious tactics and thus 
intensifying the crisis".39 The predominant position of conspiracy theories in Iran generally, 
and those involving the British in particular, has greatly affected Iran's relations with Britain. 
While Iranian perception of the British as conspirators was reinforced by the conflictual, 
volatile and unstable nature of the relations it has further escalated hostility between the two 
countries.
Special Relationship
According to B. Vivekanandan, the Anglo-American special relationship "has no parallel in 
modem international relations".40 This relationship has been premised on "the perception of 
strategic coincidence", in which "America saw Britain as its strategic forewals post, and 
Britain regarded America as its own strategic hinterland".41 The areas of association between 
London and Washington in the context of their 'special relationship' have been largely in 
intelligence, diplomacy, technology, defence, and economic cooperation. In Henry Kissinger's 
words, the special relationship has made it "psychologically impossible" for the United States 
not to consult with Britain on any universal issue. Kissinger states: "They [British and
36 Groh, Op. Cit., pp. 1 & 5.
37 Anderson, Op. Cit., p. 100.
38 Larson, Op. Cit., p. 21.
39 Dean G. Pruitt, "Conspiracy Theory in Conflict Escalation" in Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), 
Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987, pp. 198-99 & 201.
40 B. Vivekanandan, "Washington Must Rely on London, Not Bonn", Orbis, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 
414.
41 Raymond G. H. Seitz, "Britain and America: Towards Strategic Coincidence", The World Today, May 1993, 
p. 87.
9Americans] evolved a habit of meeting so regularly that any autonomous American action 
came to seem to violate club rules".42
The special relationship was reinforced in the 1980s under President Reagan and Prime 
Minister Thatcher. "The chemistry between these two leaders and the international 
environment at the time provided the impetus that elevated US-British cooperation to a level 
unseen since the end of World War II".43 Thatcher's words are indicative of the new era which 
the special relationship entered. She stated: "We in Britain stand with you [Americans]. 
America's success will be our success. Your problems will be our problems, and when you 
look for friends, we will be there".44
Meanwhile, by adhering to its special relationship with the United States, Britain has been 
able to uphold its position in international politics. In fact, London has been in a position to 
play a role on the broad international stage, with America validating its action and role.45 In 
return, Britain has extended "reliable support for Washington's world leadership".46 
Furthermore, Washington has received strong British support and endorsement for policies 
which others find troubling.47 The US action in bombing Libya in April 1986 is the best 
example in this respect. When the US failed to persuade other European countries, such as 
France and Spain, to provide logistical support, it approached London. Only Britain provided 
the United States with the necessary facilities for bombing Libya.
The special relationship is conducive to enhancing Britain's international position, but also 
causes damage to British interests. This can clearly be seen in the Middle East region 
generally, and in Iran in particular. "London's fortunes [which] are seen by the regional 
powers as closely tied" to America causes damage to Britain's interests if it is perceived by the 
states of the region "as a 'US lackey', with little independence of action".48 Iranian perception 
of Britain as a US lackey led the post-revolutionary Iranian leaders to conclude that British 
policies towards their country were either inspired by America or designed to support and 
endorse US policy towards Iran.
Iranian identification of Britain with the United States j iLi caused British approaches towards 
Iran to be interpreted as identical to those of America. Since America has been regarded as the
42 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, 1979, p. 90.
43 Vivekanandan, Op. Cit., p. 414.
44 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Washington, D. C.: US Government 
Printing Office, 1982, p. 165.
45 Seitz, Op. Cit., p. 85.
46 Paul Sharp, "Thatcher's Wholly British Foreign Policy", Orbis, Vol. 35, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 405.
47 Sharp, Op. Cit., p. 402.
48 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "The Problem of Wearing Too Many Hats", Parliamentary Brief, November 1995, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 57.
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first enemy of the revolution and Iranians have perceived its policies towards their country as 
hostile, Tehran has viewed British policies as harmful as well. In sum, this predominant view 
in Iran has acted as an obstacle to maintenance of a good working relationship with Britain.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis follows a chronological order, and has six chapters. Chapters one and two examine 
the historical background of Iran's relations with Britain before 1979, while chapter three 
locates key policy changes in the immediate post-revolutionary era. Chapters four to six 
explore Iran's relations with Britain from the 1979 revolution to the end of Rafsanjani's 
presidency in 1997.
Chapter One provides a historical overview of relations between Iran and Britain. It covers 
relations from the formation of the Anglo-Iranian alliance in 1798 until the Second World 
War. It concentrates only on the key issues which were conducive to evolution of Iranian 
perception of Britain as an exploitive and manipulative power.
Chapter Two examines relations from World War II until Iran's 1979 revolution. It focuses 
primarily on factual aspects and the psychological environments in this period which 
developed a tendency in the collective psyche of Iranians to perceive Britain as a 
conspiratorial power and blame it for all their misfortunes. Also the chapter traces the origin 
of the perception by which Iranians identify Britain with the United States.
Chapter Three provides a broader picture of Iranian foreign policy since 1979. It aims to 
establish a link between the historical background and the rest of the thesis. It explores post­
revolutionary Iran's foreign policy orientation, Iran’s world view, the relationship between 
Islam and Iran's foreign policy trends, and the dynamic interplay between Iran's domestic 
politics and foreign policy.
Chapter Four explores Iranian-British relations from 1979 to the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 
1988. It locates the substances and variables which shaped Iranian-British relations in this 
period. The chapter examines why Iranians perceived British policies as designed to suit the 
USA, and how this affected relations.
Chapter Five covers the period from the end of the war to the severance of relations in 1989. It 
undertakes analytical study of three important issues which, in one form or another, had a 
major impact on relations. These include: issues associated with human rights, Iran's export of 
revolution, the emergence of the British policy of rejectionism towards Iran, and the Rushdie
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affair.
Chapter Six examines Iranian-British relations in the post-Khomeini era. It explores new 
dimensions in Iran's foreign policy associated with Iran's national reconstruction, the 
redefining of export of the revolution, and foreign policy diversification. The chapter provides 
an overview of Iran's relations with the European Union generally, and a detailed account of 
Iran's relations with Britain in particular in the light of changes introduced by Rafsanjani's 
government. It also discusses how economic ties between Iran and Britain developed despite 
their volatile and unstable political relations.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The historical part of the thesis is designed only to provide essential background for the main 
subject -  Iran's relations with Britain since 1979. Thus, Chapters One and Two are not 
comprehensive accounts of the relations from 1798 to 1979. The main issues and fundamental 
developments discussed in these two chapters are intended only to set the stage for the rest of 
the thesis.
The relations, as the title of the thesis indicates, are largely examined from the perspective of 
Iran. The reader should bear in mind that whatever the reality of a given situation may be, 
what is described here accurately reflects Iranians' predominant view of Britain and British 
policies towards their country.
The chronological sequence of the thesis is limited to the end of Rafsanjani's presidency in 
August 1997 when Iran's current president Mohammad Khatami took power. This time-frame 
has been purposely chosen as Khatami has introduced new dimensions to Iran's regional 
and international relations and brought new policies and ideas in Iran's domestic politics. 
Thus, the examination of Iranian-British relations since the inauguration of Khatami as 
president requires a separate study. In any case, the themes of this study, including the role of 
Iran's domestic politics, the traditional Iranian perception of Britain, the Iranian identification 
of Britain with the United States and the resulting negative impact on relations between Iran 
and Britain, are likely to influence future developments.
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Chapter 1
Iranian-British Relations from the 1798 Alliance to the
Second World War
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to examine Iran's relations with Britain from 1798 until World 
War II. Since in the period before 1798, Iranian-British relations were purely commercial, the 
chapter will begin with the formation of the Anglo-Iranian alliance in 1798. From this time 
onwards Britain viewed Iran as a strategic place where the British political and strategic 
interests were to be secured. During this period Iran, which was languishing under the weak 
and corrupt Qajar Shahs, emerged as a place for political and economic rivalry between 
the European powers.
This chapter will explore how Britain intervened in Iranian affairs, exploited its resources 
through gaining economic concessions, rendering Iran independent only in name. It will 
discuss the British-Russian rivalry in Iran; followed by an appraisal of the British struggle for 
concessions; the British policy towards the Constitutional movement in 1906; Britain's role in 
the division of Iran in 1907; and finally, World War I and British policy in Iran. It 
demonstrates how Iranian-British relations in this period bequeathed a legacy of high­
handedness in policy-making on the part of the British, while the Iranian people grew to 
harbour deep misgivings against the British as an exploitative, conniving and manipulative 
power.
THE FORMATION OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN ALLIANCE 1798
By the late eighteenth century, Iranian-British relations were based entirely on trade and 
commercial activities. The first English agency was opened at Shiraz in 1617, and in the 
following year the Shah granted the British East India Company a monopoly over the export 
of silks from Iran. "The strategic location of Iran formed a useful adjunct to the Company's 
'country' trade, that was the trade in Asian goods between Asian ports".1
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the company established a factory at Bushire, and
1 Malcom Edward Yapp, Strategies of British India; Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798-1850, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 24.
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it quickly became the centre of British trade in Iran. At that time, neither the Iranian 
government nor the East India Company imagined that this firm foothold would result in 
eventual British predominance in southern Iran in the coming decades.
The replacement of the Portuguese by the British in the Persian Gulf in the late eighteenth 
century and the establishment of British supremacy in that area with a monopoly of commerce 
and trade in southern Iran were followed by three main events, transforming British 
commercial interests into strategic and political ones in Iran.
The first and most important was related to the ascendancy of Napoleon in France. The 
Napoleonic period and the French invasion of Egypt in 1797 led to British fears of Napoleon's 
ambitions to invade India. This caused Britain to see Iran as the best buffer state and a barrier 
for defending India. Therefore, Iran emerged as an important, strategic place in the eyes of 
British policy-makers. Given Iran's location as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and as a 
possible gateway to India, both Britain and France began to secure rival political interests in 
Iran, and sought to manipulate it for their purposes.
Second, there was a change in the status of the East India Company. In 1784, the British 
government introduced legislation to increase London's political control over the company,2 
so as to became relatively more responsive to Britain's political objectives and interests in 
Iran. The third was Russian colonial ambitions in northern Iran. Given Russia's broad 
expansionist ambitions in Asia, Russian dominance over the Iranian provinces around the 
Caspian Sea was a serious danger to Iranian independence. Russia's southward push began in 
1800 when Russia annexed in a year later Georgia, then an Iranian possession. The Iranian 
government's realisation of this danger in the north and the inability of the Qajar Shahs to 
defend Iran against it forced Tehran to look for a European ally for help.
Britain was the first to show willingness to form an alliance with Iran and help the Iranian 
army. Britain wanting to counteract a French invasion of India, while Iran, expecting that it 
would obtain British help against Russia, entered a new era in which political and strategic 
interests were of paramount importance. To sum up, the period of Iranian-British relations 
based on commercial interests changed into one premised on strategic and political interests.
Although Russia had advanced into the Caucasus and invaded territories in northern Iran, at 
that time the Russian threat was considered by Britain only secondary to that of France- "The 
government of India during the Napoleonic wars had no fear of a Russian attack on India
2 Roman Ghirshman, Vladimir Minorsky and Romesh Sanghvi, Persia the Immortal Kingdom, London: Orient 
Commerce Establishment, 1971, p. 168.
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through Persia. Britain's principal concern was to fight the French As Clayton argues: 
"Defence of India in the first half of the nineteenth century was chiefly a matter of ensuring 
that the sea routes to it were safe from attack".3 4 British perception of a French threat resulted 
in discussion in London and Calcutta about the nature and extent of their strategic interests in 
Iran, and possible ways to protect them.
During the Napoleonic wars another factor which led the British to secure further their 
position in Iran was Afghanistan. At that time Kabul was under the control of Zaman Shah 
who had been contacted by Napoleon's agents, and the Shah had advanced into India 
occasionally. Thus with British help Iran could attack Afghanistan in order to divert the latter 
from attacking India.5 Although in Ingram's view, discussion of the role of Iran in the British 
empire had begun before the Napoleonic period,6 it was the Napoleonic wars and the Afghan 
threat, aggravated by the latter's contact with the French, that forced Britain to discuss 
seriously its diplomatic and strategic interests in Iran and the possibility of an Iranian alliance.
In order to oppose French ambitions for invading India, to counteract their activities in Iran 
for securing passage to India, and also to divert Zaman Shah from possible attack on India, 
Britain decided to ally with Iran. After sending Mehdi Ali Khan, British resident at Bushire, 
as a special envoy to Iran in 1798, Governor-General Wellesley7 decided to extend relations 
with Iran to the utmost degree. He appointed Captain John Malcolm to lead a British mission 
to Iran. This appointment was regarded as the formation of the Anglo-Iranian alliance. As has 
been suggested: "The making of the Persian connection signifies that the British political elite 
took for granted at the end of the eighteenth century that their territories in India and trade 
with the eastern seas helped to make Great Britain a great power".8
Malcolm succeeded in concluding two treaties with Iran in 1801. The first was a commercial 
treaty in which "the East India Company gained more commercial privileges".9 The second 
and more important was a political treaty, which allied Britain and Iran against France and 
Afghanistan. Britain in return undertook to equip the Iranian army and also to help Iran in 
case of an outbreak of war with France or Afghanistan.
3 Da vid Mclean, Britain and Her Buffer States; The Collapse of the Persian Empire 1890-1914, London: Royal 
Historical Society, 1979, p. 25.
4 G. D. Clayton, Britain and Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli, London: University of London Press, 
1971, p. 17.
5 Rose Greaves, "Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798-1921" in Peter Avery, et al. (eds.), 
The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nader Shah to the Islamic Republic, Vol. 7, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. 376.
6 Edward Ingram, Britain's Persian Connection 1798-1928; Prelude to the Great Game in Asia, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 8.
7 Earl o f Momington became Marquess Wellesley in 1799.
8 Ingram, Ibid., p. 2.
9 Ghirshman, et al, Op. Cit., p. 168.
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The real danger to Iran, however, was Russia, which advanced to Georgia in 1800, compelling 
the Iranian government to go to war in 1804. In this war, Iran expected to receive British 
assistance but Britain did not assist and left Iran alone in its war. This was due to a change of 
policy by which Britain had to reduce its involvement outside India and withdraw from any 
alliance or connection outside it, and to the fact that in the renewed war against France, Russia 
and Britain were allied. "Under strong pressure from England to cut down expenses and 
commitments the new Governor -General, Lord Cornwallis and his successor, George Barlow, 
had little time or money to spare for Iran".10 The British therefore invoked the letter of the 
treaty as not binding them to aid Iran against Russia.
"Failing to receive assistance from the British the Shah, in 1807, denounced the Malcolm 
Treaty (of 1801 ) and concluded with France the Treaty of Finkenstein, in which Russia was 
stated to be equally an enemy of the kings of Persia and of France".* 11 By this alliance the 
Shah could resist the Russian advance, and it also provided a counterbalance to British 
influence. France undertook to make every attempt to force Russia to return Georgia to Iran, 
train Iranian troops, and supply the Iranian army with modem weapons.
The weak point of the Franco-Iranian alliance of 1807, like the Anglo-Iranian alliance of 
1801, was that British and French interests in Iran were secondary to their respective political 
interests in Europe. Napoleon's policy towards Iran had been determined by his conflicts with 
Russia in Europe. The temporary settlement of Napoleon's differences with Russia by the 
Treaty of Tilsit of 7 July 1807 meant that there was no longer a reason to supply Iran with 
military assistance against Russia. As a result Iran was again alone against Russia, and once 
more appealed to the British in both India and London.
Reports of the uprisings in Spain and Portugal against Napoleon made Fath Ali Shah realise 
that France would have no capacity to invade India, and therefore Napoleon would no longer 
be interested in an alliance with Iran. This realisation led to Harford Jones, leading the new 
British mission in Iran, to meet the Shah. Once again, while looking for help from Britain 
against Russia, and with Britain wanting to exclude France from Iran, Tehran started 
negotiations for a new treaty.
Jones concluded the Preliminary Treaty of 1809 by which Iran undertook not to allow any 
European powers to pass through Iranian territory to India, and to cancel other treaties with 
European countries. Britain, in return, undertook to assist the Iranian forces and to give 
military aid in case of war between Iran and European powers. The main point to note is that 
the term 'European power' in the Treaty was a source of potential misunderstanding. "Britain
10 Yapp, Op. Cit., p. 37.
11 John Marlowe, The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century, London: The Cresset Press, 1962, p. 19.
16
expected the treaty to operate against France, but Iran thought it should work against 
Russia".12
From the formation of the Anglo-Iranian alliance in 1798 through the first half of the 
nineteenth century, one main question shaped Britain's relations with Iran. This was whether 
the interests of the Indian government should prevail in defence of India or of Britain in 
European politics. "The appearance of Russia in northern Iran had made it certain that 
European considerations would ultimately prevail in Iranian diplomacy".13 Britain's relations 
with Iran being of secondary importance, resulted in Britain sacrificing Iranian interests.
Given the Preliminary Treaty of 1809, Iran expected the British to assist Iran against Russia. 
Britain considered its interests would be better guaranteed if the Iranians continued their war 
with Russia which had concluded an alliance with France at Tilsit, so it assisted Iran in its war 
with Russia in 1809. "As a result, the British tried to set Persia against the Franco-Russian 
alliance".14 Jones, the British envoy in Tehran, therefore recommended a subsidy and military 
aid for Iran to continue its war with Russia in 1809. Meanwhile, negotiations for the 
Definitive Treaty began in 1810 and replaced the Preliminary Treaty in 1812, but contained 
no notable changes.
The French attack on Russia in 1812 caused Britain to reverse its policy. The new British 
envoy in Iran, Ouseley, was instructed to make peace between Iran and Russia in order to 
assist Russia to stand effectively against France, and to withdraw British officers from 
assisting and training Iranian troops. "Ouseley sacrificed Iran to the Russians; Iran was to 
make peace with Russia in order once more to fulfil British ends in Europe".15 Finally the 
Treaty of Gulistan was concluded between Iran and Russia in 1813, by which "Russia gained 
Caucasian territory and exclusive rights to have warships on the Caspian".16 But Russia 
remained dissatisfied with the results, and its demands for more Iranian territories continued.
One consequence of Iran's defeat was that it became more dependent on Britain and British 
promises and wanted to show its commitment to the provisions of the 1812 treaty. Britain, 
however, wanted to modify its alliance with Iran and also to cover its failure to fulfil the 
commitments it had assured in the Definitive Treaty. Subsequently, the Treaty of Tehran was 
concluded in 1814, and wastheformal basis for Iranian-British relations until 1857.
12 M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modem Near East 1792-1923, London and New York: Longman, 1987, p. 56.
13 Yapp, Strategies of British India, p. 70.
14 Edward Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia 1828-1834, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 20. 
13 Yapp, Strategies of British India, p. 83.
I6 Nikki R. Keddie and Richard Yann, Roots of Revolution; An Interpretive History of Modem Iran, New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, p. 41.
17
In the Treaty of Tehran, Iran declared null and void all alliances it had previously concluded 
with those European countries which were at war with Britain. Iran also undertook to make 
no agreements hostile to Britain. In return, Britain agreed that should Iran be invaded by any 
European country hostile to Britain, it would either send forces to help Iran or pay an annual 
subsidy. The British obligation, however, applied only if Iran was not the aggressor. Britain 
also agreed that in any Iranian war with any European power at peace with Britain, it would 
mediate between them, and if mediation failed would pay Iran a subsidy until the war ended. 
In the case of war between Iran and Afghanistan, Britain undertook to remain neutral, and to 
offer mediation only if both parties requested it.
The territorial provisions of the Treaty of Gulistan between Iran and Russia were unclear 
enough to raise disputes. Disagreement over three disputed districts led to their occupation by 
Russia in 1825. Iran expected Britain to offer mediation and request Russia to withdraw from 
the occupied districts, but it did not. This suggests that Britain had no intention of jeopardising 
relations with its European ally over an Iranian frontier dispute.
In the absence of mediation, and with failure in negotiations between Iran and Russia, Iranian 
public opinion, fed by the religious elite, Ulama, forced the Shah to declare a holy war, Jihad, 
against Russia. The war began in 1826, and despite some initial successes resulted in Iran's 
defeat. In this circumstance the best way for Britain not to fulfil its promises undertaken in the 
Treaty of Tehran was unilateral interpretation of the treaty. Britain announced that Iran had 
started the war; it was therefore the aggressor. Although Russia's occupation of three districts 
of Iran was the initial act of aggression, the treaty made no provision for paying a subsidy for 
any Iranian war with an European country at peace with Britain. The war ended in disaster for 
Iran with the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, which forced Iran to give up all claims to 
Georgia and other territories already lost, and which imposed a heavy indemnity, and granted 
extra-territorial privileges to Russian subjects.
The imposition of the indemnity provided an opportunity for Britain to get rid of the subsidy 
clauses in the 1814 Treaty. Iran could not afford the first portion of the indemnity, payment of 
which was a condition for Russian withdrawal from most of Iranian Azerbaijan. Britain 
agreed to pay the first part of the indemnity, on condition that the subsidy clauses be 
abrogated. Iran had no choice but to accept. The abrogation of the subsidy clauses was 
regarded as breaking the last chains of connection between Iran and Britain at that time.
Iran's defeat in this second war with Russia convinced it that British promises were unreliable, 
that Britain would not provide effective aid against Russia, and that it would have to settle for 
the best terms it could get from Russia. Settlement of the frontier question between Russia and 
Iran coincided with the Russian policy of colonising Central Asia and British fear of the
18
Russian intention to secure access to the Persian Gulf. Iran was a key for Russia to gain 
these objectives. To meet these objectives, Russia turned to befriending Iran. "From 
henceforward, and until the closing years of the nineteenth century, Russia was regarded by 
the British as the great potential enemy in the East, and British policy in Persia was 
conditioned by that fact".17
From the time of British realisation of Russia's ambitions to use Iran for its regional purposes, 
Britain made some efforts to prevent Iran becoming more dependent on Russia. In this regard, 
"the information acquired, the ideas formulated and the contacts made during that period were 
to be of considerable significance during the period from 1830 onwards when the strategies 
employed against France were to be refurbished for use against Russia".18 From this time 
onward Iran emerged as a scene for British-Russian political and economic rivalry.
BRITISH-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN IRAN
Since conclusion in 1828 of the Treaty of Turkmanchai, Russia tried to make northern Iran an 
area of overwhelming Russian influence. "While the French threat evaporated and Britain 
made some progress in southern Iran, notably in controlling the ports which flanked the sea 
route to India, Russian influence developed in the north".19 Russia's attempts to colonise the 
Central Asian region, to Russianise northern Iran and finally to have access to the Persian 
Gulf, all were seen as threatening British interests in India. Iran was caught between the 
Russian security concerns on one side and British colonial expansion on the other. As Saikal 
points out, "while Russia regarded Iran as vital to its security and as a gateway to the wealth 
of India, Britain found it increasingly important to the defence of its colonial interests". The 
British-Russian rivalry, or in other words the struggle of the two great powers, was instantly 
felt in Tehran. From this time, the Iranian government would be respondent to pressure from 
both London and St. Petersburg.
Iran's failure to recover its Caucasian territories, together with the confirmation of Russian 
rights over the captured Iranian cities in the north by the Treaty of Turkmanchai, resulted in a 
transformation of Iranian ambition from the northern to the eastern borders, in order to capture 
Herat, an ambition which was intensified with Russian encouragement. This new policy in the 
1830s turned Iran's eyes in the direction of British India, and the supposed Russian goals 
behind the encouragement of Iran were regarded by Britain as a clear signal that Russia would
17 Marlowe, Op. Cit., p. 19.
18 Yapp, The Making of the Modem Near East, p. 56.
*9 Morgan Gerald, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810-1895, London: Frank Cass, 1981, p. 17.
20 Amin Saikal, "Iranian Foreign Policy 1921-1979", in Peter Avery, et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Iran, From Nader Shah to the Islamic Republic, Vol. 7, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 427.
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be a serious challenger to British interests in India.21 The Iranian attempts to recapture Herat; 
which were thwarted by Britain, caused a change of British policy towards Iran and 
Afghanistan, and resulted in two wars with Iran.
Britain considered that if Herat fell into Iranian hands, it would inevitably mean a Russian 
presence and influence in Afghanistan, which was a gateway to India. This understanding led 
to a serious discussion in Britain on how to keep Afghanistan from Russian influence. There 
was one view that Britain should attempt to recover her influence in Iran in order to dissuade 
the Iranian government from invading Herat. But this view was not viable, because Russian 
influence was too strong to be challenged. Another option was to make an alliance with 
Afghanistan, so that the Iranian and Afghan buffers would be complementary. This would 
preserve Afghanistan's independence and also give Britain time to make plans to obtain 
influence in Iran again. It was finally decided to attach less value to the Iranian connection 
and to defend Afghanistan from any attack from Iran. "From then onwards Herat became, in 
British eyes, a vital outer bastion in the defence of India".
Iranian forces besieged Herat in 1838. British opposition started with a clear message to Iran 
that any attempt to capture Herat would be regarded as an unfriendly and hostile act, and 
would be opposed. As this did not dissuade Iran, Britain seized Khark, an Iranian Island in the 
Persian Gulf, in spite of her obligation under the 1814 Treaty of Tehran not to interfere in any 
war between Iran and Afghanistan. This forced the Iranian government to give up the siege of 
Herat, though proclaiming its capture still an important objective.
Following Iran's lifting of the siege, the Anglo-Iranian Commercial Treaty, for which the 
British had long pressed, was signed in 1841. It gave the British the same consular rights 
which had earlier been conceded to the Russians. The most important were capitulation 
rights. The treaty included the famous 'Most Favoured Nation Clause', and with its subsequent 
extension to treaties with other countries, foreign powers were automatically granted 
privileges given to Britain under that clause.23
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mirza Abul Hasan Khan Shirazi, who signed the Treaty, had 
also endorsed the Preliminary Treaty of 1809. Following the conclusion of Treaty of 1809 and 
after Shirazi came back from London, he was informed by the East India Company that a 
pension would be paid to him regularly "so long as you shall lend your assistance to the 
British Ambassador in preserving the friendly relations between Great Britain and Persia".24
21 J. B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, p. 459.
22 Denis Wright, The Persians Amongst the English: Episodes in Anglo-Persian History, London: Tauris, 1985, 
p. 103.
23 Keddie and Yann, Op. Cit., pp. 47-48.
24 Wright, Op. Cit., p. 62.
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His role in negotiating the Treaty for which the British had been pressing for years, is 
acknowledged in a letter from McNeill, the British Minister in Tehran, to his wife. "Mirza, 
now Minister for Foreign Affairs, has behaved splendidly throughout and the whole thing has 
been arranged without one unpleasant word".25
Iran's aspiration to capture Herat remained strong, however, and led Iran to occupy it without 
resistance in 1856. Britain reluctantly declared war, occupied Khark again, then engaged the 
Iranian army in Bushire and Muhammara (Khurramshahr). Britain's occupation compelled the 
Iranian government to call for peace and the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1857.
Due to domestic opposition in Britain which questioned by "whose authority the war had been 
started, and who was going to pay for it, India or England?",26 Britain quickly settled the 
essentials. Under the Treaty of Paris, Iran agreed to withdraw its forces from Herat, to 
relinquish all claims to it and other Afghan territory, not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan, and to recognise Herat's independence.
BRITISH STRUGGLE FOR CONCESSIONS IN IRAN
From the mid-nineteenth century, British-Russian rivalry in Iran took the form of economic 
penetration. Given the growing industrialisation of the West and its need for new markets and 
raw materials, Iran with the chronic weakness of its government, provided ample opportunity 
for the two superpowers of the day to exploit it. From this time onward, their rivalry 
manifested itself in a struggle for economic concessions.
In addition to the bankruptcy of the Qajar Shahs, and their dreams of European-type 
modernisation (such as railways and banks), the main factor in Britain's success in obtaining 
concessions was its influence on Iranian politics. Britain employed all means such as threats, 
bribery, protection and military penetration to control the Qajar Shahs and other influential 
persons. The various treaties mentioned above and the relevant terms on trade, capitulations 
and protection of favoured Iranian subjects provided the ground for Britain and Russia to enter 
a new era, in which they fought principally with economic weapons, to Iran's cost.
In Curzon's words, "indifference to Persia might mean the sacrifice of a trade that already 
feeds hundreds of thousands of our citizens in this country and in India. A friendly attention to 
Persia will mean so much more employment for British ships, for British labour, and for
25 Ibid, p. 66.
26 Barbara English, John Company's Last War, London: Collins, 1971, p. 140.
21
British spindles".27 Britain's exploitation of the Iranian economy can be glimpsed from the 
nature of most concessions granted to British subjects. The first, in 1863, was for the 
establishment of a telegraph line through Iran. As Lord Curzon put it in Persia and the 
Persian Question, "it was from no special desire to bring Persia into telegraphic connection 
with Europe...., it was her geographical position that made Persia the fortunate recipient of 
this not wholly disinterested boon in technology."28
A naturalised British subject, Baron Julius Reuter, was granted an amazing concession in 
1872 to explore all mineral resources except precious stones, to construct railways, dams and 
tramlines for a period of seventy years in Persia, and to collect all Persian customs duties for 
twenty-five years throughout Iran. "In return, Reuter was to pay the Persian government 20 
per cent of the railway profits and 15 per cent of those from other sources".29 In Curzon's 
words, this concession was "the most extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources 
of a kingdom into foreign hands".30 However, in the wake of Russian pressure, Iranian 
opposition, and a lack of the enormous capital required to fulfil the concession, the Shah 
cancelled it in 1873.
On the insistence of the British Minister to Tehran, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Britain 
obtained a concession for regular commercial navigation on the Karun river in 1888, which 
"both for trading and strategic reasons, formed one of the principal objectives of British
o  1
diplomacy in Persia". Russian fear of British penetration and commercial competition 
intensified when Britain attempted to acquire a concession to construct a railway from the 
Karun river to Tehran. Russia began to obstruct any railway construction in Iran, so that in the 
context of British-Russian rivalry neither side was permitted to endanger one another's 
interests. This obstructive policy persisted until the First World War.
Reuter's claim for compensation for his cancelled concession was supported by the British 
government, which led to his obtaining another concession, to establish the Imperial Bank of 
Persia in 1889. The bank had an exclusive right to issue bank notes in Iran for a period of 
sixty years, and played a major role in providing loans to the Iranian government and 
individuals as dictated by the British. "The Imperial Bank of Persia after its foundation with 
British government support, acted as the direct agent of British official policy in Tehran".32
27 George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Volume 2, London: Frank Cass & Co. LTD., 1966, p. 
604.
28 Ibid, p. 607.
29 Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 144
30 Curzon, Op. Cit., Vol. 1, p. 480.
31 D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968, p. 230.
32 F. H. Hinsley, British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 
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In 1890, the Shah granted a British subject, Major G. Talbot, a monopoly over the production, 
sale, and export of all Iranian Tobacco for a period of fifty years, exempt from all taxes and 
customs duties. In return, the Shah would receive a fixed amount annually and also one- 
quarter of the company's annual net profit. "This exploitative action in which the people in 
Iran were obliged to buy from a foreign corporation the tobacco which they themselves grew 
and gathered, led to popular dissatisfaction".33 As popular discontent developed, Mirza 
Mohammad Hasan Shirazi issued a religious edict (Fatwa) prohibiting smoking until the 
concession was cancelled. The positive mass response to the Fatwa compelled the Shah to 
cancel the concession in 1892. This resulted in another claim for compensation by the 
company, which inaugurated Iran's first national debt. The compensation, 500,000 pounds, 
was funded as a loan at 6 per cent interest by the Imperial Bank of Persia.
The 1901 oil concession, granted to William Knox D'Arcy, a British subject of Australian 
origin, marked the beginning of a new era in Iranian-British relations. It was secured with the 
support of Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British Minister in Tehran, and gave D'Arcy exclusive 
rights to explore, produce and refine oil throughout Iran, except in the five northern provinces, 
seen as a zone of Russian influence, for a period of sixty years. In return, the prospective 
company was to pay the Iranian government 20,000 pounds in cash, the equivalent of this sum 
in the enterprise, and 16 per cent of annual net profits.34 With financial assistance provided by 
the British Burma Oil Company in 1905, D'Arcy's exploration company commenced its 
search for oil in Iran.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT IN 1906 AND THE DIVISION OF IRAN BY 
THE CONVENTION OF 1907
The external factor of the British-Russian rivalry and influence on Iranian politics, and the 
internal factor of a corrupt and weak political system in Qajar-ruled Iran interacted to 
engender two major events in the early twentieth century. The first was the appearance of 
popular unrest and dissatisfaction with the traditional political system and foreign influence in 
Iran, which led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The second event was the eventual 
and formal division of Iran into spheres of influence by Britain and Russia in 1907, which left 
Iran independent only in name.
The constitutionalist movement had two objectives: to promote domestic reforms, and to 
conduct an independent foreign policy. These two objectives sought, on the one hand, to
33 Edward G. Brown, The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910, p. 50.
34 For the text of the concession agreement, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A 
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establish legal constraints on the powers of the monarch, and on the other, to galvanise 
resistance against British and Russian influence on Iranian politics. To meet these goals the 
nationalists demanded the monarch to conduct himself within the framework of the law, and 
to establish a National Assembly or Majlis (parliament). Mass demonstrations broke out, 
mainly in Tehran and Tabriz, in support of these goals.
The British view of the constitutionalist movement was conditioned by Britain's relations with 
Russia and by the extent of Russian influence on the Shah and his court. In the early 1900s 
British influence declined to the point where support for Iran seemed "support of a state 
apparently under Russian control".35 For this reason, Britain favoured the nationalists in the 
early stages. "In as much as the early stirrings of nationalism had been a protest against the 
unbridled economic activities of Russia, Great Britain watched the development with 
particular interest".36
The nationalist movement succeeded and the Persian monarch, Muzaffaraddin Shah, approved 
the establishment of the National Assembly in 1906. Following the death of the Shah, his son, 
Mohammad Ali Shah, succeeded his father as ruler from 1907. Because of the limitations on 
his rule under the Constitutional Law and a Russian feeling of vulnerability, the Shah and the 
Russians cooperated to oppose the Majlis, and the previous British support for the 
constitutionalist movement ceased when circumstances altered in 1907. For the first time, 
British-Russian rivalry in Iran changed into cooperation and rapprochement for the sake of 
their greater and common interests. This cooperation culminated in the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907.
The Anglo-Russian rapprochement was based on two factors. The first was a fear of Germany 
and its advance to challenge British interests in the Persian Gulf, which were very significant 
to British supremacy in the world. The British monopoly of foreign commerce in the Persian 
Gulf ports, and British communication lines in the form of the Indo-European Telegraph, all 
seen as vital to the safety of India, underlined the British position. Britain was therefore 
determined to obtain Russia's recognition of the status quo in the Persian Gulf.37
Realisation by both Britain and Russia of the impossibility of practising a policy of non­
intervention in Iran was the second factor in their rapprochement. "Given the extent of their 
commercial, financial and political involvement, it was practically impossible for them to
35 George Monger, The End of Isolation; British Foreign Policy 1900-1907, London: Robert Cunningham and 
Sons, 1963, p. 90.
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retreat to a policy of total non-intervention even had they wanted to".38 They had two choices: 
open confrontation or formal partition of Iran. They opted for the latter, as they did not want 
"Iran to upset the delicate Anglo-Russian balance in the Middle East at a time when both 
were threatened by a challenge from Imperial Germany".39
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, drafted without consultation with Iran, formally 
divided Iran into three spheres of influence. The Russian sphere was located in the north, the 
British in the south and finally, the centre would be a neutral zone in the hands of the Iranian 
government. "Through the convention of 1907, the two imperial powers not only forced 
Tehran to lose most of its initiative in the conduct of Iran's domestic and foreign policies, but 
also sought to pressure, buy off, and weaken successive Iranian leaders so as to make them 
obedient to, and dependent on, the two powers for their survival".40
From this time onwards, Britain joined the Russians and the Shah in attempts to destroy the 
foundations of the constitutional government, because the constitutionalists strongly opposed 
the Anglo-Russian agreement, and in contrast, the Shah showed willingness to accept it as a 
means of procuring British-Russian support against the constitutionalists. Consequently, 
British popularity among the constitutionalists declined to a very low point.
At this point, a major development occurred which gave Britain great future benefit. In 1908 
D'Arcy's exploration company discovered oil in large quantities in southern Iran. Iranian oil 
was of crucial military importance to Britain, because so far it had identified no major oil 
resources in its Empire and also at that time the British navy was switching from coal to liquid 
fuel. A proposal was presented to the British Parliament in which the Company "would 
guarantee oil supplies for twenty years while the British government would buy a controlling 
interest in the company for 2.2 million pounds".41 The exploration company was replaced by 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which was formed in 1909.
The British control of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had three major consequences for Iran. 
These were decentralisation of power, strengthening of tribal power, and further weakening 
of the already weak central government. Discoveries of oil in the Bakhtiari tribal area and also 
location of the Abadan refinery and oil port in the area dominated by Sheikh Khaz'al, an Arab 
tribal leader, led Britain to conclude separate treaties with these tribes. "These treaties 
involved payments to tribal leaders and also implied British protection for these tribes, both of
38 Hinsley, Op. Cit., pp. 237-38.
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which had pretensions to autonomy".42 Britain agreed to protect and pay the tribes, and 
assured them of securing current and future autonomy, in order to buy their cooperation for its 
own purposes.
The internal situation in Iran had become chaotic. Disagreement among the nationalists 
resulted in splits and conflicts. The foreign influences and lack of administrative experts 
among the victorious nationalists intensified the chaos and anarchy. The political instability 
and foreign intervention coincided with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Despite 
the Iranian declaration of neutrality in the war, Russo-Turkish hostility turned the Iranian 
northern territory into a theatre of war between Russia and Turkey. In the south, the British 
position in the Persian Gulf was challenged by German activities. As a result, the central 
government in Iran had no capability or power to manage internal affairs.
WORLD WAR I AND BRITISH POLICY IN IRAN
In spite of Iran's declared neutrality, it emerged as a battleground for warring parties fighting 
for their own purposes. When the war broke out in 1914, the Iranian public opinion was 
strongly against the British and Russians. This was due to the perceived injustice of the 
Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, the partition of Iran by Britain and Russia, and also the 
experience of the long rivalry of the two powers for control of Iran. They were reluctant 
therefore to side with Britain and Russia. Yet Iran was not in a position to ally itself with the 
Central Powers (Germany, the Habsburg Empire, and the Ottoman Empire) or to oppose the 
Entente Powers (Britain, Russia and France), so it announced a policy of neutrality. "Some of 
the emergent Iranian policy makers were so intense in their hatred of Great Britain and Russia 
that they could only adopt a policy of neutrality as a facade behind which flirtation and even 
secret agreement with Germany might take place".43
The strategic importance of Iran for Britain and Russia was too crucial for them to respect 
Iran's neutrality. To Britain, Iran's significance was furthered by Britain's involvement in the 
Iranian oil industry, as acknowledged by Lord Curzon: "we possess in the south-western 
comer of Persia great assets in the shape of the oil fields, which are worked for the British 
Navy and which give us a commanding interest in that part of the world".44 The British 
concern for its interests in Iran, which might be challenged and threatened by German and 
Turkish agents, was a principal reason for Britain to violate Iran's neutrality and occupy 
southern Iran.
42 Nikki R. Keddie, Iran: Religion, Politics and Society, London: Frank Cass, 1980, p. 212.
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Britain's first step, taken at the beginning of the war, was to put the southern and western 
Iranian oilfields under direct British protection, even though they were located, under the 
Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, in the neutral, not the British, zone. Britain's second step 
was to attempt to secure some arrangement with the Iranian government, so that the Iranians 
would protect the oil fields, pipelines and installations. There were, however, two obstacles. 
Firstly, the Iranian government was too weak to protect British interests. Secondly, many 
Iranians saw the war as an opportunity to end Russian and British control of Iran. As a result, 
most Iranians sided with the Central Powers actively or in spirit.
In the absence of an Iranian guarantee British policy makers were either to have a direct 
presence in Iran or to secure the support of local tribal leaders. The British authorities 
preferred the latter. "The British were reluctant to disturb the situation lest their actions push 
the Iranians, who were already sympathetic to Germany, to side with the enemy".45 Therefore, 
a close relationship and cooperation with the tribes in the south and west formed the third step 
which Britain took to secure its interests. Agreements were concluded between the Anglo- 
Persian Oil Company and the tribal chiefs, under which the tribes would protect the oil fields, 
pipelines and other installations, and in return the company would pay a subsidy to them and 
also support the independence and autonomy of the leaders.
This policy was not entirely successful. Some tribal leaders were reluctant to commit 
themselves to Britain and became responsive to German activities. Others were unable to act 
effectively against the German attacks. As a result, "early in 1916, Great Britain decided to 
dispatch a military mission to south-western Iran. This mission was to be organised and 
commanded by Sir Percy Sykes",46 and "to raise their own Iranian security force, called the 
South Persian Rifles, to assist in protecting and possibly expanding their zone of influence, 
especially in Khuzistan province, the location of most of the British-run oil industry".47 Thus 
the South Persia Rifles carried on extensive military and police operations during the war.48
Iran emerged from the war in a state of administrative and financial chaos. Many Iranians 
were suffering from famine, malaria, and influenza. Internal disorder resulting from the war 
had made the task of restoring even a relative degree of order impossible.
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THE END OF THE WAR AND THE ANGLO-IRANIAN AGREEMENT OF 1919
At the end of the war, Britain emerged as the only influential power in Iran. This was due to 
several factors. Its old rival, Russia, had come under Bolshevik rule, and was too busy 
with civil war and internal consolidation to influence Iranian politics and constrain British 
action there. The Russian revolution of 1917 was the first and major factor that tempted 
Britain to try to bring Iran under its complete control. Additionally, the Ottoman Empire had 
disappeared and could no longer pose any threat to British interests in Iran. Germany was 
temporarily eliminated as a great power. The final factor was the might of Britain in Iran. At 
the end of the war Britain dominated the main centres of Iran, particularly in the south, 
remained master of India and had control of most of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire. The 
Iranian oil industry, the Iranian government's main source of revenue, was under full British 
control. The pro-British government in Tehran lacked order, money, and administration. "The 
only stable element amid all these varied troubles besetting Iran was the British with their 
armed forces, and with their money".49
In this context, Britain attempted to finalise the security issue of India and to secure its 
interests in Iran. The pro-British government in Tehran also tried to gain British assistance in 
all areas, particularly administration, armed forces, and finance. This situation led to the 
conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919. To understand the reasons for the 
conclusion of the agreement, it is essential to specify the interests of both sides.
Although the war had ended, and Germany and Russia, the two major British rivals, had 
temporarily clawed back from the arena of power struggle, there was still need for a plan to 
protect British Imperial possessions from European interference. "In the chain of buffer states 
stretching between India and the European nations, Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary, regarded 
Iran as the weakest and the most vital link".50 Curzon therefore attempted to bring Iran under 
British dominance with an official agreement.
Britain had three main goals in concluding the 1919 Agreement: "to make Persia a more 
effective component of a new Anglo-Indian system of defence", "to strengthen the position of 
those at the centre of Persian politics whom Curzon regarded as Britain's friends and 
partners",51 and to protect Iran's oil. The future of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the single 
most powerful channel of foreign investment and commercial influence in Iran, depended on a 
long-term friendly alliance. Curzon tried by the agreement to finalise the security and safety
49 Marlowe, Op. Cit., p. 56.
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of Britain's monopoly of the Iranian oil industry.
The Iranian government's interests in concluding the 1919 agreement were conditioned by 
Iran's internal and external circumstances. "British occupation of a large part of Iran, the 
domestic weakness of the Iranian government, and its growing financial dependence on 
Britain, as well as Iran's internal disarray",52 all affected the Iranian decision to conclude the 
agreement. Regardless of pro-British tendencies of the government of Vusuq and Britain's 
attempts to bribe some Iranian officials, the restoration of internal order with British 
assistance was the Iranian government's principal motive in concluding the 1919 agreement.
Furthermore the Russian revolution of 1917 had encouraged the rise of several separatist 
movements in Iran, such as Kuchak Khan's movement in Gilan, or Khiabani's movement in 
Azerbaijan, which opposed the central government. The Iranian government needed British 
support to control the provinces and resist those movements.
The main clauses of the agreement fell into three broad parts. The first was concerned with 
military assistance. Britain agreed to help the Iranian government with military advisers, 
officers, and munitions at Iran's expense. The second part related to administration. Britain 
would provide advisers and experts for the Iranian administration, also at Iran's expense. The 
third part was to formalise economic relations. Britain undertook to reform Iranian transport 
and communications, and construct roads and railways, again at Iran's expense. Iran agreed to 
revise its existing customs tariff with Britain on a new basis. For all expenses which Iran 
would incur for British advisers working in Iran, Britain agreed to provide a loan of 2,000,000 
pounds to be repaid monthly at a rate of 7 per cent per annum.53
The agreement of 1919 was the culmination of a policy which Britain had pursued from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. It was described as "a diplomatic masterpiece and a great 
triumph" by Lord Curzon, who claimed responsibility for it.54 According to the Iranian 
Constitution it was to be approved by the National assembly {Majlis). "Had the Treaty been 
approved by the Iranian Majlis, it would have enabled Britain to control the country's foreign, 
defence and financial affairs, and thus to reduce its position to that of a virtual British 
protectorate".55
When the agreement was published, several factors undermined Curzon's chances of securing
52 Saikal, The Rise and Fall o f the Shah, p. 18.
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final approval. The first and most important factor was Iranian nationalism. The nationalist 
movement, which had begun with the constitutional revolution, was characterised by hopes of 
ending foreign dominance, and was directed particularly against Britain and Russia. In the 
atmosphere created by the nationalists, it was impossible for Vusuq's government to uphold 
the agreement. This Iranian nationalist opposition was bolstered by the second factor, 
opposition to the agreement by other foreign powers. France opposed any British expansionist 
move in the Middle East. The US opposition derived from the fact that the "Agreement of 
1919 violated President Wilson's principles of 'open covenants openly arrived at' and 'self- 
determination'".56 A practical consideration, perhaps more important to the United States, was 
that had the agreement been approved it would have been most difficult for the United States 
to gain any share of Iranian oil. This opposition "generated sympathy for the Iranian 
nationalists, who could point to outraged foreign opinion as a sign of what the Agreement 
really meant".57 Britain's policy of cutting its commitment and reducing its forces in Iran after 
the war constituted the last factor in undermining the agreement. The evacuation of British 
forces was followed by a Soviet invasion of northern Iran. "British unwillingness or inability 
to protect Persia from Soviet Russia killed any remnant of enthusiasm for the Treaty which 
might have existed in Persia".58 Implementation of the agreement was suspended until a new 
Iranian Majlis should be set up.
After the Russian revolution of 1917, the friendly Anglo-Russian relations based on the treaty 
of 1907 reverted to the pre-1907 rivalry. In this context, and due to its internal troubles, the 
Soviet government made friendly gestures to Iran in order to counteract British hegemony in 
Iran. While Britain was employing every means to formalise its political and economic 
monopoly in Iran by concluding the 1919 agreement, Vusuq's pro-British government in Iran 
did not effectively take up the opportunity which Soviet Russia provided. The Bolshevik 
government announced that all previous Russian treaties which had been forced on Iran, and 
all Russian privileges such as capitulations, were null and void. In the absence of an 
appropriate response from Vusuq's government, Soviet forces occupied northern Iran. 
However, the Vusuq government was forced to resign and a new government was formed by 
Pir Nia. He, as a first step, suspended implementation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement until a 
new Majlis had been set up, and initiated moves to negotiate with Soviet Russia. Britain 
warned him that if he did not accept Britain's conditions and implement the agreement, British 
subsidies to the Iranian government would cease. Pir Nia responded that "no one but the 
people of Iran could tell him what to do, and then added that public opinion was against the 
British demands and his government was not in a position to recommend to the people or
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Parliament what had already been condemned".59
While some parts of northern Iran were under Soviet occupation and some Iranian 
provinces proclaimed independence, the central government had no power to manage the 
country. In this situation political pressure from within and military pressure from outside the 
capital led to a bloodless coup in early 1921. The pressure in Tehran was directed by the pro- 
British Journalist, Seyyed Zia ad-din Tabatabai, and the leader of the military force which 
marched from Qazvin was Reza Khan, Commander of Iran's Russian-trained Cossack 
Division. Tabatabai became Prime Minister and Reza Khan Commander-in-Chief and 
Minister of War in the new government.
Most Iranians believe that the idea of a coup and formation of the new government were 
essentially a British plot. This popular belief was upheld by some scholars and writers, for 
instance Ramazani.60 Halliday also argues that "it was the British who encouraged Colonel 
Reza Khan to march on Tehran and seize power in February 1921".61 This claim is supported 
by Keddie and Yann? as they point out "it is now known that the commander of British 
military forces in Iran, General Ironside, encouraged Reza Khan to undertake a coup".62
Whether or not the British were behind the coup, under pressure from elements opposed to the 
Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 the new government formally cancelled it, and the new 
Iranian Majlis finally refused to ratify it. A few days after the coup the 1921 Irano—Soviet 
Friendship Treaty was signed in Moscow. The Soviets agreed to withdraw their forces from 
northern Iran before the treaty was ratified by the Majlis, and with the evacuation in progress, 
Reza Khan, as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War, began to bring anti-government and 
independent movements such as Nehzat-e Jangal in the north under control. Later events 
proved that Reza Khan was the main force in the coup. While Minister of War in all 
governments after the coup, he finally became Prime Minister in 1923.
By this time, Soviet Russia and Britain had decided to follow policies of non-intervention in 
Iran. The former had realised that in order to counteract British influence, it should pursue 
friendly relations with Iran. "It became clear to the Bolsheviks that they should refrain from 
any action that could increase Iran's dependence on Britain".63 The latter, due to anti-British 
sentiment in the region particularly in Iran, India, and Turkey, and because of its post-war 
policy of reducing its forces and cutting its commitments in Iran, also adopted a policy of non-
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interference. These emerging non-interventionist attitudes from 1921 onwards, and their 
favourable consequences for stable and strong government in Iran, were the major factors in 
creating the situation in which Reza Khan reached the throne of Iran, suppressed the Qajars 
and established the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925.
THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY AND IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS 1925- 1941
The hands-off policy of Britain and Soviet Russia in Iran from 1921 onwards created a 
situation in which Reza Khan could demonstrate to Iranians his ability to govern and also to 
Britain and Russia that he could secure their interests in Iran. In this situation the Iranian 
Majlis in 1925 declared the end of the Qajar dynasty, and by amending the 1906 Constitution 
chose Reza Khan as the next Shah of Iran.
During the rule of Reza Shah, the most important events which brought him to challenge 
Britain were the abolition of capitulations and the status of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
At the time of his succession the only influential power in Iran which had capitulatory 
privileges was Britain. In order to abolish the capitulations, Reza Shah employed three 
policies. These were the modernisation of the Iranian legal system by deploying the civil code, 
exploitation of a British desideratum by delaying permission for Britain to use Iranian air 
space to complete its air route from Cairo to Karachi, while granting such permission to 
Germany and Russia, and finally doubling the Iranian customs tariff on imports of British 
goods.64 As a result, Iran's negotiations with Britain led to a new commercial agreement in 
1928, under which all existing treaties including capitulations were annulled. Iran would have 
autonomy in setting customs tariffs, but would grant favourable rates to imports from Britain.
The second issue was controversy over Iran's share in benefits from the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company. When in November 1932 the Company responded negatively to Reza Shah's 
demand to replace D'Arcy's 1901 concession with a new agreement more favourable to Iran, 
Reza Shah cancelled its concession altogether.
As oil was the Iranian government's principal source of revenue, more income from it was 
needed to improve the Iranian economy and military. Reza Shah's cancellation of the D'Arcy 
concession was determined by four main factors. First and foremost was the sharp reduction 
in the revenue the government received from the company during 1931-1932 -  something 
which the company claimed to be the result of a slump in oil sales and the world economic 
crisis.65
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This brought to a head Iranian dissatisfaction with the terms of the D'Arcy concession. The 
circumstances surrounding the grant of the concession in 1901 were the second factor. 
Iranians had long believed that the concession was granted under pressure from and deception 
by the British Legation in Tehran. "The drop in royalties was enough to bring to the surface 
the long-standing dissatisfaction of influential circles in the Iranian government with the 
amount gained under the D'Arcy Concession of 1901".66 This grievance was increased by the 
fact that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had monopolised the Iranian oil industry with much 
benefit to the company and Britain rather than to the Iranian government.
Differing interpretations of Article 10 of the Concession by the Iranian government and the 
company are regarded as the third factor. Article 10 stated that the royalties to be paid to the 
Iranian government were to be based on the net profits from the company and other 
companies that might be formed. The Iranian government interpreted this to mean that Iran's 
royalties should be calculated on the profits which the company obtained outside as well as 
inside Iran. The company interpreted the article as applying only to its operations inside Iran.
At the end of the war, when Britain was negotiating the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, it 
presented a claim for compensation for wartime damage to the company's installations, 
because the Iranian government had not been able to protect them, and for this reason ceased 
paying royalties to the government. As one Iranian writer put it, the British claim was 
shameful and unreasonable as it was Britain which had itself violated Iranian neutrality in the 
war, occupied a large part of the country, and caused starvation and disease among Iranians.67
The pro-British government of Vusuq agreed to the appointment of Sidney Armitage-Smith, a 
British Treasury official, as Iranian representative to resolve the disputes with the company. In 
1920, the Armitage-Smith agreement was signed, by which Iran would receive a fixed amount 
against previous unpaid royalties, and both Iran and the company would abandon their claims 
against each other. In 1932 Reza Shah claimed that the Agreement had not been ratified by the 
Iranian government but "imposed on the Iranian government by a British Adviser in the 
interest of the British-owned company".68 This view was a fourth factor behind the 
cancellation of the D'Arcy concession in 1932.
The British government's reaction to the cancellation was a strong protest. Britain declared 
that the Iranian action was illegal and the Iranian government would be held responsible for
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any damage to the company's interests. While the case was before the Council of the League 
of Nations, direct negotiations between Iran and Britain resulted in the conclusion of a new 
agreement in April 1933. Its major provisions were reduction in the area of the concession for 
exploration, an increase in royalties to the Iranian government, extension of validity of the 
concession until 1993, and non-acceptability of unilateral cancellation of it. By this agreement 
the company changed its name from Anglo-Persian to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as Reza 
Shah wanted the country to be known by its ancient name.
REZA SHAH S THIRD POWER POLICY, THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND 
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS IRAN
One of the main characteristics of successive Iranian governments after the coup of 1921 was 
the attempt to establish close relations with a third power in order to counterbalance British 
and Soviet influence. Reza Shah's decision to build a foreign policy based on intense relations 
with a third power was in this context. His objective was to find a power disinterested in 
Iranian affairs, and preferably a distant one.
The first power he approached was the United States, but due to its policy of isolationism, and 
its perception of the region originally as part of the British domain of influence, the US at that 
time had no interest in committing itself to close relations with Iran. The Shah's failure in this 
respect led him to approach American oil companies. Although the latter were ready to obtain 
concessions in Iranian oil, their attempts also failed when opposed by Britain and Russia. 
Reza Shah decided to look elsewhere.69
Germany was the second power which Reza Shah tried. His outstanding success here was 
conditioned by "the rise of Germany as a nationalist and anti-British power, which had 
impressed the Iranian leadership".70 Also high-profile generous German assistance to Iran and 
to its neighbours such as Afghanistan and Turkey, contributed to Iran's determination to form 
a close relationship with Germany. Subsequently, a strong German legation was established in 
Tehran. "Unlike the British and the Russians, who forced themselves upon the country, the 
Germans used the technique of infiltration"71 rather than force and threats.
As the main objective of Reza Shah's policy was to counterbalance British and Soviet 
influence, he strengthened Iran's political and economic relations with Germany. "Iran’s
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increasing ties with Germany were to serve the overriding objective of politico-economic 
emancipation from the traditional control of Great Britain and Russia".72 Developing relations 
extended over trade, the acceptance of German capital and technical assistance, transportation 
and communication, and the employment of German advisers. "By 1938 Germany had 
achieved first place in Iran's foreign trade and was supplying Iran with its basic industrial 
machinery and railroad material".73 Consequently as Churchill stated, "German prestige stood 
high among Iranians".74
The beginning of the Second World War created a situation in which neutrality was assumed 
as an ideal policy for Iran. The existing anti-British and anti-Soviet sentiment amongst the 
Iranian people and officials left no room for Iran to join their side, but British and Soviet 
interests, influence and proximity, and the remoteness of Germany made it impossible for Iran 
to join Germany's side. Furthermore, entry into the War was not in Iran's interests. "The third 
power policy of Reza Shah, aimed at assisting Iran to free itself from Britain and Russia, led 
to an excessive reliance upon Germany, the new dominant power in Iranian affairs, from 
whose control fne Shah found it difficult to extricate himself'.75
Until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, neither Britain nor the USSR 
regarded the neutralist attitude of Iran with too much concern. As long as it did not oppose 
their interests, it was acceptable. But after June 1941 their attitudes changed. Both became 
concerned about the German Legation in Tehran. For Britain Iranian oil was the major 
strategic and economic interest in the region. Britain was concerned that a German fifth 
column might damage the oil installations. Accordingly, Britain and Russia demanded that 
Iran expel all Germans from Iran; but Reza Shah did not do so. Britain and Russia thereupon 
invaded Iran in August 1941, claiming that the Iranian government had failed to implement its 
policy of neutrality. But this was not the only reason. The allied powers also wanted to secure 
Iran as a corridor for war supplies to the Soviet Union.
The invasion of Iran occurred according to almost the same terms of the two powers' 
agreement of 1907. The two previous traditional rivals were once again wartime allies against 
a common enemy, Germany. Britain and the United States used the Iranian railways heavily 
to assist the Soviet Union. Iran lost its sovereignty and the internal situation once again fell 
into chaos. The conduct of Iran's domestic affairs was directed by the occupying forces. 
Consequently, Reza Shah abdicated on 16 September 1941 in favour of his son, Mohammad 
Reza, and went into exile in South Africa. London, after consultation with Moscow,
72 Ramazani, Op. Cit., p. 281.
73 Howard M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936-1954, New York: Knopf, 1972, p. 157.
74 Quoted in Saikal, "Iranian Foreign Policy 1921-1979", Op. Cit., p. 434.
75 Ramazani, Op. Cit., pp. 298-299.
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recognised Mohammad Reza as Shah, because he was ready to accept and legitimise the 
British and Russian actions.
To conclude, while taking the opportunity of the Iranian weak governments, Great Britain 
reaped the maximum benefits in Iran. Whenever the British realised it was in their interests to 
overlook their undertakings with Iran, they simply did so. When it was imperative for Britain 
to penetrate Iran economically through concessions, they did so by the use of force, threats, 
and bribery. The British during this period showed that they were not genuinely in favour of a 
strong Iranian constitutional government since it would restrict their influence in the country. 
Thus they eventually joined the Russians and ended the life of the constitutional movement. 
When the British-Russian rivalry transformed to rapprochement, they simply divided Iran 
into their respective spheres of influence. It was British and Russian invasion of Iran in 
World War I that caused the rise of Reza Shah to power. And again their invasion led to 
the coming to power of his son Mohammad Reza in 1941.
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Chapter 2
Iranian-British Relations from World War II until 
Iran's Revolution of 1979
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this chapter is on the factual and psychological environments in the period between 
the Second World War and Iran's revolution of 1979 which was marked by a tendency in the 
collective psyche of Iranians to blame Britain for all their misfortunes. The main objective is to 
discuss how British involvement in Iran between 1945 and 1979 not only failed to improve 
Britain's already tainted image amongst Iranians, but also reduced it to a power which had 
always inhibited Iran's development and undermined its independence. Also an attempt will be 
made to trace the origin of a predominant perception by which Iranians identify Britain with the 
United States, and hold Britain responsible for both its own and US policies towards Iran.
The chapter will begin with an analysis of Iran's relations with Britain during World War n, 
and aftermath of the war, with particular reference to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, British 
policy towards oil nationalisation, the overthrow of the Musaddeq government and restoration 
of the autocratic rule of the Shah in the wake of the Anglo-American coup of 1953, the Shah’s 
alliance with the United States, and finally Britain's clinging to its declining position in the 
world and region by exploiting the notion of an Anglo-American 'special relationship'.
IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS DURING THE WAR AND IN THE POST­
WAR ERA
Mohammad Reza Shah's decision to side with the Allied Powers during World War II led to the 
conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iran in 
January 1942, under which Britain and the USSR agreed to respect the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and political independence of Iran, promised to withdraw their forces from Iranian 
territory no later than six months after the war ended, and also to prevent starvation and other 
difficulties caused by the war which might affect the Iranian people. In return Iran undertook to 
provide for the secure passage of Allied troops or supplies and granted the Allied Powers the 
right to use, maintain, and control all means of communication throughout Iran.1 The
1 J. A. S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties 1914-1973; History and Guide with Texts, New York: 
Stein and Day Publishers, 1975, p. 210.
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provisions of the treaty were reaffirmed by Britain, the Soviet Union and, on Iran's insistence, 
by the United States in the Tehran Declaration of 1943.2
W hile Britain signed the Tripartite Treaty and confirmed its provisions in the Tehran 
Declaration, it pursued its own selfish line to secure British interests. The British adopted a 
three-track policy. The first track was related to Iranian politics and society, which can be called 
the 'divide and rule' principle and found its reflection in support of "the politics of conservatism 
and tribalism against the forces that sought radical changes".3 4It was conducted in the 
expectation that the Iranians would keep each other quiet, that the ongoing internecine struggle 
would keep Iranian society fragmented and thus easy to manipulate. During the Reza Shah 
period, the fragile Iranian political system had been partly centralised by force and different 
tribes had become relatively subordinated to the central government. This system, however, 
disintegrated again in the course of the war. Therefore, the British policy of 'divide and rule' 
benefited from the situation and in turn aggravated it. As occupation and war caused Iran to lose 
its sovereignty, and then to have its domestic affairs conducted by foreign forces, Britain 
became deeply involved in Iranian affairs. The conduct of the war and protection of lines of 
communication led the British to intervene in all aspects of Iranian politics. Sir Reader Bullard, 
British Ambassador to Iran at the time, emphasised what he saw as the need for British 
intervention in support of tribalism in Iran. In his annual political report in 1942, he stated:
We are forced to take an interest in tribal policy to secure peace in districts adjoining 
vital roads and railways; we were obliged to interfere frequently and radically in the 
local administration which often showed itself incapable of facing war problems; we 
were obliged to ask for special security measures to be taken by the Persian 
Government to deal with suspects. The compelling need to save shipping also forced 
us into a considerable degree of interference in local affairs ... .^
The only way by which Britain could protect its influence and keep its agents in Iran active was 
through reinforcing and strengthening the traditional political structure, which was dominated 
by the monarchy, tribal leaders, and the military who opposed any significant changes in the 
system. "So Britain was in a position to orchestrate the traditional political system"5 to secure 
its interests and influence. The only challenge to British policy was the flourishing of different 
movements and political groups, which varied in principles and goals. These movements can be
2 For the text of agreement of the Tehran Conference, see Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes (eds.), The United 
States and Iran; A Documentary History, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1980, pp. 142-43.
3 Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah 1941-1979, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 28.
4 Rose Greaves, "1942-1976: The Reign of Muhammad Riza Shah" in Hossein Amirsadeghi and R. W. Ferrier 
(eds.), Twentieth Century Iran, London: Heinemann, 1977, p. 55.
3 Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States; A Cold War Case Study, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1988, p. 59.
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categorised as communist, religious, and nationalist, with different bases of support amongst 
the Iranian people, but united in their common opposition to the traditional political system, and 
to British influence.
The 'divide and rule' policy, with its support of conservatism and enforcement of tribalism, 
resulted in further unpopularity of Britain, to the extent that "Iranians hated the British".6 As 
Bullard stated, while British influence grew enormously, British popularity did not. He argued 
that the lack of British success with the Iranian public was due to unpopular measures which the 
British took. This policy intensified the belief and practice of Iranians, who blamed the British 
for all Iranian troubles and shortcomings for years.7 It also led to reinforcement of the third 
power policy in Iran. While there was great distrust of Britain and the Soviet Union amongst 
Iranians, the United States gained popularity and attracted their trust and confidence. Many 
Iranians regarded the United States as a third power which could save Iran from Soviet 
aggression and British interference.
The second aspect of British policy related to increased United States involvement in Iranian 
affairs throughout the war. The British adopted a policy of close partnership and cooperation 
with the United States. "The provision of American war supplies to Russia through the Persian 
corridor brought some 30,000 non-combatant American troops under British command into 
Iran".8 By a revision of its policy of isolationism and its realisation of Iran's economic and 
strategic importance, the United States increased its commitment to the Middle East generally, 
and to Iran in particular. The improved position of the Americans was due to the history of 
Anglo-Russian diplomacy in Iran, and the legacy of distrust this had engendered. The trust, 
confidence and strong enthusiasm of Iranians for the United States were such that even the 
British could not ignore them. Bullard stated that "from the British point of view the Americans 
are the sole hope of Persia".9 Britain realised that without cooperation with the United States, it 
could not retain its influence and strong presence in Iran. Furthermore the close Anglo- 
American partnership in Iran in the post-war era was mainly prompted by subversive and 
expansionist Soviet activities in northern Iran. While the Soviets were steadily tightening their 
hold there, and refusing to withdraw their forces, Iran became the place where the superpowers 
engaged in a local 'Cold War'. To contain the Soviet Union and to protect British interests in 
Iran, Britain needed American might and assistance.
6 Stephen L. McFarland, "The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Onset of the Cold War" in Melvyn P. Leffler and 
David S. Painter (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History, London and New York: Routledge, 
1994, p. 242.
7 Greaves, Op. Cit., pp. 55-56.
8 Peter Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, London: Macmillan, 1973, p. 97.
9 Mark Hamilton Lytle, The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance 1941-1953, New York: Holmes & 
Meier, 1987, p. 52.
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The third aspect of British policy related to the Soviets in post-war Iran. Britain attempted to 
contain Soviet influence as much as possible. During the war Churchill ordered British forces to 
monitor Soviet activities in the north, and to ensure that Soviet influence was kept within 
reasonable bounds.10 Iran's effort to attract American involvement in Iranian affairs, in order to 
counterbalance British and Soviet influences, resulted in American willingness to have a share 
in Iranian oil. This led the American oil companies, 'Standard Vacuum' and 'Sinclair', to 
negotiate oil concessions in 1943. At the same time the joint British-Dutch company, 'Royal 
Dutch Shell', also approached the Iranians to obtain the same oil concession which the 
American companies sought in the south. While negotiating with these companies, the Iranian 
government received a Soviet demand in 1944 for oil concessions in northern Iran. In fact 
Moscow's demands were the countermove "to rebuff the Americans and any further British 
demands".* 11 Although the Iranian government's policy was to relieve British and Soviet 
pressure by involving American oil companies, it suddenly found itself embroiled in British and 
Soviet demands for oil concessions.
Meanwhile, there were two major views in Britain about the new British and Russian demands 
for oil concessions in the south and the north respectively. The first stressed the importance of 
gaining new oil concessions and supporting Shell in obtaining these, even if it might result in 
the Soviets securing concessions in the north. Its advocates believed it pointless to sacrifice the 
British concession to ensure rejection of the Soviet claim, as Soviet influence in the north would 
not thereby be eroded. The second view emphasised containment of Soviet influence and 
protection of the AIOC monopoly. Its chief advocate was Bullard. He argued that "Since we 
want a concession badly, that would be something of a victory for the Russians, .... and it 
would be better that we get no oil than that the Russians have a free hand in the north".12 His 
view prevailed and Britain through its diplomatic agents consistently encouraged the Iranian 
government to cancel the negotiations, so that the Soviets would not obtain oil concessions.
To escape from the British, Soviet and American requests for oil concessions, and with British 
encouragement to cancel the negotiations, the Iranian government rejected all demands and 
postponed negotiations until after the occupation ended. The Majlis passed a bill prohibiting all 
Iranian officials from negotiations with official or unofficial representatives of any government 
or oil company, and added that no future oil concession would be legal unless ratified by the 
Majlis. The architect of this bill was Dr Mohammad Musaddeq, who was leading the 
nationalists in the Majlis.
The other development with which the British were deeply involved was related to Soviet
10 Saikal, Op. Cit., p. 26.
11 Ibid., P. 31.
12 Quoted in Lytle, Op. Cit., p. 92.
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withdrawal from Iran after the war. The Tehran government was eager to see foreign troops go, 
but the Soviets not only ignored their commitment under the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran 
Declaration, but on the contrary began Sovietisation of northern Iran. In fact, the Soviet Union 
through its agent in Iran, the Tudeh Party, set up autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan, both of which rejected control by the central government.13
In addition to regarding Iran as a barrier to Soviet expansion into the Middle East, the 
Americans saw Soviet activities in the country as a serious loss for the economy of the Western 
world. President Truman saw the Soviets as planning "to get at least northern Iran under their 
control" and this event "began to look like a giant pincers movement against the oil-rich areas of 
the Near East and the warm-water ports of the Mediterranean".14 The United States therefore 
called for immediate Soviet withdrawal from Iran. Britain, however, adopted a relatively feeble 
stance. Its note to the Soviet government, declaring that British troops would remain in Iran if 
the Soviets did not withdraw, was considered by the US a weak policy and passive response.15 
When the last date for evacuation of Soviet forces, 6 March 1946, had passed, and British and 
United States troops had withdrawn, the Iranian government decided to publicise its case in the 
new-born United Nations Security Council. Britain again showed no support or sympathy 
towards the Iranians, and even opposed the decision to appeal to the United Nations, under the 
pretext that launching an appeal to the just-created UN might undermine its long-term 
effectiveness. The weakness of British policy towards Soviet actions, and also the conciliatory 
and passive British approach to the USSR in general were so obvious that "some American and 
Iranian officials saw that they [the British] anticipated some attempt to revive the sphere of 
influence arrangement from 1907" in order to preserve their interests in Iran.16
Yet there were four major considerations underlying the conciliatory British policy towards the 
Soviet Union. The first was general British weakness following six years of war. The second 
was related to the fact that London feared Soviet propaganda attacking British actions and 
interference in southern Iran through the AIOC, if Britain took a hard stand on Soviet actions in 
the north. The third was some British officials concluded that Soviet influence in the north was 
too strong for the Iranians to resist, and regarded northern Iran as lost. At the end of the day in 
line with their imperial predisposition, the British decided to consolidate their own influence in 
the south instead of opposing the Soviets in the north.17 Finally, the British realised that Iranian 
nationalists viewed them with the same eye they cast on the Soviets. Anti-Soviet Iranian
D  See Robert Rossow J.R., "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 
1956.
14 Harry S. Truman, 1945 Years of Decisions, The Presidential Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, New York:
Signet Book, 1965, p. 574.
Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East 1941-1974; The Road to the Cold War, London: Frank 
Cass, 1980, p. 168.
16 Lytle, Op. Cit., p. 147. Also for details of 1907 Agreement, see chapter 1.
17 Ibid., p. 147.
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nationalist sentiments could well have easily turned anti-British.
However, exposure of the Iranian crisis to international scrutiny at the UN Security Council, 
the strong US opposition to Soviet occupation, and following direct negotiations between the 
Iranian government and the Soviets, brought the crisis to an end in 1946. The Soviets traded 
evacuation of their forces for a proposed joint Iranian-Soviet oil company in northern Iran, in 
which the Soviets would have a 51 percent share for twenty-five years. According to the April 
1946 agreement Soviet forces would leave Iran within a month and a half, and the Iranian 
government would submit the concession for ratification to the Majlis within seven months .
As Soviet troops left, Iranian government forces reoccupied Azerbaijan and Kurdistan without 
substantial resistance from their communist and Soviet-supported regimes. Meanwhile, the 
Majlis had no desire to ratify the oil agreement and thereby give the Soviets a firm foothold in 
the north. Due to Cold War politics and the US containment policy, the United States 
government strongly supported the Majlis' opposition. US ambassador George Allen declared 
that "Patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their national interest, may therefore 
rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own 
choice",18 and that "the United States felt Iran should decide for itself how to deal with the 
Soviets".19 By contrast, Britain favoured ratification. The British ambassador, Sir John Le 
Rougetel, "cautioned the Iranians against closing the door in Russia's face",20 and the British 
government advised Iran to leave the door open for further discussions with the USSR rather 
than give a blank refusal on the subject of oil.21 Britain's support for the Soviet oil concession 
was due to its wanting to prevent confrontation, and more importantly wanting to avert a Soviet 
propaganda attack on the AIOC. It was argued in London that "rejection of the Iranian-Soviet 
agreement posed an indirect threat" to Britain's existing concession.22
Eventually the Majlis, reflecting Iranian nationalist views, and with strong US support, 
overwhelmingly rejected the agreement. Amongst the clauses in the law cancelling the Soviet 
concession was an instruction to the Iranian government to undertake such negotiations and 
measures as might be necessary to secure the national rights, in all cases where the rights of the 
people had been violated in respect of the natural wealth of the country with special reference to 
the southern oil.23 The British at that time failed to appreciate the significance of this law, and
George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 311.
19 Cottam, Op. Cit., p. 78.
20 James F. Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51; The Diplomacy of Neglect, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1989, p. 12.
21 George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East; From the Rise of Islam to Modem Times, Sixth edn, 
London: Methuen, 1961, p. 265.
22 Lytle, Op. Cit., p. 186.
23 Ronald Ferner, "The Development of the Iranian Oil Industry", in Hossein Amirahmadi and R. W. Fenier 
(eds.), Twentieth Century Iran, London: Heinemann, 1977, p. 103.
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regarded it as a tactical move, and saw in these developments a policy of 'bogus balance' which 
meant that "as soon as Iran gives [the] USSR a kick it must deliver a comparable kick to some 
other power" -  usually Britain.24
These events marked the beginning of three major developments. The first was the end of the 
British and the beginning of the American role as Iran's defender against Soviet infiltration, 
which was reflected in the military cooperation agreement signed between the US and Iran on 6 
October 1947. The second was the commencement of "a shift in nationalist feeling from its 
original anti-Russian to its later anti-British orientation".25 While the rising Iranian nationalism 
reached its first crest with rejection of the Soviet oil concession, "nationalist elements believed 
that the next task must be the elimination of British influence" which they believed was 
exercised through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.26 The third major development was the 
transformation of Iran's foreign policy from 'positive equilibrium' to 'negative equilibrium'. 
The latter was fully introduced in Iran's foreign policy in 1951 when the government headed by 
Mohammad Musaddeq nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE: TOWARDS OIL NATIONALISATION
In 1947 the Iranian government introduced its first Seven Year Plan of economic development 
which needed large capital expenditures. Its only possible source to finance the Plan was oil 
royalties from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Meanwhile, the Iranian government had four 
major reasons to demand the revision of the 1933 agreement with AIOC. The first was that 
Venezuela negotiated an oil concession agreement giving it a 50:50 share in profits. The 
Iranians saw no reason why they should accept a lesser share in their national wealth. The 
second reason was the official price of gold used for calculation of AIOC's tonnage royalties. 
At that time the market value of gold was much higher than the official price introduced by the 
IMF in the post-war era. "Altogether the Iranians felt they were being cheated, both over their 
royalty income and over their dividend-related receipts" 27 The third reason was British taxation 
policy which resulted in much more revenue going to the British government than to the 
Iranian. "In 1948, for example, Iran received 9 million pounds in royalties compared to the 28 
million pounds paid in taxes to the British government".28 Due to British taxation policy,
24 Greaves, Op. Cit., p. 64.
2  ^ John Marlowe, The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century, London: The Cresset Press, 1962, p. 149.
26 R. K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran; The Patterns of Influence, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982,
p. 12.
27 Ali-Reza Moussavizadeh, British Foreign Policy Towards Iran with Special Reference to the Nationalisation 
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 1948-54, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wales, Swansea, United 
Kingdom, November 1993, p. 36.
2  ^ James A. Bill, "America, Iran, and the Politics of Intervention, 1951-1953", in James A. Bill and W. M. 
Roger Louis (eds.), Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil, London: I.B. Tauris & Co LTD Publishers, 1988,
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"whereas between 1944 and 1950 AIOC's profits had increased more than tenfold, Iran's 
revenues had increased only fourfold".29 The AIOC's directors argued that the British 
government's fiscal policy was determined by Britain's post-war financial situation, and it was 
not AIOC's responsibility to change it.30 The last reason concerned accountancy procedures, 
the price of oil for internal consumption, customs exemptions, and the training and employment 
of Iranian workers at skilled levels.
The Iranian government, demanding the necessary adjustments within the framework of the 
concession, presented a 25-point memorandum. It "centred on internal oil sales to the 
government and others, a request for 20 per cent of the distributed profits of dividends, 
adherence to a fifty-fifty formula on the basis of the Venezuelan example and concessional 
revisions every 15 years".31
While Iranian nationalism was emerging as the only influential force in Iranian politics and 
British unpopularity amongst Majlis deputies and public was reaching its peak, the British 
government and the AIOC directors in particular remained insensitive to the Iranian 
government's demands. In response to increasing Iranian domestic pressures for a new 
relationship with the AIOC, the British entered into negotiations. The result was the 
Supplemental Agreement of 1949. The major thrust of this agreement was to raise Iran's royalty 
from 22 cents to 33 cents per barrel. Most of the Iranian demands were again rejected, including 
that for a 50:50 share.
While the Chairman of AIOC argued that the Supplemental Agreement was the best offered to 
any Middle Eastern country by any oil company at the time, it was not viewed as such by the 
Iranians.32 Overall, the British believed that "further concessions would only stimulate the 
appetite of the Iranians while decisiveness would eventually force them to capitulate".
In the wake of increasing Iranian nationalism, anti-British sentiment, and British pressure, the 
main and difficult task of Iranian Prime Minister Ali Razmara was to secure ratification of the 
Supplemental Agreement by the Majlis. It set up an Oil Commission to discuss and report on 
the agreement. The commission, headed by Musaddeq, concluded that the agreement did not
p. 262.
29 Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, New York: Viking, 1991, pp. 249-50.
30 Ronald W. Ferner, "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute: A Triangular Relationship", in James A. Bill and W. M. 
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31 Ibid., p. 172.
32 Bill, "America, Iran, and the Politics of Intervention, 1951-1953", Op. Cit., p. 261.
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adequately safeguard the nation's rights, and should be rejected. Meanwhile, the early signs of 
intent to nationalise oil were beginning to emerge in the Majlis. The public, press, and deputies 
all discussed it as the only way to end British influence and great power rivalry in Iran. For 
example, the unpopularity of the British and the AIOC can be seen in a Tehran press description 
of the AIOC as "a malignant cancer which has eaten away the life of Iran for over fifty years".34 
Pushing for ratification, and intending it as a substitute for outright nationalisation, Razmara 
told the Majlis that the time was not ripe for nationalisation.35
The final blow to the Supplemental Agreement came when the Saudi government obtained a 
50:50 profit-sharing agreement with the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) in 1950. 36 
British realisation of the public pressure for nationalisation, the Majlis' rejection of the 
Supplemental Agreement of 1949, and the Saudi-Aramco deal, forced the British to modify the 
agreement in the hope that the Majlis would accept it. The new agreement accepted 50:50 profit- 
sharing and also offered immediate substantial financial support to the Iranian government. A 
few months earlier such an offer might have been ratified, but by February 1951 the Iranians 
would be satisfied only by overall nationalisation.37 Razmara was assassinated, the Majlis, on 
recommendation of the Oil Commission and through Musaddeq's efforts, swiftly and 
unanimously passed a bill for immediate nationalisation of AIOC, and on 29 April Musaddeq 
was named as Prime Minister.
OIL NATIONALISATION: IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS 1951-1953
Musaddeq and his followers believed that nationalisation of Iranian oil had to be implemented 
primarily for economic reasons. They argued that the Iranian government could use the profits 
from the nationalised oil industry to strengthen the local economy and to improve living 
conditions.38 Musaddeq declared that "with the oil revenues we could meet our entire budget 
and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our people".39
Another reason equally important from Musaddeq's point of view was the political issue of 
Iran's national sovereignty. Musaddeq stated that "... we had no other goal but the
34 Quoted in Greaves, Op. Cit., p. 75.
35 Razmara said in the M ajlis: "Iran's industrial capability at the present time is not such that it can itself 
explore for and sell oil in the world market;... with what personnel, with what instruments, will you explore for 
and nationalise the oil". See M. Reza Ghods, "The Rise and Fall o f General Razmara", Middle Eastern Studies, 
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3(> Irvine H. Anderson, "The American Oil Industry and the Fifty-fifty Agreement of 1950", in James A. Bill and 
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37 Cottam, Op. Cit., p. 91.
3  ^Wilber Donald N., Iran Past and Present, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 114.
39 Cited in Saikal, Op. Cit., p. 39.
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nationalisation of the oil industry as the basis for this country's freedom and independence".40 
In his memoirs Musaddeq pointed out:
When the D'Arcy concession was signed there was no proof of the existence of oil 
deposits in Iran, and the British navy was using coal for fuel. But now that oil has 
been produced in Iran, and used for strategic purposes, how could the Iranian people 
be happy to let a foreign company produce its oil, and to protect the illicit benefit it 
takes from it deprive a country of its freedom and independence 41
Musaddeq referred to the issues of national sovereignty and independence as the principal 
reasons for nationalisation, which he described as "the one and only way of stopping the illegal 
and illegitimate interferences of the former oil company in the internal affairs of Iran" 42 The 
priority of these issues in Musaddeq's mind was so strong that most persons who negotiated 
with him to settle the dispute concluded that while they talked of economic issues, he 
emphasised sovereignty and independence.
Britain did not accept the nationalisation. The Iranian government declared its willingness to pay 
compensation for all British assets and capital, but the British regarded AIOC still as Britain's 
legal property which the Iranian government had no right to expropriate. There were four major 
factors behind the British opposition to oil nationalisation. The first was economic. The amount 
of Iranian oil revenue received by Britain illustrates the importance and extent of the benefit the 
British obtained from the AIOC. The Abadan refinery was not only the world's largest, it was 
also Britain's single largest overseas asset. "It would be impossible to calculate the effect on 
Britain's post-war recovery if the Iranian oil revenue were lost" 43
The second factor was the issue of British prestige in the world generally and the Middle East in 
particular. As Louis argues, the refinery at Abadan represented not only wealth but also that 
intangible in Britain's presence in the Middle East, 'prestige '.44 Regarding British prestige, 
Albert Hourani has argued:
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Having withdrawn from India [in 1947], the [British] government did not draw the 
conclusion that the British Empire had come to an end and it should withdraw from 
other positions of strength in the world; on the contrary, there was a determination 
to cling to the positions which it had left, and in particular to those in the Middle 
East.* 4
In the words of Francis Pelly, the British Resident in Kuwait, "Abadan stood for something 
huge, a symbol which not even the most sceptical Arab could deny of British energy, British 
wealth, British efficiency and British industrial might".46 This judgement was also confirmed 
by Sir Rupert Hay, British Resident in Bahrain, who said: "I have little doubt that the 
catastrophe at Abadan undermined our whole position in the Gulf' 47 Oil nationalisation 
occurred at a time when Britain "was battling, both politically and psychologically, against 
accepting the fact that its position as the western world's leading power was rapidly being taken 
over by the United States" 48 As the British government considered nationalisation of the AIOC 
an embarrassment in its relations with the Arab states, it was committed to showing that it 
would not sacrifice its essential interests in Iran.
The third factor was that if oil nationalisation succeeded in Iran this would be regarded as an 
example for other countries to follow suit in the region. "If Persia was allowed to get away with 
it", said Emmanuel Shinwell, British Minister for Defence, "Egypt and other Middle Eastern 
countries would be encouraged to think they could try things on" 49 "The British government 
was anxious to avoid defeat in the Iranian scene", wrote Musaddeq, "so that other countries 
would not use the example of Iran. .." .50 US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's view was 
similar; he argued that British refusal to recognise Iran's sovereign right for oil nationalisation 
was based on their asserted belief that Iran's success would jeopardise all their foreign 
investments.51 In the face of Arab nationalism, the British were resolved to prevent oil 
nationalisation succeeding in Iran.
The last factor was the election issue in Britain. It was argued in the British Labour government 
that its actions over oil nationalisation would be an important determining factor in the 
upcoming general election. In this context, the Labour government, even if it wanted to 
compromise with Iran, was handicapped; Conservative Party pre-election campaigning was
45 Albert Hourani, "Conclusion", in James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis (eds.), Musaddiq, Iranian 
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47 Ibid., p. 230.
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criticising it for lack of strength and commitment to oppose Iran.
In the early stages of nationalisation the Americans showed some sympathy towards the 
Iranians. The American view of Iran's strategic position as a barrier to Soviet expansion and to 
Soviet access to oil led Washington to view oil nationalisation differently from the British. The 
Truman administration in general regarded Musaddeq's government as moderate nationalist, to 
be encouraged because it could be drawn into friendly relations with the West.52 Regarding the 
oil nationalisation, Secretary of State Acheson said: "Our approach to the problem, growing out 
of the expropriation of American oil interests in Mexico, was that the sovereign power of a state 
to take such property could not be denied, but raised the obligation to pay prompt and just 
compensation ,..".53 The American view resulted in Iran seeing Washington as a Western 
power which understood its position. In the early months of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 
Americans were more interested in stopping communism than in an oil settlement favourable to 
the British. Eden clearly pointed out the differences of view between Britain and America on 
Musaddeq government:
I did not accept the [US] argument that the only alternative to Musaddiq was 
communist rule. I thought that if Musaddiq fell, his place might well be taken by a 
more reasonable Government with which it should be possible to conclude a 
satisfactory agreement. I knew that the country was possessed of an elasticity and 
resilience which appearances did not suggest. Iranians have always been good at 
coming again.54
But soon the early American sympathy changed into confrontation with the Musaddeq 
government, just as British support of the liberal nationalist movement of 1906 (the 
constitutional movement) in Iran had changed into enmity towards the constitutional 
government. The British and American changes of view in these two different periods were 
based on the fact that "the liberal nationalist movement in 1906 and 1951 produced in Iran a 
chaotic situation which threatened the perceived strategic interests of the British and the 
Americans respectively".55 In Musaddeq's words, the change in US policy became evident by 
the replacement of their ambassador."... The replacement of [Dr Henry] Grady, the American 
Ambassador to Iran (who was a fair and impartial man) by Loy Henderson, their ambassador to 
India, who was not unbiased" was the first sign of change in Washington's policy.56 In fact, 
Eden acknowledged Henderson's appointment: "Anglo-American relations further improved as
52 Hourani, Op. Cit., pp. 337-38.
55 Acheson, Op. Cit., p. 505.
54 Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden; Full Circle, London: Cassell, 1960, p. 201.
55 Richard Cottam, "Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Iran and Dr Muhammad Musaddeq", in James A. Bill and 
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a result of the appointment of Mr Henderson ... . He never allowed himself to be played off
cn
against us by Musaddiq". The American refusal of Musaddeq's request for financial aid was 
another indication of change in the US policy. Musaddeq in his memoirs wrote:
At the very time of the Anglo-American negotiations in Paris [November 1951] I 
was in Washington, and I asked the American government for a loan of $100 
million at any rate of interests. ... They told me that they would study the matter, 
but the study went on for so long ... and [finally] I was sent the following reply: 
'unless a settlement is reached with Britain over the oil dispute, the American
58government would be unable to give any aid or grant to Iran'.
The British adopted a five-fold strategy to reestablish their control over Iran's oil by either 
forcing Musaddeq into a favourable settlement or overthrowing him. The first component of 
this strategy was military manoeuvres and implied military intervention. For this, British 
parachute troops were sent to the Persian Gulf not far from Abadan, troops in Iraq were 
reinforced and Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison announced that airborne troops were being 
held in readiness in UK to prevent illegal seizure of British property. However, there was 
disagreement within the government about military intervention. Prime Minister Attlee held that 
"occupation of Abadan island would not necessarily bring about a change in the Persian 
government and might well unite the Persian people against this country, and neither the oil 
wells nor the refinery could be worked without the assistance of Persian workers".59 Also a 
strong US opposition to the British use of force supported Attlee's position against those in the 
British government who favoured the military force. Acheson, believing that "armed 
intervention offered nothing except great trouble", stated "a substantial difference was 
developing between our views on the permissible use of force in Iran and those to which some 
elements in London appeared to be adhering".60 Attlee's view prevailed.
The second component was to resort to two major international bodies, the International Court 
of Justice and the United Nations Security Council. British legal manoeuvres started by 
requesting the International Court of Justice to arbitrate on the legality of Iran's act of 
nationalisation. The Iranian government refused the court's arbitration for two reasons: first, 
Iran had a sovereign right to expropriate AIOC subject to payment of compensation, and, 
second, exercise of sovereignty was not subject to arbitration, so the International Court had no 
jurisdiction. In September 1951, Britain took the matter to the Security Council, complaining 
about Iran's refusal to accept the International Court's jurisdiction. Following the International
57 Eden, Op. Cit., p. 204.
5% Katouzian, Mosaddiq's Memoirs, p. 270.
59 Quoted in Mussavizadeh, Op. Cit., p. 48
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Court's announcement of its inability to arbitrate, the Security Council refused to condemn Iran.
Meanwhile, the third component was put in motion. This was negotiating with the Iranian 
government. As Musaddeq was ready to negotiate with American mediation, talks took place 
several times, but without success. Failure to reach a settlement was partly due to the British 
unwillingness for settlement with Musaddeq. In the words of Acheson "the British were so 
obstructive and determined on a rule-or-ruin policy in Iran" that the United States had to strike 
out on an independent policy.61 The British government was "unwilling to comprehend or 
recognise the force, authenticity and legitimacy of Iranian nationalism" and was "reluctant to 
give credit to Musaddeq as the articulator of Iranian national aspirations".62 The other factor 
which made negotiations futile was Musaddeq's irreversible position on the act of 
nationalisation. In the words of the petroleum adviser to Assistant Secretary of State George 
McGhee, "Musaddeq never, during our discussions, retreated in any way from the principle 
that Iranian oil had been nationalised. This he considered a fa it accompli".63
While the British were negotiating with the Iranian government, they simultaneously conducted 
the fourth component of their strategy which was to undermine Musaddeq's position and 
destabilise his government through economic measures. These measures were aimed to prevent 
Iranian oil from entering the world market; to impose economic sanctions on Iran; and to 
suspend the conversion of sterling into dollars by the Iranian government, which needed the 
latter currency to pay for imports. The AIOC argued that Iranian oil was its property, and sale 
without its authorisation was illegal. The seven major oil companies (Seven Sisters) backed by 
the British and US governments joined the boycott and refused to purchase Iranian oil from the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) even at low prices. This act "was in part to help a sister 
company; but the principal reason was to prevent other oil-exporting countries (in whose 
territories they operated) from learning a bad lesson from Iran's example".64 The AIOC's threat 
to take legal action against any concern or individual attempting to buy the oil from Iran deterred 
almost every oil importer. Britain's boycott brought the Iranian oil industry to a standstill and an 
enormous loss for the Iranian government's principal source of foreign exchange. To intensify 
its economic pressure and undermine Musaddeq's government further, Britain imposed 
economic sanctions, banned the export of certain goods such as iron, steel and sugar to Iran, 
and also reduced imports from there. "Up until 1950 the UK had been by far the largest 
supplier of goods to Iran. In 1948 and 1950 Britain imported 39.8 per cent and 26.0 per cent
61 Acheson, Op. Cit., p. 682.
62 Azimi, Op. Cit., p. 55; Also see Katouzian, "Oil Boycott and the Political Economy: Musaddiq and the 
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respectively, of Iran's total exports, and Iran imported 27.4 per cent and 28.0 per cent of its 
total imports from Britain".65 To worsen Iran's economic position, Britain imposed sterling 
controls to deny Iran facilities in transferring and converting sterling into dollars.
The last component of the British strategy was to replace Musaddeq with someone more 
amenable to compromise. For this, it needed American support. As the oil dispute dragged on, 
the early American sympathy towards Musaddeq and oil nationalisation changed to open 
American backing for British confrontation and intervention in Iran.
The change in the United States began with the emergence of the new Republican administration 
in the United States which took office in late January 1953. While the Democratic 
administration under Truman wanted to end the oil dispute by diplomatic means, the Republican 
administration under Dwight Eisenhower who viewed the situation strictly in the content of the 
Cold War, found the solution in confronting the Musaddeq government and finally 
overthrowing it.66 In fact, Eisenhower in his election campaign claimed that the Democratic 
administration had not acted effectively against communism, and that if he was in power, he 
would stand strongly against communist expansion. The Iranian scene would be a test case. 
Thus on both sides of the Atlantic, there were now conservative governments in power, neither 
of which had sympathy for nationalism in the Middle East.67
Furthermore, the United States was concerned about the communist challenge in Iran. 
Musaddeq's tactic of encouraging the Eisenhower government to assist Iran financially and 
morally by raising the spectre of a communist threat to his country merely intensified US 
perception of the communist danger in Iran. Musaddeq, for example, in his letter of 28 May 
1953 to Eisenhower, argued: "There can be serious consequences, from an international 
viewpoint as well, if this situation is permitted to continue. If prompt and effective aid is not 
given to this country now, any step that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the 
negligence of today might well be too late" 68 While Eisenhower responded that the US was 
handicapped in assisting the Iranian government by the lack of an agreement between Iran and 
Britain, he obviously decided to prevent a communist take-over in Iran, not by assisting 
Musaddeq but by replacing him with someone who would compromise with the West generally 
and the British in particular. The US interest in gaining access to the rich Iranian oil reserves 
also contributed to the change of US policy. It has been argued that the main motive behind
Makio Miyagawa, Economic Sanctions with Particular Reference to the Iran-US Hostage Crisis in 1979, 
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Washington's confrontation with Musaddeq was the desire of US policy makers to help US oil 
companies gain a share in Iranian oil production.69 As Musaddeq stated "there can be no doubt 
that the British government had proposed American participation in Iranian oil, and my 
replacement by another person who would be able to get the oil concession law through the 
Majlis".70 This interest drew the Americans closer to the British in overthrowing the Musaddeq 
government.
The last reason for the American change to conformity with British policy was the Musaddeq 
government's uncompromising stand on the oil dispute. Vernon A. Walters, translator in 
Musaddeq's meetings with the US envoys wrote that Musaddeq's view "that if one haggled 
long enough the other side would be worn down and would in the end give in" played a major 
role in the failure of negotiations.71 The Eisenhower administration gradually "came to see 
Musaddeq as too destabilising a factor" in the region.72 It was in this context that John Foster 
Dulles, Secretary of State, suggested that "the situation was so dangerous and unpredictable that 
it might be necessary to act promptly, and that the United States would have to have a 
considerable measure of discretion as to what it did".73 Thus, while Acheson and Truman were 
becoming impatient with Musaddeq and his uncompromising stand, it was with Dulles and 
Eisenhower that the United States decided to intervene and remove him.
The original plan for a coup (Operation 'Boots') in Iran was designed by British Intelligence, 
MI6, submitted to the CIA, studied carefully and finally conducted as 'Operation Ajax' by 
Kermit Roosevelt, who headed CIA operations in the Middle East, because the British had 
become personae non gratae in Iran. Both agencies started the plan through their networks of 
politicians, military officers, royalists, paid mobs, and some conservative clergy inside Iran. 
"The Iranians would not or could not have acted without American/British direction and the 
psychological support that this involvement carried with it".74 Finally the coup of 19 August 
1953 occurred and Musaddeq was replaced with Fazlollah Zahedi, a pro-western figure. The 
Shah, who had shortly before fled the country when Musaddeq attempted to restrict him to his 
constitutional role, came back and began his rule. As soon as he arrived in Tehran, he met 
Roosevelt. Offering Roosevelt a large gold cigarette case as a souvenir, he said: "I owe my 
throne to God, my people, my army, and to you" 75 In Roosevelt's words, "by 'you' the Shah
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meant me and the two countries, Britain and the United States".76
Although there is much literature addressing the causes of Musaddeq’s fall, "few analysts 
disagree that the Anglo-American intervention was the immediate cause of his fall".77 
Regarding the other causes of his failure, scholars have different views which can be 
categorised in economic, ideological, and political terms. Apart from these causes, it seems that 
the most important secondary cause in Musaddeq's fall, as Ramazani has argued, was nation­
wide factionalism, which "invited the Anglo-American intervention in which the royalist faction 
fully participated".78
THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COUP
Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, said that when he heard that the Musaddeq 
government had been replaced by the pro-western government of Zahedi under the autocratic 
rule of the Shah, "I slept better that night".79 Removal of Musaddeq resulted in four major 
developments. The first was the securing by the US of a considerable share in Iranian oil, while 
the British monopoly of the Iranian oil industry was ended. One of the main urgent tasks of the 
new Iranian government was to find a quick solution to the oil dispute. Through American 
initiatives, particularly those of Dulles and his special oil advisor, Herbert Hoover, an 
International Consortium was formed in 1954, which was rapidly approved by the Iranian 
government. In this consortium, five major American oil companies obtained a total of 40 per 
cent, (8 per cent each), British Petroleum, 40 per cent, Shell, 14 per cent, and C.F.P. of France 
obtained 6 per cent. "In theory, the consortium was to act as a customer of the National Iranian 
Oil Company. But in practice, while acknowledging Iranian ownership of the oil industry, the 
consortium controlled most of Iran's oil, from exploitation to pricing and marketing ....".80 On 
6 August 1954 the Times of London wrote: "Clearly, the British Government and the 
Consortium Companies' negotiations have gone a long way to meet Persian aspirations without 
prejudicing the essential interests of the companies, old and new ...”.81
The second development was the end of the slow progress that Iran had been making since 
1906 towards a more representative and democratic form of government. In fact the Musaddeq
76 Ibid., p. IX.
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administration made a greater effort "to make laws more democratic" and "to govern the country 
by the rule of law than any other administration in Iranian history".82 Both the United States 
and Britain felt, however, that 'a stable autocratic monarchy' would better protect their 
geopolitical and economic interests in Iran than an 'unstable constitutional monarchy' working 
through a parliamentary democracy. For this reason, while Iran endeavoured to learn to live 
under the rule of law (1941-53), the experience was aborted as Britain and the United States 
intervened on the side of Iranian opponents of constitutional government.83
The third development was Iran's deepening dependence on the West and particularly the 
United States. The Shah's monarchy had been revived by the joint efforts of the British and 
Americans, and he owed his rule to them. Besides, he faced internal opposition which regarded 
him and his government as products of foreign intervention, as well as external opposition from 
radical Arabs and the Soviet Union, who considered him an imperialist tool in the region. As a 
result, he had to rely on the United States, which had replaced Britain as the major influential 
power in the world generally and the region in particular. In this context "the regime committed 
itself to a formal alliance with the West, and tied not only Iran's foreign policy but also the 
country's socio-economic development to the interests of the capitalist world".84 In sum, 
'Operation Ajax' marked the beginning of Iran's dependence on the West whereby eventually 
Iran became a formal pro-Westem ally in the region.
The alienation of the Iranian masses, their growing hostility towards the West generally, and the 
United States in particular, which led to the rupture of Iranian-American relations should be 
regarded as the fourth development. This motif was to figure prominently in Iran's revolution 
of 1978-79 in which the slogan of 'Death to the American Shah' was one of the most popular. 
In fact, Iranians viewed the United States and Britain as interventionist powers which 
guaranteed the survival of the illegitimate regime of the Shah, and also provided for the 
continuity of his policies.
FROM THE 1953 COUP UNTIL THE 1979 REVOLUTION
The Shah who began his rule again in 1953 aimed at achieving two objectives: (a) to consolidate 
his rule at home, and (b) to resist subversive forces in the region. To do so, he adopted a policy 
of 'positive nationalism' which in reality meant alliance with the West, particularly with
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America. Since he had seen the failure of past policies of neutrality during the two World Wars, 
and also 'negative equilibrium' during Mosaddeq's regime, he was determined to ally Iran 
formally with the West. Explaining his policy of 'positive nationalism’ the Shah said: "It does 
not mean non-alignment or sitting on the fence. It means that we make any agreement which is 
in our interests, regardless of the wishes or policies of others".85 At the same time he pointed 
out that Iran's interests would be served best by alliance with the United States. He said that 
"there is a deep and fundamental identity of national interests" between Iran and the United 
States "which overshadows everything else".86 By alignment with the West, the Shah wanted 
to strengthen his domestic base through Western economic, military, and technical aid, and to 
get protection from the West against regional threats from Soviet or radical Arab opposition.
In the context of the Cold War, the West, to strengthen resistance to communist expansion, 
promoted the formation of a defence system based on regional allies.87 The Shah formally allied 
Iran with the West through membership in the Baghdad Pact in 1955.88 The other members of 
the Pact -  largely a British-sponsored military and economic alliance -  were Britain, Iraq, 
Turkey, and Pakistan. In the words of Anthony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, the Pact 
was based on the "understanding that the whole Middle east, including the Persian Gulf, 
required to be defended on the frontiers of Iraq, and that this could only be done in co-operation 
with local forces".89 Although the Pact was originally an anti-communist alliance, each member 
had its own reasons for joining. For instance, while Iran intended to achieve more security in 
the region, Pakistan needed the Pact to promote political backing for its conflict with India.
For joining the Baghdad Pact, the Shah came under strong criticism and propaganda attack from 
the Soviet Union and some Arab radicals such as Egypt under Nasser. Denouncing Iran's 
decision, the Soviet Union declared that the Pact would serve
the purposes of certain powers which are seeking to turn the countries of the Near 
and Middle East, Iran included, into their military place d armes. . . . The situation 
that is being created by Iran’s accession to the aggressive Baghdad bloc is fraught 
with danger to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet government
cannot remain indifferent to Iran's accession.8 9^
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This prompted the Shah to draw even closer to the United States. Furthermore, the 1958 pro- 
Arab nationalist coup which toppled the pro-Westem monarchy in Iraq, coupled with growing 
Soviet presence in Syria and Egypt, heightened his fear of encirclement by the Soviet Union.91
The new regime in Baghdad withdrew from the Pact, and the alliance was renamed the Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1958. But the Shah who had became disillusioned with the 
efficiency of the Pact as a means of resistance to Soviet subversion, and disappointed by 
American unwillingness to join it92, urged conclusion of a bilateral defence agreement with the 
USA. Finally in March 1959 an agreement was concluded, under which the United States 
committed itself to defend Iran against any aggression.
In this context, "Washington acted as a 'Patron power' in upholding and securing the Shah's 
regime and influencing the direction and substance of its policies in line with Western regional 
and international interests" 93 While the Shah through his close relationship with America felt 
secure to pursue his domestic and regional policies, especially against growing internal and 
external opposition, Washington needed Iran as a barrier against Soviet expansion and radical 
forces in the region.
Meanwhile Iran's alliance with the West followed by three developments were conducive to 
Iran's becoming a regional power in early 1970s. On 16 January 1968 the British government 
announced that it would withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. The end 
of 150 years of British domination and control of the region created a power vacuum in the 
Gulf. This was more serious for the West, particularly America and Britain when viewed in the 
light of Soviet military support for radical forces such as those ruling post-coup Iraq.
The second related development was the announcement of the 'Nixon Doctrine' in 1972. 
Following British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 it seemed, from the Western point of view, 
that the region would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union and its allies in the region. The 
friendship treaties the Soviet Union signed with Iraq and Egypt, the presence of Soviet troops 
in Egypt and Somalia in 1972, and deliveries of fairly advanced Soviet weapons to Iraq were
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major concerns for the United States. Britain's decision to withdraw coincided with a "moment 
when Iraq was being put into a position by Soviet arms to assert traditional hegemonic aims".94 
It was in this context that Washington needed to maintain a regional balance of power in order 
to protect Western interests, namely the security of local allies and client regimes, and the flow 
of oil. To achieve this, it could either intervene directly and act as a balancing force itself, or 
assist a regional power to do so. Since Washington was involved in the Vietnam war at the 
time, President Nixon chose the second option, and proclaimed a doctrine intended to reduce 
direct dependence of regional allies on US forces. Nixon explained tha t " . . .  they must define 
the nature of their own security and determine the path for their own progress. For only in this 
manner will they think of their fate as truly their own".95 The United States opted to rely on 
Iran to maintain stability in the Gulf, and to sell Iran the advanced weapons and equipment it 
would need to fulfil its designated role.
The third development was the Shah's vision of the region and his ambition to be the regional 
power. He had seen the failure of the Baghdad Pact and CENTO to protect the Iraqi monarchy 
from a coup in 1958, or to support Pakistan in its war with India in 1965, and was determined 
to improve his own military capacity and become a regional power.96 In his view his domestic 
and regional objectives could all be achieved by alliance with America, and none could be 
achieved in any other way. Furthermore, becoming the regional power would enable him to 
settle Iran's disputes with other regional states, such as its border conflict with Iraq, on 
conditions favouring Iran. So the Shah "made friendship with the United States the starting 
point of his foreign policy". Meanwhile he could play the role of policeman in the Gulf, and 
protect W estern, particularly US, interests. In the words of Anthony Parsons, British 
ambassador to Tehran in 1974-79, "the Shah adopted foreign and strategic policies which 
suited the United States (and Britain for that matter); in return, the cornucopia of American arms 
supplies and political support was opened wide".99 Since the Shah was ready to pay for his 
American weapons out of oil revenues, American interests in the region could be protected at 
little or no cost to the US.
Consequently, the convergence of the Shah's ambitions and Western objectives and the 
"parallelism of interests between the United States and a friendly Iran" provided a situation in 
which Iran could act as a regional power.100 While the Shah was confident of US support, and
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was in process of building up Iran's military capability through the increasing oil wealth, he 
defined Iran's regional security interests as reaching beyond the Gulf. He said: "I will not state 
how many kilometres we have in mind, but anyone who is acquainted with geography and the 
strategic situation . . .  knows what distance from Chah Bahar this limit can reach".101
While Washington was taking over Britain's place in the region, the British government was 
struggling to preserve Britain's prestige and position in its traditional sphere of influence -  the 
Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf. At the end of the Second World War its position in 
the region had appeared stronger than ever, but subsequent events proved that this was not the 
case. In fact Japan's initial successes in 1941-2 had shown the subjects of the European 
empires that their foreign overlords could be beaten. Even though the Japanese eventually lost, 
the boost the initial Japanese advancement gave to nationalism in the colonies meant for the 
colonial powers that to retain their empires, it would take much more effort and expense than it 
had before, and raised the question of whether maintaining an empire was worth the cost. In 
addition, the rise of superpowers, USA and USSR, both of which were far more powerful than 
any European imperial power, and neither of which had any interest in helping the Europeans 
keep or recover their empires was the other factor. Furthermore, the War reduced Britain's 
economic and military strength to the extent that the British government was forced to devalue 
sterling in 1967 in order to prevent further deterioration of British economy. From World 
War Two until the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf the British government adopted 
different strategies and policies in order to preserve its hegemony and dominance in the region. 
These included the use of force, formation of defence alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and 
efforts at conciliating regional nationalism. But by the beginning of the 1970s none of these 
policies were successful in enablingBritain to maintain its domination; it eventually had to 
withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf.
The end of "Britain's moment"103 in the Middle East following the British military withdrawal 
from East of Suez did not end the British desire to influence events in the region. Therefore 
from the early 1970s the British attempted to conceal their decline behind the notion of an 
Anglo-American 'special relationship'.104 By adhering to this notion, Britain tried to uphold its 
declining position in international politics. The various British governments since the Second 
World War "remain convinced that without special access to the United States, Britain would be 
reduced speedily to the role of a suppliant cooling its heels in the ante-chamber of history".105
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 9 November 1972, Middle East (ME)-4140.
I®2 J. B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West, London: George Windenfeld and Nicolson Ltd, 1980, p. 48.
1°3 For more information on 'Britain's moment' in the Middle East, see E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the 
Middle East: 1914-1956, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1963, p. 11.
I04 On the Anglo-American 'special relationship', see D. Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain 
and the International Order Since the Second World War", International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, Winter 1985/86,
pp. 1-20.
1°5 Christopher Coker, "Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s", International
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This preoccupation with Britain's declining position in international politics and identification 
with the United States were influenced by the British perception of a history of two centuries of 
an empire on which 'the sun never set'. It was this relationship that inevitably influenced British 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Not unnaturally, having opted for a close association with the US, Britain also had to bear 
considerable responsibility for American policies in the region. The identification by which 
Britain would extend moral and physical support to the United States made British interests 
secondary targets for regional revolutionaries and nationalists whenever they were not able to 
assault American interests. A clear example of this was the attack on the British embassy in 
Tehran during the revolutionary period of 1978-1979 when the road to the US embassy had 
been blocked. Anthony Parsons, the last British ambassador to pre-revolutionary Iran (1974- 
79), explained that the British embassy was attacked on 5 November 1978 as the British were 
"the best substitute for the Americans that they could find".106 He added:
The American embassy was heavily guarded and a difficult target; we were neither. 
Politically it was well known that we and the Americans were supporting the Shah, 
and the British government had made no secret of their support; it was therefore 
logical that a strike should be made at the softer target.107
The next day, Ayatollah Khomeini from Paris spoke of the "deep-rooted hatred" of the Iranian 
people for the British government.108 in the eyes of Iranian people, Britain was responsible for 
the re-establishment of the Shah's dictatorship in 1953, and it was Britain together with the 
United States which had enabled the Shah's regime to survive. The presence of around 20,000 
British subjects in Iran by late 1975, the existence of British Council centres in Tehran, Shiraz, 
Ahwaz, Mashhad, and Tabriz, and the existence of many British military teams in Iranian cities 
were indicative of the importance of Iran as a strategic asset for Britain. In addition, Britain was 
one of the major sources of arms for the Shah's regime. Between 1965 and 1970, Iran 
purchased $1.6 billion worth of military hardware from the West, and another $ 1 billion worth 
of weaponry was ordered in 1971-72.109 Altogether, the Shah purchased from Britain 1297 
Chieftain Tanks, 250 Scorpion Tanks, 4 Guided Missile Frigates, 10 Hovercrafts, and 4 
Minesweepers in the period between 1965 and 1979.110 Also during 1974-78 Iran was
Affairs, Vol. 68, 3 July 1992, pp. 407-422.
106 Parsons, Op. Cit., p. 98.
107 Ibid., p. 98. For more details of the attack on the British emabssy, see Parsons, pp. 93-98.
108 On the attack on the British embassy by Iranian demonstrators, see "The Poodle that barked when 
Washington whistled", The Guardian, 25 January 1979.
100 K. R. Singh, Iran: Quest for Security, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1980, p. 275-76.
110 See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, London: Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Various Years;StockhoImInternational Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford: Oxford
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Britain's largest export market in the Middle East. Furthermore, Iran's diplomacy was always 
on the US and British side:
In the 1973 Middle East war ... Iran was the only country bordering the Soviet 
Union not to permit the Soviets use of its air space ... . The Shah absorbed the 
energies of radical Arab neighbours to prevent them from threatening the moderate 
regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf. ... He never used his control 
of oil to bring political pressure; he never joined any oil embargo against the West
or Israel. * * ^
It was for these reasons that Parsons stated:
There was no doubt that the continuation of the Shah's regime . . . (was) in our 
interests. We would be unlikely to see another regime in Iran whose commercial, 
foreign and strategic policies would be more favourable to our own objectives, and
with which we could share so intimate a working relationship.^
As Parsons argued "the British stake in Iran had become so important by the mid-1970s that a
1 1
collapse of the regime would be of direct concern to British national interests". To secure and 
enhance these interests Britain extended its full support to the Shah whenever he needed it. 
David Owen, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in a keynote statement 
in the House o f Commons on 6 November 1978, defended his government's policy in 
supporting the Shah. Owen described the Shah as Britain's ally and friend and said:
It would not be in the interests of this country or the West for the Shah to be 
toppled. Can you simply take their money, sell them tanks, which you do for a 
strategic interest, sell them cars, persuade them to hold down the oil price in the 
world, generally exert influence with them, and then when they come under attack 
just back off. * ^
University Press, Various Years; and also Mo'assesay-e Motaleat va Pejoohesh-hay-e Bazargani, Engelestan (in 
Persian), [Englandl, Tehran: Mo’assesay-e Motaleat va Pejoohesh-hay-e Bazargani, 1991, Chapter 7.
111 Kissinger, The White House Years, P- 1262. On the issue of Shah's tacit alliance with Israel, see Sohrab C. 
Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: lsraeli-Iranian Relations 1948-1988, New York: Praeger, 1989. On the issue 
of Shah's active support for the conservative regimes in the Persian Gulf, see William Stivers, America's 
Confrontation with Revolutionary Change in the Middle East 1948-1983, London: Macmillan, 1986.
112 Ibid., p. 18.
113 Ibid., p. 140.
114 See The Guardian, 11 January 1979, and also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXV, 1979, pp. 
29387 & 29735.
60
Meanwhile, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to US President Jimmy
Carter, had passed the Shah his word of absolute support in coping with internal dissent.115 
Although London reaped maximum rewards from its support, it left the Iranian people and post­
revolutionary leaders resentful towards Britain and its policies. Following the overthrow of the 
Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in February 1979, post-revolutionary 
leaders identified Britain as enemy number two, second only to the United States.
115 Ibid.
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Chapter 3
Iran's Foreign Policy and Relations in the First Decade of
Revolution
INTRODUCTION
To grasp the nature of the relationship between post-revolutionary Iran and Britain, it is 
important to understand the broader picture of Iranian foreign policy since 1979. This chapter 
will set the appropriate context through locating key policy changes and new foreign policy 
orientation in post-revolutionary Iran. This will be achieved by discussing first, the major 
tenets of political Islam and post-revolutionary Iranian ideology; second, the relationship 
between Islam and foreign policy trends in Iran since the revolution; third, post-revolutionary 
Iran's world view and its impact on foreign policy; fourth, the ways in which Iran's domestic 
politics in the 1980s impacted upon the practical implementation of foreign policy.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF IRAN’S ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT
The Iranian Islamic Revolution is an event through which Islam has been redefined from a 
universal religion to a political ideology, with a claim by Iranian Islamic leaders that Islam has 
requirements and abilities to form an Islamic state and provides the idea and method for a 
social order. Although the conceptual roots of this claim are embedded in the work of such 
past architects of revolutionary Pan-Islamism as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, 
and Rashid Ridah1, the Iranian revolution's "re-definition of Islam from a religion promising 
salvation in the other world to an ideology harbouring utopia in this world is perhaps the 
single most important feature of Muslim collective consciousness in modem times".2
Viewing Islam and religious authority as primary, and the state as their instrument, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his followers argued that religious authority should form the government, and 
that political authority was an instrument for the application of religious authority in society.3 
Adhering to the unity of religion and politics, they believed that the government had to be
1 Al-Afghani: (1838-1897), Abduh: (1849-1905), Ridah: (1865-1935).
2 Hamid Dahbashi, "Islamic Ideology: The Perils and Promises of a Neologism" in Hooshang Amirahmadi and 
Manoucher Parvin (eds.), Post-Revolutionary Iran, London: West View Press, 1988, p. 11.
3 For the study of political Islam, see S. Hasan Nasr, "Islam" in M. Adams (ed.), The Middle East, New York: 
Facts on File Publications, 1988, pp. 253-259; Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab 
World, London: Routledge, 1995, Chapter 1; and Amin Saikal, "Islam: Resistance and Reassertion", The World 
Today, Vol. 43, No. 11, November 1987, pp. 191-194.
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Islamic and religious in its leadership. From their point of view, an Islamic polity was one in 
which Islam and its authority had been applied in all aspects of society such as government, 
education, legislation and the judicial system.4 Furthermore, they stressed that Islam had all 
the requirements and capacity to manage a government and direct the domestic affairs and 
foreign relations of an Islamic society.5
Ayatollah Khomeini clarified his version of the role of Islam6 in a society and the nature of an 
Islamic government long before he was exiled to Iraq in the mid-1960s. In his book, Velayat-e 
Faqih ya Hokoomat-e Islami (Supreme Jurisprudence or The Islamic Government), he argued 
that Islam had rules and laws for all aspects of an Islamic community. As Islam had regulated 
spiritual and individual affairs, he argued that it had also brought rules for social and 
governmental affairs.7 He believed that the separation of religion from the state was a 
colonial ploy and a conspiracy to prevent Muslims from determining affairs in their own 
societies.8
Ayatollah Khomeini singled out a number of reasons by which he had attempted to 
demonstrate the necessity of establishing an Islamic government. He argued that it was 
necessary for implementation of the Islamic laws and rules in order to meet the ultimate 
purpose of having law and rule which is 'Islah and Sa'adat' (Reform and Happiness) for 
human beings. Referring to history, he provided the example of the Prophet Mohammad, the 
first person in the history of Islam to undertake the implementation of Islamic laws, the 
establishment of ordinances, and the administration of society, thereby bringing into existence 
the Islamic state. He was of the belief that the nature of Islamic laws concerning crime, 
taxation, international relations, and economics underlined the necessity of establishing an 
Islamic government, because without such a government and an executive body the Islamic 
laws could not be implemented. Furthermore, he stressed that those Islamic laws which were 
related to the protection and preservation of Islam and its territories necessitate the 
establishment of Islamic government. The unity of Muslims throughout the world as the 
Muslim Ummah (Muslim Nations), one of the most important elements of Islamic 
universalism as praised by Ayatollah Khomeini, is regarded as another reason for the 
necessity of Islamic government. He argued that in order to unite Muslims throughout the
4 For the discussion on different appraoches to understanding the role of Islam in society, see Mohammad Reza 
Saidabadi, "Islam and Foreign Policy in the Contemporary Secular World: The Case of Post-Revolutionary Iran", 
Pacifica Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, November/December 1996, pp. 32-34.
5 For details, see Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, The Government of God: Iran's Islamic Republic, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984, p.p. 30-34.
6 It should be noted that the primary concern of Ayatollah Khomeini was Shi'ite Islam.
7 Imam Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih ya Hokoomat-e Islami (in Persian), [Supreme Jurisprudence or The Islamic 
Government], Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1981, p. 10.
8Ayatollah Khomeini's interview with the Lebanese delegation of Amal Movement, 1978, Paris, Sahifay-e Noor, 
Collection of Imam Khomeini's Guidelines, Vol. 4, Tehran: Sazman-e Madarek-e Farhangi Enghelab-e Islami, 
1982, p. 33.
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world, Muslims should uproot unjust, corrupt and un-Islamic rulers in Islamic countries, and 
bring about truly Islamic governments. Finally, he stated that Islam was not only for 
happiness of Muslims, but it was the supporter of all oppressed people. So it was necessary to 
set up an Islamic government in order to help oppressed people throughout the world achieve 
their lawful rights.9
In line with Ayatollah Khomeini's argument, many other religious scholars of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran believe that the necessity of Islamic government is based on several premises 
which can be understood through two respected principal Islamic sources; the Qur'an and the 
tradition of the Prophet Mohammad (Sunnah). Rejecting the idea that Islam is merely a 
collection of injunctions pertaining to man's relations to God and individual behaviour, they 
argue that the number of Quranic verses concerning social affairs is several times more than 
those which are concerned with ritual worship. 10 It is for this reason that "so many 
voluminous scholarly books have been compiled from the earliest times on different areas of 
Islamic law, such as judicial procedure, economic transactions, penal laws, retribution, public 
and private law, international law, etc" .* 11 They conclude that since Muslims believe that the 
laws and ordinances of Islam are perpetual, not limited to a specific time or place, the 
application of Islamic laws and ordinances of Islam in a Muslim society by an Islamic state is 
necessary in all times.12
The term Da'wa is the other issue used to demonstrate the necessity of an Islamic state. This 
term literally means asking, inviting, preaching, and leading.13 Da'wa in its broadest sense 
means struggle and hard work to build a society based on Islamic values. Da 'wa in Islamic 
literature is a process which calls for righteousness, enjoyment of justice, and forbidding of 
evil. Therefore, it is a never-ending process to carry out a more just and egalitarian social 
reconstruction. 14 Da'wa in Islam is originally based on the doctrine of al-Amr bi al-Ma'roof 
va al-Nahy an al-Munkar which means encouraging and spreading Islam, preaching, 
enjoying what is right, and forbidding and stopping what is wrong. There is a consensus 
amongst Muslim scholars that this principle is a religious duty which has been commanded 
(Wajib) for any Muslim. Implementation of this principle in its broadest scope, in a Muslim 
society, means that decision-making, legislation, the judicial system and the executive body 
have to be based on Islamic law in order to guarantee the fulfilment of Da'wa and its doctrine.
9 For more details see Imam Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, pp. 26-50.
111 Mohsen Azimi Etemadi, "Political Thought in Islam", Message ofThaqalayn, A Quarterly Journal of Islamic 
Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1995, p. 80.
11 Ibid., p. 80.
12 For more elaboration on the issue, see Ibid., pp. 79-84.
13 Qur'an, 40:60, 3:104, 16:125, 7:195.
14 M. Amei Rais, "Contemporary Problems of Da'wa and Efforts to Overcome Them", Message ofThaqalayn, 
Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1995, p. 75.
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As history testifies, religious scholars refer to the life of the Prophet, who conducted his 
Islamic Da'wa in several stages.15 Thus, the life of the Prophet and his Da'wa show that the 
establishment of an Islamic state is an essential instrument of Da'wa, and every Muslim is 
commanded to try to fulfil this duty.16
Given the necessity to establish an Islamic state, as is inherent in Ayatollah Khomeini's and 
his followers' prescription, it is important to discuss how this prescription has been reflected in 
post-1979 Iran's political system. Although many scholars have stressed different reasons for 
the downfall of the Pahlavi regime, and each has viewed the revolution from a different 
perspective, the fact is that religion did have a major role to play in the 1979 revolution.17 
The revolution was underlined by 1) a religion-based upheaval against a secular government; 
2) a grass-roots revolt against rapid modernisation and Westernisation; 3) a public protest 
caused by inflation, unemployment, and economic distress; 4) a defiance of the Shah's 
autocratic and oppressive rule by the populace.18 Regardless of what precisely caused the 
Iranian revolution, the latter opened the way for the transformation of Iran into an Islamic 
Republic under the spiritual-political leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme 
Jurisprudent.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the most important framework for conduct of Iran's 
domestic and foreign policies, sanctifies the role of Islam, religious authority, and newly 
founded religious institutions in post-revolutionary Iran. It describes the Islamic Republic as 
"a system based on the belief in ... religious leadership and continuous guidance, and its 
fundamental role in the permanency of Islam's Revolution".19 It states that in the absence of 
any appointed Imam directly from God, "the governance and leadership of the nation 
(JJmmah ) develop upon the just and pious Faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of 
his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability".20 The duties and 
powers of the religious leader are stated in Principle 110. They include: determining the 
principal policies of the Islamic Republic; approving the elected president's credentials; 
dismissing him if the supreme court has found him politically incompetent or in violation of
*5 These stages included asking his close relatives, Qur'an 26:214; asking the public, Qur'an 11:112; establishing 
the Islamic state in Medina, Qur'an 33:21; and finally spreading Islam throughout the world.
10 For further study on these issues see A. Ezzati, "State and Politics as Essential Instruments of Islamic Da'wa", 
Message ofThaqalayn, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 65-72; and also Amei Rais, Op. Cit., pp. 75-77.
17 For more reading on the role of religion in Iran's revolution, see Amr Sabet, "Islamic Iran: A Paradigmatic 
Response to Modernity", The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 76.
18 For more information on different theories analysing the Iranian revolution of 1979, see Jahangir Amuzegar, 
The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1991, pp. 23-78; John Foran, "The Iranian Revolution of 1977-79: A Challenge for Social Theory", 
in John Foran (ed.), A Century of Revolution; Social Movements in Iran, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1994, pp. 160-173 and also see Nikki R. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution, 
New York: New York University Press, 1995, Chapter 6, pp. 95-111.
10 The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Principle 2.
20 The Constitution of IRI, Principle 5.
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his duties towards Parliament (Majlis); and appointing the highest judicial authority and the 
Islamic jurists on the Council of Guardians, which vets all legislation passed by the Majlis. As 
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces, he has the authority to appoint or dismiss the Chief 
of General Staff and the commanders of the military’s three branches and of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard corps, and declare war or peace.21
According to the Constitution, the Majlis cannot legislate any law which is in conflict with 
Islamic laws or the Constitution. The Council of Guardians is responsible for determining 
whether the laws passed by the Majlis are Islamic or not.22 The Majlis must send all its 
legislation and laws to the Council; of its twelve members, six are jurists (Faqihs ) appointed 
by the leader, and the other six lawyers elected by the Majlis. Principle 93 explains that 
without the existence of the Council of Guardians the Majlis has no legitimacy. Furthermore, 
all court judges are duty bound not to apply any administrative or executive laws which 
contradict the ordinances of Islam.23
POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY
There is a vast literature examining different factors affecting the external behaviour of a 
sovereign state. In analysing a state's foreign policy behaviour, scholars focus on domestic and 
external factors with different degrees of importance.24 However, there is a consensus that the 
interplay of internal and external factors determines and forms a state's foreign policy action. 
William Chittick distinguishes the field of foreign policy from the fields of domestic and 
international politics. Then he identifies foreign policy as the linkage between and intersection 
of these two fields, and describes foreign policy as the nexus between the domestic and 
external aspects of state affairs 25 Based on this definition, the remainder of this section looks 
at Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy.
Iran's foreign policy orientation, under both the Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic Republic, has 
been shaped by some general factors which are related to Iran's internal and international 
characteristics. These include geographic location, historical experience, the ideology of the
2 1 2*Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, p. 120.
22 The Constitution of IRI, Principle 72.
23 The Constitution of IRI, Principle 170.
24 For more reading on this issue, see Patrick Callahan, et al. "Properties of the Predecisional context", in Patrick 
Callahan, et al. (eds.), Describing Foreign Policy Behaviour, Beverley Hills: SAGE Publications, 1982, p. 73.
On factors affecting state external behaviour, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985; James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 
1971; and James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Wolfram F. Hanrieder, 
1971.
25 William O. Chittick, "The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy", in William O. Chittick (ed.), The Analysis of 
Foreign Policy Outputs, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1975, pp. 1-24.
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regime, resource constraints, domestic political context, and the external environment in 
which Iran is acting.26 The geographic and geo-strategic location of Iran have ensured that 
its only access to the sea is through the Persian Gulf in the south. This underlines Iran's 
preoccupation with its position there. Despite sharing ethnic and linguistic ties with countries 
such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Iran has still found itself isolated by virtue of its religious 
sectarian identification. Iran's separation from the Arab world and Turkey by ethnic, linguistic 
and sectarian barriers, has further exacerbated Iran's isolation. Thus, by adopting different 
policies, under the Shah and since the revolution, Iran has attempted to break out of this 
isolation. Iran's location as the land access to the Persian Gulf for Russia, and its position as 
the most important buffer zone for Britain against Russian expansion towards the Gulf and 
India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries placed the country at the heart of Anglo- 
Russian rivalry. The change o f regime in Russia in 1917 and the replacement of Britain by 
the United States after the Second World War did not end great-power rivalry, as Anglo- 
Russian rivalry was replaced by US-Soviet rivalry. Nevertheless, Iran's geo-strategic location 
has made its foreign policy orientation vulnerable and susceptible to the requirements of 
international politics and great power rivalry.
Historical experiences and memories have had a great impact on Iran's foreign policy. They 
have been shaped by Iran's "territorial contraction, its political, economic, and cultural 
domination by others, and its national humiliation".27 As was pointed out in the previous 
chapters, the Russo-Iranian conflict in the nineteenth century led to two wars and resulted in 
two treaties, Gulistan in 1813 and Turkmanchai in 1828. These treaties resulted in the loss of 
Iran's northern territories, and the grant of extra-territorial privileges to Russian subjects. This 
loss generated national humiliation and feelings of national dishonour. By the same token, 
British interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf, and also defence of India, were achieved at Iran's 
expense. In sum, foreign intervention and national humiliation in Iran's history created a 
strong desire for independence which often led to unrealistic and inflexible policies. Dr 
Mosaddeq's recalcitrant and uncompromising approach towards Britain in the settlement of 
Anglo-Iranian oil conflict of 1951, Iran's refusal to accept a negotiated peace with Iraq in the 
1980s, and its constant insistence on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime until July 
1988 are examples of this.
As for the role of ideology, during the Pahlavi period, Iranian nationalism defined not as "a 
sense of loyalty to an entity called Iran" but as "a cult of the monarchy, with the person of the 
monarch as the repository of highest virtue"28, affected the character of Iran's external
26 For the study of these factors and their impacts on Iran's foreign policy, see Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the 
World Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 
6- 20 .
27 Ibid., p. 8.
28 Ibid., p. 12.
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behaviour and directed its international relations. Under the Islamic Republic, Iran’s foreign 
policy orientation has been largely based on Islamic ideology. However, in both periods, 
Iranian nationalism and Islam impacted, in one way or anothei^'lran's foreign policy. So the 
relative ascendancy of nationalism or Islam, or their combination in the form of Islamic 
Iranian nationalism as the regime's ideology, has produced different orientations in Iran's 
foreign policy.
With regard to economic, military, and infrastructural factors, as Dessouki and Korany have 
argued, one of the major issues that developing countries face in the conduct of their foreign 
policies is the contradiction between the need for foreign aid and the maintenance of national 
independence.29 From the early nineteenth century, Iran needed foreign economic, military 
and technological assistance. It was for this reason that Iran allied with Napoleonic France in 
the early nineteenth century, Reza Shah Pahlavi developed a close relationship with Germany, 
and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, made an alliance with the United States. It is obvious that 
these alliances had a major impact on Iran's foreign policy and indeed limited its foreign 
policy choices. Post-revolutionary Iran after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and especially in the 
1990s needed foreign aid and credit to resuscitate Iran's economy. For this reason the Iranian 
Islamic leaders were forced to smooth their radical foreign policy and their militancy of the 
1980s.
The issue of resources/objectives dilemma is another determinant of Iran's foreign policy.30 
While a major objective of post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy in the 1980s was 
continuation of the war with Iraq until the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iran, due to 
resource constraints mainly as the result of political isolation and arms sanctions, was forced 
to accept UN resolution 598 in 1988.31 Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic since the end of the 
war has been in need of foreign technology and Western economic investment. Given that 
Iran is in the era of post-war reconstruction, it has had to adjust its foreign policy.
The political stability of a regime also affects its external behaviour. Political instability in the 
1950s and 1960s made the Shah's domestic position unpopular. "The Shah chose alliance with 
the United States partly to protect his rule against the Moscow-supported leftist opposition".32
29 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki and Bahgat Korany, "A Literature Survey and a Framework for Analysis" in Bahgat 
Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab Sates, Boulder and London: Westview 
Press, 1984, p. 8.
30 Dessouki and Korany have underlined three major dilemma for developing countries in the conduct of their 
foreign policies. These are the aid/independence dilemma, the resources/objectives dilemma, and the 
security/development dilemma. For more information on these issues, see Ibid., pp. 5-8.
3 1 See "Dalael-e Paziresh-e Ghatnamay-e 598 Shoray-e Amniyat az Taraf-e Iran", [The Reasons for Iran's 
Acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 5981, Daily Salam, 18 July 1995.
32 Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 17; For more reading on this issue, see Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 
1941-1979, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, Chapter II.
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The process of foreign policy decision-making is also important in a country's external 
behaviour. While during the Pahlavi period the decision-making apparatus was largely a 
centralised one, based on the Shah's personal decision and his individual perception33 of 
international issues, under the Islamic Republic the decision-making system is decentralised, 
and is affected by several institutions. The number of internal sources of influence on Iran's 
foreign policy since the revolution generally, and during the first decade of revolution in 
particular, has increased for two main reasons. First, it is characteristic of any revolutionary 
regime that in its initial phase there is no clear-cut division of responsibilities and duties. 
Iran's revolutionary regime was no exception, and every official organ or person considered 
itself or himself entitled to talk about Iran's foreign policy. Furthermore, the various 
institutionalised decision-making bodies in post-revolutionary Iran, such as Leader's office, the 
Cabinet, and Parliament, were playing major role$in Iran's foreign policy decision-making. 
Second, Islam and its Shi'a branch are based on Ijtehad, an act of searching for and obtaining 
different Islamic rules by qualified religious persons through the principal sources of Islam: 
the Qur'an, personal wisdom, the words and deeds of the Prophet and the twelve Imams, and 
the consensus of Ulama. Moreover, under the Islamic Republic which is primarily based on 
Shi'ite Islam, any qualified person is eligible to search through Islamic sources, explain his 
version of Islamic foreign policy, and offer his interpretation of an Islamic foreign policy 
orientation.34
Finally, a factor which has played a major role in determining Iran's foreign policy choices is 
the external environment, regional and international, within which Iran exists. These choices 
can be isolation, non-alignment, and coalition-building or alliance construction.35 As Hunter 
argues, "the rigid bi-polarity of the post-war years largely dictated Iran's alliance policy, 
though not the character of its allies".36 The importance of the Persian Gulf region to the West 
created a situationin whichBritain and then the United States maintained a strong presence there. 
This presence, in turn, limited Iran's foreign policy choices. The Islamic Republic also 
benefited from the bi-polarity of the world order in the 1980s, as it could follow a more 
independent foreign policy than the Shah's regime. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, Iran could play the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc 
against the United States and the Western countries. However, the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev 
and changes in Soviet foreign policy after 1985 led to a new era of detente in superpower 
relations and their co-operation on most regional issues. It was at this time that Iran failed to
33 On the issue of individual perception and its determinants, see Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy 
Motivation; A General Theory and a Case Study, London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, pp. 80-92.
34 For more details, see Bijan Izadi, Syasat-e Khareji-e Jomhoori-e lslami-e Iran (in Persian), [Foreign policy of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran], Qom: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Daftar-e Tablighat-e Islami-e Houzay-e Elmiya-e 
Qom, 1992, pp. 168-171.
35 K. J. Holsti, International Politics, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977, p. 109.
36 Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 19.
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dissuade the United States from reflagging Kuwaiti tankers just by charting closer relations 
with the Soviet Union in 1987-88. Although Iran is the largest and potentially most powerful 
state in the region, the introduction of outside forces into the region, especially after the 
Kuwait War of 1991, limits Iran's ability to follow its own agenda and policy there.
POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN’S WORLD VIEW
The past history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly its first decade under the direct 
leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, has shown that it attempted to offer its own version of 
international order and justice. Meanwhile, post-revolutionary Iran's world view is rooted in 
the notion of Islamic world order. This notion, and the Islamic Republic's attempts to apply it 
to its foreign policy, have been in contradiction with the prevailing Western view of 
international order. The American hostage crisis of 1979, Iran's involvement in Lebanon,and the 
passing of the Fatwa on Salman Rushdie in 1989, are but a few examples of the consequences 
of that notion which surfaced in Iran's foreign policy. Thus, it can be argued that the clash on 
the world stage between Iran's unique interpretation of Islamic world order and the existing 
Western-dominated international system has produced explosive effects.37 However, there is 
no better way to examine post-revolutionary Iran's world view than to understand Ayatollah 
Khomeini's perception of the international order, and his version of Islamic world order.
The Ayatollah's perception was rooted in Tawhid (monotheism). Islamic monotheism refers to 
one God, one community of believers (Ummah) and one path to salvation, Islam.38 Ayatollah 
Khomeini believed that men have to submit only to God, and should obey no-one else. He 
explained that other ideologies are unacceptable for a true believer as a solution to problems. 
He therefore rejected the legitimacy of Eastern and Western ideologies as artificial and 
materialistic. He continued that happiness and progress of human beings and societies are 
conditioned by their obedience to God's sovereignty and his rules. He argued that people must 
fight other alien ideologies and free themselves and their societies from them in order to be 
true believers, and emphasised that men have to stand against colonial and arrogant powers 
which are barriers to submission to God and his rules.39
Believing in Islamic universalism, Ayatollah Khomeini stressed that Islam is not restricted to
37 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh, "Editors' Preface" in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and 
Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, London and New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 
xii.
38 Monotheism in Islam is so important that Qur'an addresses it on several occasions; Sura al-Baqara, No. 163; 
Sura al-Nahl, No. 22; Sura al-Moa'menoon, Nos. 91-92; Sura al-Safat, No. 4; Sura al-Ekhlas, No. 1; Sura al- 
Forqan, Nos. 61-61; Sura al-Omran, No. 180.
39 Imam Khomeini's interview with London Times, Paris, 1978, Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 4, p. 166-167.
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one nation, colour or race. Islam is the straight path for the glory and happiness of humanity, 
regardless of colour, race, and culture.40 Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic world order was also 
rooted in his belief that the present international order and international organisations are not 
just. He argued that the present international order works only for the interests of big powers, 
and that international organisations such as the United Nations, and issues such as Human 
Rights, were tools in the hands of superpowers to use against small countries. He said that the 
most important problem of the world is dominance by superpowers and dependent rulers who 
rule for the interests of the superpowers and neglect their people's rights and interests.41
Furthermore, Ayatollah Khomeini argued that through its economic and political organs and 
rules the unjust system of world order has produced two distinctive groups: Mostakberin 
(arrogant, oppressors or exploiters) and Mostazafin (downtrodden, oppressed or exploited). He 
believed that the first group has power and uses it to dominate and exploit the second,42 that 
all prophets were chosen from the downtrodden group by God and one of their primary duties 
has been to free Mostazafin from Mostakberin. He maintained that all the downtrodden 
throughout the world should unite and prevent oppressors from more exploitation and 
oppression 43
On the role of foreign powers and colonial forces, he believed categorically that all the 
Muslim countries' misfortunes, weaknesses and underdevelopment are the results of foreign 
conspiracies. He also stated that Western and Eastern colonialism are united to destroy any 
independent-minded Islamic polity in order to plunder Muslims’ wealth. He argued that big 
powers divided Dar-al Islam (Territory of Islam) into different parts with different names and 
various nations. He even elaborated that it was the result of a conspiracy by arrogant powers 
that the Ottoman Islamic state was divided, providing the superpowers with more opportunity 
to plunder the Muslims' wealth.44
From Khomeini's perspective, the solution to the misfortunes, weaknesses and problems of 
Mostazafin generally, and Muslims in particular is unity against Mostakberin and formation 
of a united front against the arrogant powers. This is regarded as another precept of the 
Ayatollah's concept of Islamic world order. To meet this objective, he argued, Muslims should
4(3 Imam Khomeini's speech to a group of Saudi Arabian students resident in Iran, 1979, Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 10, 
p. 115.
41 Ayatollah Khomeini's message to the martyred and disabled families of Islamic revolution, 1982, Sahifay-e 
Noor, Vol. 17, pp. 189-190; see also Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 17, pp. 70-71, and Vol. 18, pp. 63-64.
42 Imam Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, pp. 42-43.
43 For more details, see Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 8, pp. 177-178 and also Ayatollah Khomeini's speech to a Libyan 
delegation to Tehran, 1979, Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 6, p. 71.
44 See Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 2, pp. 113-114; and Dar Jostojooy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Isteamar va 
Abarghodratha; Byanat va Ealamyahay-e Imam Khomeini 1962-1982 (in Persian), [In Search of the Path from 
Imam's Statements: Colonialism and Superpowers; Imam's Statements and Speeches 1962-1982], Vol. 14, 
Tehran : Moassesay-e Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1983, pp. 33-68.
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uproot their dependent and dictatorial rulers in order to achieve unity.45
Finally, the nexus of these precepts, which formed Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic world order, 
is Iran's international role. He believed that Iran, as the only true Islamic state in the world, 
has a specific role in leading, regulating, and instituting the Islamic world order. This special 
role is seen in the notion of Sodoor-e Enghelab (Export of Revolution). Iran's international 
duties, he argued, were first spreading Islam's message to the world,46 and second, facilitating 
world-wide unity of Muslims 47
APPROACHES TO THE CONDUCT OF IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
One of the most controversial principles in the Iranian Islamic regime's foreign policy is its 
support of all Muslims' rights, and of all the downtrodden (M ostazafin) in their struggle 
against injustice throughout the world. The manifestation of this principle can be traced in one 
of the major objectives of Iran's foreign policy: 'Export of Revolution'. The Iranian 
Constitution addresses the importance of this principle.48 With reference to the Prophet's order 
"to help the oppressed" and also his statement that "a believer to another believer is like a 
building whose different parts reinforce each other"49, it is argued that Muslims throughout 
the world are all one nation (Ummah al-Islamiyya). Implementation of this principle in Iranian 
foreign policy sometimes contradicts some other principles such as the preservation of Iran as 
Omm-al Qora or Dar-al Islam (the Territory of Islam)50 and of having peaceful relations with 
other countries.51 To resolve this possible contradiction, there are four broad approaches
45 Imam Khomeini's messages to Haj pilgrimages in 1979 and 1983, Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 9, P. 225 and Vol. 18, 
p. 90.
46 For more details, see Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 18, pp. 102-103; and also Vol. 12, p. 283.
47 On this issue, see A 'iin-e Enghelab-e Islami; Gozidayi az Andishahava A 'ra-e Imam Khomeini (in Persian), 
[Blueprint of the Islamic Revolution; Selection of Imam Khomeini's Thoughts and Views], Tehran: Moassesay-e 
Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Imam Khomeini, 1994, pp. 394-403.
48 The Constitution of the IRI, Principle 2.
49 Mohammad Muhsin Khan (trans.), The Translation of the Meaning ofSahih Al-Bukhari, Arabic-English, Vol. 
3, New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1984, p. 374.
50 Several Islamic principles are fundamental in shaping the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy. These 
are: preservation and protection of the Islamic state (Dar-al Islam or Omm-al Qora), refusal of any foreign non- 
Muslim domination in any aspect of an Islamic society (Nafy- Sabil), rules of expediency and ability (Maslehat), 
dissemination of Islamic values to the world (Da'wa), attraction of other countries toward the Islamic state and 
oblige them morally to pursue a friendly and positive policy towards the Islamic government (Talif-e Qoloob), 
and support for all Muslims' right and all the downtrodden in their struggle against injustice throughout the world 
(Sodoor-e Enghelab). For Islamic principles of post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy, see Ali Qazvini, "Bahsi 
dar Baray-e Syasat-e Khareji-e Islam: Pejoheshi dar Boad-e Feqhi-e Syasat-e Khareji-e Iran" (in Persian), [A 
Discussion on Islamic Foreign Policy: A Study on the Islamic Roots of Iranian Foreign Policy], Majallay-e 
Syasat-e Khareji (in Persian), [Journal of Foreign Policy], Spring 1995, Vol. IX, pp. 60-67. Also see Ali Qaderi, 
"Tarh-e Tahghigh-e Mabani-e Syasat-e Kharegi-e Islam" (in Persian), [Introduction to the Islamic Foreign 
Policy], Majallay-e Syasat-e Khareji, No. 2, 1987.
51 Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, believes that as the Islamic government of Iran has a 
message for the world, it is necessary to have relations with other countries. He continues that through this
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dealing with priorities and preferences in post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy.
The first approach argues that everything should be used for the well-being, development, and 
progress of Iran in the world.52 Supporters of this approach who can be called 'nationalists' 
believe that the ultimate purpose of commitment to Islam by Iranians is to make Iran more 
prosperous and to bring progress. They argue that if the Islamic Republic attempts to export 
its revolution throughout the world, and supports other Islamic movements, it is for the 
purpose of gaining more influence for Iran in the world. If Iran has an ideological and popular 
base in Lebanon, if it invests in Afghanistan, and if it has religious influence in Pakistan, it is 
for the achievement of greater influence beyond its frontiers.53 The advocates of this approach 
believe that when implementation of the Islamic principle of support of other Muslims and 
their movements throughout the world is not in conformity with the well-being, development, 
and progress of Iran, then it should be neglected. Mehdi Bazargan's words reflected this 
approach as he believed "in serving Iran by means of Islam".54
The second approach focuses on the responsibility and ability of the Islamic State. Referring 
to present international conventions and treaties which are related to the contemporary 
frontiers of countries, and to the existence of separate and independent states, supporters of 
this approach who are among 'Islamist pragmatists' argue that it is evident that in this 
situation, whether just or unjust, the ability of the Islamic Republic is limited. They continue 
that as ability and responsibility are interrelated, wherever ability is limited, so is 
responsibility. They conclude that given Iran's constraints, Iran is not responsible for all the 
difficulties and shortcomings of the Muslim world. In this regard, Iran as an Islamic State will 
sympathise with other Muslims' troubles, and defend their rights wherever it is possible, such 
as in regional and international conferences. They believe that after attempting to make Iran as 
Omm-al Qora strong, prosperous, and without difficulties, then Iran should assist other 
Muslims in the world if ability and capacity allow. Accepting the reality of the state of present 
affairs, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani points out: "we do not always have the power to 
choose. . . .  In some cases, we may be limited and we may have to forge some of these 
principles".55
The third approach which is also supported by 'Islamist pragmatists' is based on the 'Doctrine
perception of Islam and Islamic government, policy of isolation is not permitted for the Islamic Republic. For 
more details see, Ali Akbar Velayati, "Sar Aghaz" (in Persian), [The Beginning], Majallay-e Syasat-e Khareji, 
No. 1, 1986, p. 3.
52 These approaches have been broadly discussed in Izadi, Op. Cit., pp. 65-80.
53 Ibid., p. 66.
54 Cited in R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, 
No. 2, Spring 1989, p. 205.
55 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), South Asia (SA), 17 April 1987.
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of Omm-al Qora'. 56 This approach is founded on the basis of establishment of an Islamic 
State responsible for all Muslim nations {Ummah al-lslamiyya), with a capacity to act as a 
vanguard of all Islamic movements under the guidance of a religious leader. The Islamic State 
with these requirements is responsible for an Islamic 'United Nations' and the influence of its 
leadership has a universal dimension. This approach explains that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the Muslim Nations have responsibilities to each other. The responsibility of Iran towards 
all Muslims throughout the world is that whenever they struggle to achieve their rights, Omm- 
al Qora has to assist them politically, financially, and morally. The followers of this approach 
believe that all unjust powers in the world will attempt to destroy the Islamic State of Iran. 
But the responsibility of the Muslim nations is that whenever Iran comes under attack by these 
powers, they must support Iran as much as possible. In case of a contradiction between Iran's 
support of the Muslim nations and the existence of Iran as Omm-al Qora itself, it is said that 
the preservation and existence of Iran takes precedence. Mohammad Javad Larijani, an 
'Islamist pragmatist', and the founder of the concept of Omm-al Qora believes that in case of 
conflict between the revolutionary principles and the system of the Islamic Republic, priority 
should be given to the system.57
The last approach argues that Iran's foreign policy makers are bound by the duty to determine 
Iran's foreign policy in accordance with Islamic principles, without thought for long or short­
term consequences. Supporters of this approach who can be named 'Islamist idealists' believe 
that the conduct of Iran's foreign policy should not take the current realities of the world into 
account.58 Where implementation of the principle of Iran's support for all Muslims' rights and 
Iran's assistance to them conflicts with the principle of preservation of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran as Omm-al Qora, they give preference to the former principle. Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, an 
influential 'Islamist idealist' believes that the safeguarding of the revolutionary principles and 
values should take precedence over that of the Islamic Republic.59 It should be noted that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran has experienced already, in one way or another, all these different 
approaches in its foreign policy.
IRAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ITS IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY
Iran's domestic politics is one of the most important factors affecting post-revolutionary Iran's
Javad Larijani, Deputy Head of Foreign Affairs Commission of Iranian Parliament and the member of 
Supreme Council of National Security, is founder of the doctrine of Omm-al Qora. For details of this doctrine 
see, Javad Larijani, Maqoolati dar Sterateji-e Melli (in Persian), [A Discussion on National Strategy], Tehran: 
Entesharat-e Enghelab-e Islami, 1990.
57 For details, see "Roundtable: Discussion on Foreign Policy", Daily Resalat, 29 October 1995, p. 2.
58 Izadi, Op. Cit., p. 79.
59 See "Roundtable: Discussion on Foreign Policy", Daily Resalat, 29 October 1995, p. 5.
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foreign policy. Iran's domestic politics during the Khomeini era from 1979 to 1989 could be 
divided into three distinctive phases. The first phase covered the period between Iran's 
revolution of January 1979 and the seizure of the US Embassy and the hostage crisis in 
November of that year, hailed as the second revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. The second 
phase began with the Presidency of Banisadr, and ended with his fall in June 1981. The third 
phase continued until the end of Iran-Iraq War in July 1988, followed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini's death in June 1989.
First phase
Once the revolutionary forces had achieved their sole common objective of expelling the Shah 
in January 1979, their unity changed to division. Ayatollah Khomeini's uncompromising 
stance towards the Shah, the use of mosques as effective organisational networks for 
spreading revolutionary messages, and the popular appeal of the Ayatollah's Islamic message 
to the Iranian people and its ease of understanding by the masses, enabled him to attract 
nation-wide mass support by late 1978, and seize the leadership of the anti-Shah movement.60 
"This left the secular groups with two choices: either to opt out of the movement or accept 
Khomeini's leadership. Despite their reservations, they opted for the latter ....".61 So it was 
inevitable that the ideological differences and the socio-economic diversity of the anti-Shah 
coalition came to the surface in the initial phase of post-revolutionary Iran.
After the coalition victory, three broad trends, Islamism, nationalism and leftism emerged, 
with different levels of mass support, divergent ideologies, and diverse prescriptions for the 
political and socio-economic reconstruction and orientation of post-Pahlavi Iran. The 
supporters of each trend had their own hopes and aspirations, and all attempted to secure their 
own individual vision for the future regime. From the initial victory of the revolution to the 
seizure of the US Embassy and resultant hostage crisis in November 1979, the revolution 
witnessed a confrontation between Islamists and nationalists/secularists. The first group was 
represented generally by the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), and the second by the Freedom 
Movement (FM) and the National Front. While nationalists/secularists dominated the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), an executive body headed by Mehdi 
Bazargan, Islamists gained control of the Council of Revolution (CR), which was acting as an 
interim legislative body.
Amin Saikal, "Iran's Revolution: An Interpretation of Ascendancy of Islamic Fundamentalists", World Review? 
Vol. 20, No. 3, August 1981, pp. 19-20.
61 Ibid., p. 20.
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Nationalists versus Islamists
Four major factors weakened the position of nationalists and strengthened that of their rival 
Islamists. The first factor was the PRG's stance which was based on reform, gradual 
reconstruction and smoothing of the revolutionary approach to resolving difficulties. 
Essentially, the PRG's prescription to the difficulties, challenges and dangers threatening 
post-revolutionary Iran domestically and internationally, was elitist. It "was sceptical of the 
rationality of the demands of the masses ... and suspicious of the unrealistic solutions the 
populists advocated".62 While the PRG's prescription for post-revolutionary Iran was not well 
received by the people, the Islamists' response was based on mobilisation of the masses from 
all classes, especially the alienated, the displaced, and the poor, for protecting the revolution 
and resolving post-revolutionary Iran's major difficulties.63 In this context, in the initial post- 
revolutionary phase, Islamists could attract nation-wide support, and the nationalists could 
not.
The second factor was the establishment of new revolutionary organisations. These included 
the revolutionary committees {Komitahay-e Enghelab), revolutionary courts, the revolutionary 
guard, the Foundation for the Disinherited (Bonyad-e Mostazafan), and the Construction 
Crusade (Jahad-e Sazandegi). All had been set up either on the order or recommendation of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. The PRG assumed that these newly-created institutions undermined its 
authority, and this led the Bazargan government to attempt either to bring them under its 
control or to restrict their scope and power. Meanwhile, the young Islamists in charge of these 
organisations were prepared to serve and protect the revolution by any means, even if it meant 
sacrificing their lives. This was the starting point for the creation of mutual suspicion and 
disharmony between the PRG and the revolutionary organisations which benefited from 
Ayatollah Khomeini's support and were directed by Islamists. As a result, this alienated more 
people from the PRG and associated nationalists.
The third factor which played a major role in the Islamists' success was their perception of 
Islamic government. Although Ayatollah Khomeini had explored the nature of an Islamic 
government long before his exile in Iraq, his final version of it was a source of controversy 
between nationalists/secularists and Islamists. In his book, Velayat-e Faqih ya Hokoomat-e 
Islami, Ayatollah Khomeini had argued that an Islamic state is one in which a Valey-e Faqih 
(Supreme Jurist) leads the state, and that political power had to be subordinated to Islamic 
precepts, criteria and objectives. He had urged that the Ulama should bring about an Islamic
62 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution; From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, Boulder 
and London: Westview Press, 1988, p. 252.
63 For more details , see Ibid., pp. 250-253.
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state and participate in its legislative, executive and judicial organs.64 However, the 
opposition groups to the Shah failed to appreciate the Ayatollah's view, as he had remained 
silent about this issue during the revolution. Once the revolution succeeded and a new 
constitution was to be drafted, the Islamists' view on the role of religious authority, in general, 
and the status of the Faqih, in particular, was that which Ayatollah Khomeini had expounded 
previously.
In reaction to the opposition to the draft constitution and the boycott of the Assembly of 
Experts election, mostly by leftists and nationalists, the Islamists (and the Islamic Republican 
Party specifically), mobilised their forces and obtained a majority in the Assembly of Experts 
which was responsible for finalising the Constitution. The Assembly then passed the Velayat- 
e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist) provision by an overwhelming majority. The provision 
granted leadership of post-revolutionary Iran to the just Faqih, and legitimised him as the final 
arbiter in Iranian politics. The constitution also subjected the future orientation and direction 
of the Islamic Republic to Islamic guidelines rather than nationalistic principles, thus giving 
constitutional support and backing to the Islamists.
The fourth factor was the Islamists' and nationalists’ differing views on the nature of 
revolutionary Iran's relations with the West, particularly the United States. While Islamists 
were suspicious of Washington, and haunted by the memory of the US role in the 
maintenance and continuity of the Shah's regime, the PRG believed that continuation of a 
reasonable working relationship with the United States was necessary,65 and this prompted 
Bazargan's direct negotiations with President Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, in Algeria, even though Washington had just admitted the Shah to the United 
States. This event renewed memories of the 1953 coup and intensified the nation-wide anti- 
US campaign, thus discrediting the PRG and worsening the nationalists' position and 
credibility.66 The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and taking of its staff as hostage 
by the Students Following the Line of the Imam (SFLI), on 4 November 1979, eleven days 
after the Shah's admission to the USA, and three days after Bazargan's meeting with 
Brzezinski, marked the beginning of a new phase in Iranian politics.
While Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamists supported the embassy takeover, the PRG and 
other secular nationalists such as the National Front condemned it. The Iranian masses at the 
time were committed to following Ayatollah Khomeini on all issues, and the embassy take-
64 For full details of Ayatollah Khomeini's view of an Islamic state, see Imam Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, pp. 
52-93.
65 For further study of Iran's domestic politics and its impact on Iran's foreign policy during the period 1979- 
1983, see Amin Saikal, "Khomeini's Iran", Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 60, No. 5, October 1983, pp. 18-30.
66 Author's personal observations in Iran, October-November 1979.
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over was no exception. Meanwhile, the leftists, who also supported the takeover, regarded it 
as a significant manifestation of the anti-US and anti-imperialist nature of the revolution. So 
the nationalists were alone in opposing the takeover, which, in turn, allowed them to be 
depicted as pro-American. While urging that of the two institutions, namely the Council of 
Revolution and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, one must be dissolved, Bazargan 
finally found the burden of running the country in this situation unbearable, and resigned two 
days after the embassy takeover.
During the initial phase between the first revolution, which toppled the Shah's regime and the 
second revolution, which was marked by the seizure of the US Embassy in November 1979, 
the main principle of Iran's foreign policy was equilibrium. In this period, Iran's foreign policy 
was directed by nationalists who were considered as liberals by Islamists. "Under the 
equilibrium principle, the Iranian government took the international system for granted and 
tried to protect and promote Iran's national interests by maintaining a balance of power and 
influence in relation to other states."67
Second phase
During the hostage crisis a referendum held on 2-3 December 1979 ratified the new 
constitution by an overwhelming majority. This further enhanced the Islamists' position in the 
political arena at the expense of the nationalists. While the hostage crisis persisted, and Iran 
was placed under US and Western economic and political sanctions, the Council of 
Revolution declared the first presidential elections, to be followed by parliamentary (majlis) 
elections in early 1980. Abolhasan Banisadr, who had a liberal approach to politics, was 
elected as the first President of the Islamic Republic. The nationalists' dominance of the 
executive branch was counterbalanced by the Islamists' majority in the Majlis. "Of the 234 
deputies, more than 130 were IRP members, almost half were Ulama, and 30 were Mujtaheds 
[senior Shi'a interpreters of Islamic law]".68
From the beginning, mutual suspicion and disharmony were the hallmarks of the relationship 
between Banisadr and the Islamists who had control of the Majlis. In the struggle between 
them issues, such as the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq War which had started on 22 September 
1980, the handling of various socio-economic problems, and the election of a Prime Minister,
67 R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in John L. Esposito (ed.) The 
Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990, p. 44. For more 
information on this issue, see Mehdi Bazargan, Enghelab-e Iran dar Dou Harkat (in Persian), [The Iranian 
Revolution in Two Phases], Tehran: Chap-e Cevom, 1983, and R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: 
Contending Orientations", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1989.
68 Milani, Op. Cit., p. 282.
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were the major sources of conflict.69 During the confrontation Ayatollah Khomeini advised 
both sides on several occasions to restrain themselves, and even ordered the creation of a 
tripartite conciliatory committee, consisting of the Ayatollah's, Banisadr’s and IRP's 
representatives, to investigate the roots of the conflict. But the situation worsened to the point 
where the Majlis used its constitutional authority to declare Banisadr incompetent, and called 
for his impeachment. In this context, Ayatollah Khomeini first dismissed Banisadr as 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (a responsibility originally and constitutionally 
belonging to the Ayatollah himself), and second, invoked his constitutional right to dismiss 
Banisadr from the presidency in June 1981.70
The second phase coincided with the introduction of two new principles that replaced the 
notion of equilibrium. These were 'neither East nor West but the Islamic Republic' and 'export 
of revolution'. These principles were incorporated into the new Constitution. In this period the 
dominance of Islamists had a considerable influence on Iran's foreign policy. By that time 
Iran's foreign policy makers "questioned the very legitimacy of the existing international 
system, they sought to protect and promote Iran's Islamic interests by rejecting the dominance 
of both superpowers in the international system and by exporting the Islamic revolution 
throughout the world."71
Leftist groups
In contrast to the secularists/nationalists, the leftists had not been included in the post­
revolutionary power structure. Given Islam's deep influence on the Iranian people, the leftist 
trend had no grass-roots support. In addition, there was an overall perception by the masses 
that the left had connections to external forces such as the Soviet Union.72 In post­
revolutionary Iran, the left was divided into two distinct groups: 1 those such as Mujahideen 
Khalq, Fedaiyan Khalq, and Peykar, violently opposed to the new leadership and the 
establishment of an Islamic Republic, and those who extended qualified support to the new 
regime, including the Tudeh Party.73 The latter's support for the new regime, and for the 
Islamists in particular, however, was based first, on their desire to negate the influence of the 
secularists/nationalists who wanted to build friendly relations with the United States, and
69 For more information on these issues, see Asaf Hussain, Islamic Iran; Revolution and Counter-Revolution, 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, pp. 145-160; and also, see Milani, The making of Iran's Islamic revolution, 
pp. 280-294.
7^ For details, see Milani, Op. Cit., pp. 175-186; also Hiro, Op. Cit., pp. 157-163 and 174-185.
71 Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution", Op. Cit., p. 44.
72 Val Moghadam, "The left and the Revolution in Iran: A Critical Analysis", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and 
Manouchehr Parvin (eds.), Post-Revolutionary Iran, London: Westview Press, 1988, p. 30.
73 Ibid., p. 30.
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second, on the expectation of having a future stake in the government of Iran. Regardless of 
their strategies, by the middle of 1983, both factions of the left possessed little influence on 
the Iranian political scene.
Third phase
Abolhasan Banisadr's dismissal from the Presidency in June 1981 marked the beginning of the 
third phase in Iran's post-1979 revolutionary foreign policy. This phase ended with the death 
of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989. As a result, the second presidential election was held on 
24 July 1981 and Mohammad Ali Raja'i, an Islamist figure, was elected. This marked the end 
of the secularist/nationalist trend. The third phase "began with the ousting of the 'liberal' wing 
of the revolutionary coalition from the power elite"74, and resulted in full and complete 
Islamist dominance over Iran's political system. From this time onwards, the two tenets of the 
second phase, 'Neither East nor West but the Islamic Republic' and the 'export of revolution', 
became the backbone of Iranian foreign policy.
Regarding the first principle, Ayatollah Khomeini stated: "a nation that cries in unison that it 
wants the Islamic Republic, wants neither East nor West but only an Islamic Republic".75 In 
his speech to a group of members of the Amal Movement of Lebanon in 1981, Ayatollah 
Khomeini said: "we will not compromise with any superpowers. We will go under neither 
American nor Soviet Union dominance. We are Muslim, and we want to be free and 
independent".76 On another occasion he stated that "because Islam is the path of neither East 
nor West, but it is the straight path, and the Islamic Republic is based on Islam and is not 
following neither Eastern or Western camp, both camps disagree with and oppose it".77
Regarding the second principle, export of revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, as the vanguard of an Islamic revolutionary movement, had a special 
duty to help not only Muslim countries but also all oppressed nations throughout the world. 
He said: "we should try hard to export our revolution to the world. We should set aside the 
thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic 
countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed peoples of the world".78 On
74 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 144.
75 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Middle East and North Africa (MEA), 10 December, 1979, p. 
29.
76 Dar Jostojooy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Enghelab-e Islami; Byanat va Ealamyahay-e Imam Khomeini 1962- 
1982 (in Persian), [In Search of the Path from Imam’s Statements: Islamic Revolution; Imam's Statements and 
Speeches 1962-1982], Vol. 10, Tehran: Moassesay-e Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, pp. 250-251.
77 Ibid., p. 251.
78 Imam Khomeini's message on the occasion of Iranian New Year, 1980, A'iin-e Enghelab-e Islami, p. 415.
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several occasions, he emphasised that the Islamic Republic tried to expand Islam's influence 
throughout the world and stood against"the arrogants'"lomination of the world. He continued 
that Iran tried hard to uproot the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and communism, and to 
destroy regimes founded on these principles. He also stated that Iran's revolution was not 
confined to Iran, but was the starting point for the great revolution in the Muslim world and it 
was Iran's duty to share its experiences with all Muslims, as well as oppressed and exploited 
people of the world.79 Meanwhile, he stressed more than once that this idea would not be 
exported by force.80
Implementation of these two principles in the third phase of Iran's foreign policy created two 
different interpretations, producing among Islamists two schools of thought. Although both 
were revolutionary, and both believed that Islam was the fundamental element of the 
revolution and politics, they differed in some respects.
The first school, the 'idealists', hoped to establish the 'Islamic world order' immediately, 
without care for the problems that might be created in Iran's relations with other states. The 
second school, known as the 'pragmatists', also believed in establishment of an 'Islamic world 
order', but did not reject the realities of the existing international system. In fact, the former 
believed that the focus of Iran's foreign policy should be on "the world's people rather than on 
its governments"81, whereas the latter took state-to-state relations for granted.
Another significant difference between the two schools of thought in relation to Iran's foreign 
policy was the means of, and strategies for, exporting the revolution. While the idealists' focus 
was external, with more emphasis on actions outside Iran, the pragmatists put their weight 
behind an internal focus, in order to consolidate the base for Iran's further ability to export the 
revolution.
Idealists in power
In the initial phase of the revolution, revolutionary sentiments and public opinion favoured the 
idealists. The external environment surrounding the newly-born Islamic Republic helped the 
idealists to dominate Iran's political ascendancy and to guide Iran's foreign policy. Following 
the establishment of an anti-American Islamic government, and then the hostage crisis of 
1979, United States' activities in the Persian Gulf increased. Iranian perceptions of these
79 For more information on Ayatollah Khomeini’s view on the export of revolution, see Sahifay-e Noor, Vols. 3: 
p. 99, 20: p. 118, 10: p. 233, 17: p. 238, 12: p. 130, 18: pp. 102-103, 11: p. 266, 21: p. 108, 20: pp. 114, 123, and 
232.
80 For example, see A 'iin-e Enghelab-e Islami, pp. 415-419.
81 Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 43.
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activities as intended to contain and ultimately destroy the revolutionary regime intensified 
Iran's anti-US policy. The Western sanctions imposed following the US Embassy seizure, and 
then the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980—a war Iranians saw as imposed by the 
United States and its Western allies—were other external factors. Both these events were 
regarded by the Arab states' rulers as elements of instability in the region, and as threats to 
their governments. This assumption, which hardened with Iraqi attempts to manipulate the 
Arab world by claiming to be defending Arab unity and integrity, resulted in financial and 
political support to Iraq by the Arab countries of the Gulf. Iran's political and economic 
isolation, and the UN Security Council's refusal to take prompt action against Iraq, created the 
notion amongst Iranians that Iran after its revolution was subject to unfair and even inimical 
treatment by the international community.82 This feeling enhanced the idealists’ position and 
hardened Iran's foreign policy towards Gulf states, Western European countries and, 
particularly, the United States.
Export of revolution in the third phase
The above-mentioned external environment surrounding the revolution made idealists certain 
that through the export of revolution throughout the world, such as the Persian Gulf region, 
Lebanon, and North Africa, they would be able to defend the revolution. The Iranian 
leadership also felt that if the revolution did not expand, it would face defeat. Ayatollah 
Khomeini, in his Iranian New Year message in 1980, stated that as the Iranian revolution 
belonged to all downtrodden throughout the world, all powers had risen to destroy it. He 
continued that "if we remain in an enclosed environment, we shall definitely face defeat".83
During the 1980s, besides peaceful means84 for Iran being outward looking, four major 
occurrences can be regarded as most significant for the export of revolution. These were the 
US Embassy hostage crisis of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's involvement in Lebanon from 
1982, and Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence on Salman Rushdie in 1989. The hostage 
crisis marked the beginning of a new phase in Iran's domestic and international politics. The
82 "When Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, the UN Security Council did not even meet for several 
days". The first resolution No. 479 of September 28, "while calling for a cessation of hostilities, did not demand 
Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian territories". See Anthony Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe", Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1989, pp. 225-226.
83 Imam Khomeini's message on the occasion of Iranian New Year, 1980, Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 12, p. 19.
84 The peaceful means which the Islamic Republic used them for exporting the revolution were through 
Tablighat (propaganda), Haj ceremony, Iranian embassies abroad, formation of conferences and so on. For more 
details o f these means, see Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution" Op. Cit., pp. 54-56; and also see Farhang 
Rajaee, "Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution", in John L. Esposito (ed.), The 
Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990, pp. 71-78; On 
Ayatollah Khomeini's views of peaceful means for exporting the revolution, see A 'iin-e Enghelab-e Islami, pp. 
416-421.
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event was aimed at harming the United States and American interests in Iran, undermining US 
prestige and regional influence, and generally challenging the superpowers' might and 
eliminating their influence from the Islamic world.85
The Iran-Iraq War highlighted yet another means for the export of revolution. When Iran 
carried the war into Iraqi territory in July 1982, the objective was 'Piroozi-e Nehaie' (final 
victory). It meant to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, replacing it with a regime similar to 
Iran's. Regardless of the reasons86 which forced Iran to accept a cease-fire in 1988, Ayatollah 
Khomeini said in February 1989:
Every day of the war we had blessing, which we utilised in all aspects. We exported 
our revolution to the world through the war; we proved our oppression and the 
aggressor's tyranny through the war. It was through the war that we unveiled the 
deceitful face of world-devourers It was through the war that we recognised our
enemies and friends...... It was through the war that we consolidated the roots of our
fruitful Islamic revolution.87
Another avenue for export of revolution was Iran's involvement in Lebanon. Following the 
Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1982, Iran dispatched military forces through Syria to 
Lebanon, to help Islamic guerrillas against Israel. In this context, the pro-Iranian Shi'a group, 
Hezballah (Party of God), emerged. "For Iran, the Lebanese situation presented a unique 
opportunity to prove its pro-Arab and anti-Israeli credentials, to propagate its revolutionary 
ideology, and to develop a core of supporters".88 Lebanon's special internal conditions and the 
Israeli invasion made Lebanon most receptive to Iran's Islamic message and influence, largely 
because of the presence in Lebanon of a large, disaffected, and radicalised Shi'a community, 
historically connected with Iran. This enabled Iran to spread the Islamic revolutionary 
message, direct a network of social services, and distribute financial aid among the Shi'ites.89
Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence on Salman Rushdie for his book, The Satanic 
Werses , was used as another means to export the Iranian revolution. Although the Rushdie 
issue and the Ayatollah's Fatwa came in February 1989 a few months after the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War and a few months before Ayatollah Khomeini's death, the issue was very 
similar in form and consequences to the aforementioned three events. The Ayatollah regarded 
'The Satanic Versus' as a conspiracy against Islam. He condemned Rushdie as a way to
85 Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 175.
86 For study of the reasons which forced Iran to accept the cease-fire in 1988 see, "Dalael-e Paziresh-e 
Ghatnamay-e 598 Shoray-e Amniyat az Taraf-e Iran", Daily Salam, , 18 July 1995.
8  ^ Sahifay-e Noor, Vol. 21, p. 24.
88 Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 123.
89 Ibid., pp. 123-126.
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challenge the anti-Islamic activities of institutions and individuals supported by Western 
powers. In his speech on 24 February 1989, he said:
The issue of the book ... is that it is a calculated move aimed at rooting out religion
and religiousness, and above all, Islam ........ The issue for them [the Western
powers] is not that of defending an individual-the issue for them is to support an 
anti-Islamic and anti-value current, which has been masterminded by those 
institutions belonging to Zionism, Britain and the USA which have placed 
themselves against the Islamic world, through their ignorance and hate.99
The Ayatollah's Fatwa placed him in the forefront of opposition to perceived anti-Islamic and 
conspiratorial activities. Thus, the Fatwa aimed at enhancing Iran's claim to the leadership of 
the Muslim world.91
To conclude, Iran's foreign policy orientation and Tehran's relations with the international 
community in the first decade of revolution was determined by such factors as post­
revolutionary Iran's world view, Ayatollah Khomeini's idiosyncratic perception of Islam and 
the Islamic government, Iran's role in leading and supporting Islamic movements in the world, 
and Iran's domestic politics. Viewing the international system as Western-dominated, and 
attempting to introduce an Islamic version of the world order, Iranian leaders rejected the 
existing state of affairs, and were convinced that their duty was to export their revolution 
throughout the world. In the first decade of revolution, in addition to Ayatollah Khomeini's 
ideas and perceptions, the dominance of idealists determined Iran's foreign policy and 
relations. Also the continuous importance of Islamic ideology and Islamic interests rather than 
Iran's national interests in foreign policy provided a situation where Tehran inevitably had to 
maintain its position as defender of Muslims' rights and supporter of Islamic movements. In 
sum, these issues impacted, in one way or another, on Iranian-British relations in the first 
decade of the revolution.
Quoted in Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution", Op. Cit., p. 56.
91 See Robin Wright, In the Name o f God; The Khomeini Decade, London: Bloomsbury, 1990, pp. 200-201, and 
also Ehteshami, After Khomeini; p. 139.
Chapter 4
Iranian-British Relations: 1979 -1988
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INTRODUCTION
Iranian-British relations from 1979 to the end of the Iran-Iraq War in July 1988 were 
characterised by tension, political upheaval and instability. This period largely witnessed the 
emergence of two new 'isms' in the international arena; 'Khomeinism' in Iran (1979-1989) 
and 'Thatcherism'1 in Britain (1979-1990). Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) 
which was fundamental to shaping Iranian-British relations, greatly affected Iran's policy 
towards Britain. However, the dominance of 'idealists' in Iranian politics in this period, except 
for a short time in the aftermath of the revolution in which 'liberals/nationalists' tried to direct 
Iran's foreign policy, was a major influencing factor.
The main argument in this chapter is that the Iranians and especially their revolutionary 
Islamic leaders interpreted British policy towards their country in conspiratorial term. This 
interpretation, however, was rooted in the conniving nature of British policy towards Iran 
over past decades and the historical legacy of British intervention in Iran. In addition, 
London's uncompromising support for the Shah to the very end of his regime had a profound 
influence on post-revolutionary Iran's relations with Britain. While Britain was partly reaping 
the fruit of its past history of intervention in Iran, clouding post-revolutionary Iran's relations 
with Britain from the start, the Iranian perception that British policies towards Iran were 
designed to suit the position of the US further exacerbated relations between Tehran and 
London.
LEGACY OF THE PAST
A long history of British intervention in Iran not only failed to enhance Britain's image in Iran 
but also damaged it. Britain is generally viewed by Iranians as an exploitative power whose 
involvement has always resulted in Iran's loss. Viewing the British "as the manipulators
1 On Thatcherism' and in what respects it was different from post-1945 Conservative Party principles and 
ideology see, Martin Holmes, Thatcherism: Scope and Limits 1983-1987, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989; 
Kenneth Minogue and Michael Biddis (eds.), Thatcherism: Personality and Politics, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1987, Chs. 1, 2 & 8; Patrick Cosgrave, Margaret Thatcher: A Tory and Her Party, London: Hutchinson, 
1978, Ch. 3; and Michael Bentley, "Is Mrs Thatcher a Conservative?", Contemporary Record, Vol. 2, No. 6, 
Summer 1989, pp. 35-36.
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behind the scenes",2 Iranians have had a long list of events on which they could draw to be 
suspicious and possibly resentful of the British. The list includes Britain’s exploitation of 
Iranian oil for over half a century, its intervention in replacing the Qajar with the Pahlavi 
dynasty in the 1920s, invasion of Iran jointly with the Soviet Union in 1941, involvement in 
replacing Reza Shah with his son Mohammad Reza after the invasion, and finally British 
support for the United States in the 1953 coup which overthrew the popular nationalist 
government of Mohammad Mosaddeq.
Britain's past mistakes from the Iranian point of view were constantly echoed and emphasised 
by Iran's new Islamic revolutionary leaders. Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, on many 
occasions before and after the revolution stated that Mohammad Reza Shah's regime was not 
legitimate, and that like his father, Reza Shah, he was imposed by Britain through the Anglo- 
American coup of 1953.3 Ayatollah Khomeini was also very damning of Britain as a colonial 
power. He ranked Britain as second only to America in causing misfortunes to Iran and 
Iranians during the Shah's regime, and claimed that only the 1979 revolution had put a stop to 
Britain's interventionist policies towards Iran.4
There is a perception in Iran that British policies have always "hampered [Iran's] 
development, undermined its independence, and caused the loss of its territory and 
influence".5 Although nowadays Britain is a second-rank power, Iranians believe that Britain 
makes up for this by diplomatically being very shrewd and interventionist. Yet, as Cottam 
clearly states "nowhere in the world is British cleverness so widely exaggerated as in Iran, 
and nowhere are the British more hated for it".6 This exaggerated view was so strongly held 
that both the Shah and his successors saw British hands in all events, "even those destructive 
to Pahlavi rule or, indeed, British interests".7 Sir Denis Wright, British ambassador to Tehran 
during the 1960s, writes: "despite our weakened position in the world, the British did enjoy a 
special position in the minds of both high and low and that we are often, without any logical
2 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion; The Tragedy of American -Iranian Relations, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1988, p. 128.
3 Ayatollah Khomeini emphasised this issue on many occasions. For example, in his speech to a group of 
resigned deputies of pre-revolutionary Iranian Parliament, Tehran, 5 February 1979; and in his speech to a group 
of Tehran’s traders, Tehran, 8 February 1979. For the text of these speeches see, Kousar, Collection of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's Speeches, (in Persian), Vol. 3 , Tehran: Moassesay-e Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Imam Khomeini, 
1984, pp. 165-170, 254-260, and 453^155.
4 See Dar Jostojooy-e Rah az Kalam-e Imam: Isteamar va Abarghodratha; Bayanat va Ealamyahay-e Imam 
Khomeini 1962-1982, (in Persian), [In Search of the Path from Imam's Statements: Colonialism and 
Superpowers; Imam’s Statements and Speeches 1962-1982], Vol. 14, Tehran: Moassesay-e Entesharat-e Amir 
Kabir, 1983, pp. 431, 444, 450-451, and also Kousar, Vol. 3, pp. 72 8c 182.
5 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World; Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 145.
6 Quoted in Harvey Morris, "From Perfidious Albion to Little Satan", The Independent, 21 June 1988.
7 Anthony Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1989, p. 220.
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reason, given either credit or blame for developments and events beyond our ken".8 Anthony 
Parsons, British ambassador to Iran in 1974-1979, stated that in the year of the revolution it 
became clear that "all Britain's efforts over the previous quarter century to bury the past and 
construct a normal relationship with Iran . . . had yet to bear fruit".9 As a result, Britain 
acquired the status of 'mini-Satan' in Iranian eyes. Given this, the Khomeini leadership, while 
initially maintaining cautious diplomatic relations with Britain, was unwilling to strengthen 
them.
Furthermore, the extent of Western states' support for the Shah's regime played an influential 
role in determining post-revolutionary Iran's foreign policy towards those states.10 Although 
this factor has not constantly prevailed in determining Iran's relations with Western powers, it 
played a prominent role at least in the initial phase of post-revolutionary Iran.* 11 Based on a 
relatively incomplete understanding of events and developments in Iran in early 1979,12 the 
British government offered uncompromising support to the Shah. Prime Minister James 
Callaghan, in his message to the Shah on 16 September 1978, hoped that "the violence will 
not interrupt Iran's progress towards democracy", and stated that "Iran’s stability and 
prosperity is of key importance to her friends and allies".13 In an interview in late 1978, 
David Owen, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said that it would 
not be in Britain's interests if the Shah were deposed. In a keynote statement in the House of 
Commons, he described the Shah as "our ally and our friend".14
Against this backdrop, Britain would not find it easy to establish a trouble-free relationship 
with the new Iranian government.15 Although Britain recognised the government of Mehdi 
Bazargan in mid-February 1979, with Owen asserting that this was an acceptance of reality
8 Cited in Morris, Op Cit.
9 Anthony Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe" in R. K. Ramazani (ed.), Iran's Revolution; The Search for  
Consensus, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 72.
10 Sepehr Zabih has broadly underlined three major considerations in determining post-revolutionary Iran's 
foreign relations with major powers. For more details see, Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution, London & 
Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 168-170.
11 For example, France had a special position in Iran's foreign policy in the aftermath of revolution since France 
admitted Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris in 1978. But the warm Franco-Iranian relations deteriorated later.
For instance, Daily Telegraph wrote:. . .  While there is widespread discontent with the economic situation 
caused by world-wide inflation, most Persians have no quarrel with the Shah nor fear of the security police.
Daily Telegraph, 3 January 1979.
This controversial message gave rise to protests from other labour MPs. See The Guardian, 11 January 1979.
14 See The Guardian, 11 January 1979, and also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXV, 1979, pp. 29387 
& 29735. As another example, it was Lord George Brown, former British Foreign Secretary who after his visit to 
Tehran said that over the past few months in 1978, he had been one of those who pursuaded Shahpoor Bakhtiar 
to break with his colleagues in the National Front and accept the task of forming a government when the Shah 
wanted to leave the country and tried to stop the revolution by appointing a national figure as Prime Minister.
See Daily Telegraph, 8 January 1979. It was for this reason that Ayatollah Khomeini after his return to Iran after 
fourteen years in exile, on 2 February 1979 said: "If Bakhtiar was a national[figure] it was impossible that 
America and Britain confirmed him". For the text of speech, see Kousar, Vol. 3, pp. 65-86.
15 Sir Anthony Parsons, "The View to the West: Iran and Western Europe" in Martin Wright (ed.), Iran: The 
Khomeini Revolution, Essex: Longman, 1989, p. 80.
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and should not alarm the Arab states of the Gulf, the good working relations between Britain 
and revolutionary Iran lasted only until September 1980, when Britain closed its embassy in 
Tehran. Even during that short period mistrust overshadowed relations, and spying charges 
against British subjects and missionaries continued. Iran's suspicions of British policy in this 
period manifested themselves in events such as the attack on, confiscation and closure of 
Anglican churches, Christian hospitals, and other missions run by British agencies.16
THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
The hostage crisis of November 1979 was a formidable challenge to US foreign policy. The 
US Embassy in Tehran was attacked and occupied by a group of Iranian students. They seized 
the Embassy staff as hostages, accusing them of being involved in espionage, and demanding 
the Shah's extradition from the United States. Ayatollah Khomeini was quick to endorse their 
action. The crisis, which lasted for 444 days antagonised the American public, prevented the 
consolidation of a working relationship between Iran and the United States, contributed to 
President Carter's electoral defeat, and left a bitter legacy that continues to poison US-Iran 
relations.17
The United States took a number of counter-measures: it halted the shipment of military spare 
parts to Iran; it banned the import of Iranian oil; it froze Iran's official assets in the United 
States;18 and it approached its Western allies for co-operative measures -  for diplomatic 
support and economic sanctions. Its allies agreed that international law regarding diplomatic 
immunity should be maintained, and that the Atlantic Alliance had a global aspect which 
could be directed to defend American honour and credibility in Iran.19
Britain, based on its 'special relationship' with the United States, uttered strong words in 
support of Washington. Although London was the first among its European partners to extend 
its support for economic sanctions, it did not, due to economic interests, do anything to prove 
it. Even when the EC countries eventually decided in May 1980 to take some economic 
measures against Tehran, Britain broke ranks with its partners in Europe, and instead secured
16 On these issues, see Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe", The Middle East Journal, p. 221-222.
17 See Hunter, Op. Cit., pp. 56-59; and R. K. Ramazani, "Challenges for US Policy" in R. K. Ramazani (ed.) 
Iran's Revolution; The Search for Consensus, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. 
125-128. On Iranian view of the United States as the world imperialism, see Javad Mansoori, Shenakht-e 
Estekbar-e Jahani (in Persian), [An Introduction to World Imperialism], Mashad: Moassesay-e Chap va 
Entesharat-e Astan-e Ghods-e Razavi, 1993.
18 These measures were taken by the United States on 8, 12, and 14 November 1979 respectively.
19 At a meeting in Brussel on December 13, the Foreign Ministers and representatives of 15 NATO member 
countries emphasised that "any taking of hostages for any motives whatsover, is totally unacceptable and must be 
firmly opposed by the international community as a whole" and urgently called for the immediate release of the 
hostages. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1989, p. 30208.
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its economic interests. In spite of this, the Iranians did not view Britain differently; instead, 
they perceived it as a driving force behind the EC sanctions, and held London responsible for 
mobilising the EC's support for the United States.
This perception was rooted in the fact that when the US allies in the early stage of the crisis 
provided only political backing to Washington, Britain was the first among them to give full 
support to America's call for economic sanctions. Prime Minister Thatcher told President 
Carter on 14 December that if he asked for economic sanctions against Iran, "you would 
expect nothing less and you would get nothing less than our full support".20 Thatcher's 
remarks came at a time "when it was by no means clear what attitude America's allies", 
particularly Britain's partners in the European Community (EC), "were going to take over 
Iran".21 But in practice, Britain only joined its EC partners by confirming its support for 
political and diplomatic efforts, and refusing to introduce trade and financial sanctions against 
Iran.
America's next move was to use the United Nations to put further pressure on Iran by 
denouncing Iran's action, and to enforce collective economic sanctions. The United States 
was successful in securing its first goal,22 but failed to attain the second, as the Soviet Union 
vetoed the resolution calling for collective economic sanctions. After America's failure in the 
Security Council, the Iranian government on 14 January 1980 called on other countries "not 
to get involved in the United States' political games" ,23 The United States severed diplomatic 
relations with Iran on 7 April 1980, imposed unilateral economic sanctions, and urged its 
European allies to do likewise.
To show solidarity with the United States, the EC (Britain included) gave political 
endorsement to the American action, but did not impose sanctions. While emphasising the 
need for strong backing of President Carter, Thatcher said that Americans "understandably 
expect solidarity from their allies, and we, for our part, have been giving and will continue to 
give them our utmost support".24 Although at that time British trade with Iran was running at 
only about 25% of the previous year's level, and Britain had shipped neither arms nor spare 
parts to Iran since early 1980, this was not the result of any unilateral British moves.25 Rather
20 Geoffrey Smith, Reagan and Thatcher, London: The Bodley Head, 1990, p. 18.
21 Ibid., p. 18.
22 The Security Council issued a statement on 9 November 1979 which urged the Iranian government in the 
strongest terms to release the American hostages without delay. (UN Security Council^
S/13616 (1979)). Then the Security Council voted 15-0 in favour of a resolution (Resolution 457, 1979) calling 
on Iran to release the hostages immediately. See "Gahshemar-e Masael-e Mohem Marboot be Iran Matrooha dar 
Shouray-e Amniyat-e Sazman-e Melal", (in Persian), [Chronology of Iranian issues discussed in the Security 
Council], Majallay-e Syasat-e Khareji, [Journal of Foreign Policy], Vol. 3, 1995, pp. 1477-1488.
23 "Iran Warns UN States of Boycott", New York Times, 15 January 1980.
24 British Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons -  Hansard, Vol. 982, 14 April 1980, Columns: 790-791.
25 John Miller, "Britain Keeps Out of Row", Daily Telegraph, 11 December 1979.
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it was due to a "complex series of factors involving the cancellation of contracts and the 
general standstill in the Iranian economy" and also "because no orders were in the pipeline" 
from Iran.26
Disappointed at America's allies' reluctance to impose economic sanctions, President Carter 
criticised those who "ask for protection but are wary of alliance", and those who "ask for 
understanding, yet often decline to understand us in return".27 This finally prompted the EC's 
Foreign Ministers to act. They met in Luxembourg on 22 April, and adopted a two-stage plan, 
initiated by UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Lord Carrington. In the first stage 
diplomatic and limited economic measures were to be taken immediately, including: reducing 
staff at EC countries' embassies in Tehran and Iranian embassies in EC countries, 
reintroducing visa requirements for Iranians travelling to the EC, withholding permission for 
new export or service contracts, and placing a formal ban on sales to Iran of arms or defence- 
related equipment. If no "decisive progress" in the hostage crisis had been made by 17 May, 
these measures would be followed by full-scale trade and economic sanctions, in line with the 
UN Security Council resolution which the Soviet Union had vetoed.28
The original British draft of the EC resolution, however, included a call for all members to 
end oil purchases from Iran.29 Britain, by then an oil-producing country, was less vulnerable 
than its continental allies to a shut-off of Iranian oil. 30 It can be argued that Britain expected 
Iranian oil could be replaced, at least for a few weeks or months, by increased output of oil 
from the British and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea, from Arab countries of the Gulf, 
and from oil sources outside the Middle East. This would, of course, be of short-term 
economic benefit to Britain through sales of North Sea oil, but also an effective way to 
pressure Iran.
However, Britain was reluctant to take any unilateral practical measures against Iran, and 
waited until the EC collectively decided what to do. But at the same time Britain, more than 
any other US ally, publicly supported the US call for economic sanctions. One can conclude
26 Ibid.
27 Carter's remark was after the EC's decision in Lisbon on April 10, 1980 which the EC countries declined to 
impose economic sanctions or to reduce their embassy staffs, and instead issued a renewed condemntation of the 
Iranian government. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, p. 30530.
28 The deadline of 17 May was chosen because first, it coincided with the next EC Foreign Ministers' meeting in 
Naples, second, it was shortly after the new Iranian Parliament was due to meet for the first time, third, it enabled 
certain members of the EC to pass the required legislation ,such as Britain, and third, it gave the Iranian 
government time to reconsider its stance. For the full text of the communique issued by EC Foreign Ministers, 
see Hansard, Vol. 983, Columns: 476-478.
29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, p. 30530.
30 For instance, in March 1980, Britain imported only 275,000 tons of oil from Iran, roughly 3 per cent of its 
needs. See Edward Girardet, Elizabeth Pond, and Rushworth M. Kidder, "Europe Gives Soft Answer to Carter 
Trumpet on Iran", The Christian Science Monitor, 10 April 1980, p. 1.
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that Britain wanted to protect its- political and economic interests, by staying out of economic 
sanctions but displaying more political support than others in Europe for the USA, as a means 
to strengthen its 'special relationship' with its powerful ally. Furthermore, Britain attempted to 
make the EC formula for economic sanctions as harmless to British economic interests as 
possible.
After the deadline of May 17 passed, and following the failed American attempt to rescue the 
hostages, the European Community sought to maximise Europe's role in formulating overall 
Western policies against Iran. As planned at the EC meeting in Luxembourg on 22 April, the 
informal meeting of EC foreign ministers in Naples on 17 and 18 May 1980 decided on 
economic sanctions, prohibiting EC countries from supplying Iran with goods or services 
under any contracts concluded after 4 November 1979, to come into effect on 22 May.31 The 
EC decision was designed as much to mollify American political and public attitudes towards 
Europe as it was to pressure the Iranian government to release the hostages. This is borne out 
by the fact that the sanctions did not include import embargoes, such as on Iranian oil; a 
freeze on Iranian assets; sanctions on financial and banking services; theyalso did not affect the 
bulk of trade between the EC countries and Iran, which was conducted under contracts 
concluded before 4 November 1979.
Britain, despite its full and uncompromising diplomatic and political support for the United 
States, not only avoided taking any unilateral economic measures against Iran, but on the 
contrary, for economic interests it breached the undertaking that it had given to its EC 
partners. In Britain, the Iran Bill had been passed, and was due to take effect on 17 May. The 
Bill empowered the government to impose sanctions on contracts with Iran, provided that no 
order under the Bill applied to existing contracts, or to contracts concluded before 17 May, 
and did not apply to contracts dealing with banking or other financial services.32 The 
government announced on 19 May that the Naples meeting of EC foreign ministers had 
agreed that sanctions would affect contracts signed after 4 November 1979. The 
announcement generated strong criticism from both British Conservative and Labour 
Members of Parliament, who accused the government of deception in the preceding week's 
debates.33 Eventually, the government announced that its sanctions would not now be 
retrospective. This meant that they would not affect contracts signed between 4 November 
1979 and 17 May 1980, the date on which the Iran Bill came into effect. Although Douglas
31 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, p. 30535.
32 Section 1, sub-sections (1), (2)(a), and (2)(b) of the Iran (Temporary Powers) Bill. See Hansard, Vol. 984, 12 
May 1980, Columns: 919-920.
33 For instance, David Winnick (Labour) said: "The government is cheating over the date when sanctions are 
going to be applied"; or Sir Nicolas Bonsor (Conservative) said: "I was not aware that the retrospective element 
of legislation, [is] now going to be invoked against Iran". See "Complaints of Cheating: Emergency Sanctions 
Debate", The Times, 20 May 1980.
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Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, had said that "we do not 
intend either to lag behind or to jump ahead of our other main competitors [EC partners]"34, 
Britain did not or could not stay in line with the other EC countries.
British failure to conform to the EC agreement engendered strong criticism from most EC 
countries. The West German Minister of the Economy, Count Otto Lambsdorff, said "the 
British decision was one of a long line of strong British words and weak actions".35 In France, 
the British failure was strongly criticised as "British solidarity with the US was less evident 
when it came to proving it in practice".36
There were a number of reasons for the EC countries' reluctance to apply comprehensive 
economic sanctions against Iran in general, and for Britain's breaking ranks with them in 
particular. Many EC countries conducted significant trade and financial dealings with Iran, 
and imported much of their oil from there. In 1978 Iran was the EC's fifth largest export 
market.37 Thus the EC countries did not want to lose their market in Iran. Furthermore, fear of 
a full Western embargo might "deliver the Iranian economy into the hands of the Soviet 
Union" and the Eastern bloc was another reason for the EC’s reluctance to impose complete 
economic sanctions.38 Yet the EC's reluctance was largely due to the view that it was 
"unlikely that such action would impress a government driven by ideological rather than 
economic considerations".39 While considering their action might be counterproductive to 
securing the release of the hostages, they feared that full sanctions would alienate the more 
moderate factions in Iran, especially President Abolhasan Banisadr.40 In this regard, Thatcher 
said that there are "people in the Government in Iran who seem to have been very anxious to 
help,. . .  but their hands have not been totally free" 41
In sum, despite strong verbal support of the USA, Britain took the weakest stand in Europe 
over economic sanctions against Iran. Although London reduced the efficacy of sanctions 
even further on 29 May by exempting extensions of existing trade contracts and new contracts 
made in continuation of an established course of business42, this did not help Britain's image 
in Iran.
34Hansard, Vol. 984, 12 May 1980, Column: 916.
35 "The Sanctions Mouse that Squeaked", The Economist, 24 May 1980.
3  ^John Wyles, "UK Sanctions about Face", Financial Times, 21 May 1980.
37 "More Bark than Bites", The Economist, 24 May 1980, p. 67.
38 Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe",The Middle East Journal, p. 225.
39 Richard Wallis, "EEC Delays Sanctions Stand, Demands Iran Free Hostages", International Herald Tribune, 
11 April 1980.
4(3 In an interview with four European newspapers on May 17, Banisadr urged the Community not to impose 
sanctions. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, p. 30535.
43 In the House of Commons, a MP naming Banisadr as the best hope for the release of the hostages, advised the 
Prime Minister to strengthen his position in Iran. See Hansard, Vol. 982, 14 April 1980, Columns: 795-796.
42 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, p. 30536.
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The Iranian perception of Britain as the Shah's accomplice and an American satellite led to an 
attack on the British Embassy on 5 November 1979, one day after the seizure of the American 
Embassy. This temporary occupation was ended by the intervention of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards.43 In fact the Iranian leaders did not want by creating another crisis to 
worsen Iran's international position which was already tainted by the US hostage crisis.
The Iranian Embassy in London was also occupied in May 1980. The occupiers, "Iranian 
Arabs, ... Iraqi-trained and bitterly opposed to the prevailing regime in Iran"44 took the staff 
hostage, and demanded the release of 91 Arabs imprisoned in Iran. Sadegh Qotbzadeh, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister, ruled out acceptance of the demands, and said that the "British 
government will be held responsible for everything that happens to our diplomats".45 In a 
message to Banisadr, Mrs Thatcher promised that "the lives of the hostages would be the 
paramount consideration of her government".46 Since the incident occurred in Britain, which 
they saw as a conspiratorial power, Iranians suspected the British government of fabricating it 
in order to force Tehran to release the American hostages. Their suspicions were deepened by 
the fact that London was making more noise than the other European countries in support of 
the United States. Despite the absence of any evidence of direct or indirect British 
involvement in the hostage crisis at the Iranian Embassy, thousands of Iranians marched past 
the British Embassy on their way to the American Embassy, the 'nest of spies', chanting 
'Death to Britain' and 'Death to Thatcher'. However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman 
warned the demonstrators against any attempt to seize the British Embassy, for he claimed it 
would only benefit "the Iraqi Baath and America".47
The six-day siege of the Iranian Embassy in London was finally ended when the Special Air 
Service (SAS) stormed it.48 Although in a message to Mrs Thatcher Banisadr expressed his
43 For more information on the occupation of the British Embassy by Iranian demostrators, see Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, P. 30205, and also Daily Telegraph, 6 November 1979, p. 1.
44 See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, p. 89. On the 
occupation of the Iranian Embassy, see The New York Times, 1 May 1980; The London times, 1 May 1980; and 
also "Iran's Embassy in London Seized", The Christian Science Monitor, 1 May 1980. On the issue whether Iraq 
was implicated in the incident, see "Suspicions Harden on Iraqi Involvement in Siege of Embassy", The London 
Times, 12 May 1980, p. 2.
45 The Guardian, 2 May 1980. Qotbzadeh also said that the American hostages at the United States embassy in 
Tehran had been taken in response to "25 years of suppression and destruction" of Iran, with the American 
plotting against the people and interfering in its affairs, whereas the hostage-taking in the Iranian Embassy was 
an action of "a few mercenaries" in London. See The Times, 2 May 1980.
46 The New York Times, 2 May 1980.
47 The Times, 2 May 1980.
4  ^As Thatcher believed that the incident was an act to exploit the perceived Western weakness, she was keen to 
resolve the crisis even by force. She says: "I was conscious that, though the group involved was a different one, 
this was no less an attempt to exploit perceived western weakness than was the hostage-taking of the American 
embassy personnel in Tehran. My policy would be to do everything possible to resolve the crisis peacefully . . . ,  
but above all to ensure that terrorism should be - and be seen to be -  defeated". See Thatcher, Op. Cit., p. 89.
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gratitude for her government's action, the development neither changed the status of the 
American hostages in Iran, nor did it enhance Iranian-British relations.49 Alongside the 
exchange of messages between Banisadr and Thatcher, there was another influential trend 
developing in Iran, headed by the Islamic Republican Party, which interpreted the crisis and 
its resolution differently.50 The Iranian daily, Islamic Republic (an organ of the Islamic 
Republican Party which emerged later as the biggest group in the first post-revolutionary 
Iranian Parliament), wrote that the whole incident in London was a conspiracy between 
Britain and the United States, and that the British security forces had deliberately blown up 
the Iranian Embassy building.51 The daily quoted an adviser to Iran's Charge d' Affaires in 
London as saying: "Blowing up the embassy was in retaliation for the damage done to the 
British embassy in Iran" during the revolutionary period of 1978-79 on 5 November 1978.52 
This view gained further popularity in Iranian public opinion when it was learnt that the 
British government had greatly reduced the staff of its embassy in Tehran one week before 
the London incident. The staff, which had gradually increased from 8 to 24 officers between 
early January and mid-April 1980, was reduced to five on 22 April.53 In fact this reduction 
was in the context of the EC’s decision to reduce its presence in Tehran in protest at the 
Iranian government's refusal to release the American hostages, and could not be related to 
Iran's Embassy incident. The reduction nonetheless enforced Iranian perception of Britain as a 
conspiratorial power. An Iranian scholar, Mohammad Shokrani has clearly reflected this 
perception by linking the staff reduction in Tehran to the incident in London. He writes: 
"Iran's embassy in London was occupied when the British government had withdrawn its staff 
from Tehran and was sure of the safety of its diplomats in case of retaliation".54
In this context the view that the Iranian embassy in London was the victim of a Carter- 
Thatcher conspiracy, stimulated by the Iraqis, prevailed.55 This was despite the fact that some 
Iranian officials attempted to refute it, as for instance, Qotbzadeh debunked the view 
propounded by Islamic Republic.56 Furthermore, besides its strong support for the United
40 On the expectations that British action would be used to enhance the situation of American hostages in Tehran 
and also put British-Iranian relations in a better position, see The Times, 7 May 1980.
50 The double policy of the Islamic Republic of having two different versions of events were the main features 
o f the second phase of Iran's domestic politics which greatly impacted on Iran's foreign relations. This phase has 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
51 Cited in The Guardian, 6 May 1980.
52 The adviser regretted that the Iranian foreign ministry had congratulated the British government, saying: "The 
ministry does not know about the moves of the (British) Intelligence Service and its plots". See Daily Telegraph, 
8 May 1980.
53 Doglus Hurd said in parliament: ". . . From 22 April, the number of UK-based staff will be five -four 
diplomatic staff and one other supporting officer", see Hansard, Vol. 983, 25 April 1980, Columns: 251-252.
54 Mohammad Shokrani, Amalkard-e Yazdeh Salay-e Doulat-e Mohafezehkar-e Margaret Thatcher (in Persian), 
[The Eleven Year Record of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government], Tehran: Moassesay-e Chap va 
Entesharat-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 1993, p. 183.
See Rushworth M. Kidder, "Bold Rescue Buoys London but Iran Relations Still Cool", The Christian Science 
Monitor, 7 May 1980.
50 See The Guardian, 7 May 1980.
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States during the hostage crisis, Britain's acquiescence in the EC decision to impose economic 
sanctions offset any credit which Britain might have gained from freeing the Iranian hostages 
in London. As such, Iran's embassy crisis thwarted the growth of Iranian-British relations.
In addition, there were other events that led to temporary closure of the British Embassy in 
Tehran. On 4 August 1980 sixty-eight Iranian students, protesting at the detention of 192 
Iranian students in Washington, were arrested during a demonstration at the United States 
embassy in London. The detainees accused the London police of unjust and discriminatory 
behaviour, and began a hunger strike. In Iran, official news reports accused "blood-sucking 
British police" of brutality against the students, and compared the treatment of the 
demonstrators with the way "the coloniser executioners crushed freedom-seekers in India, 
Egypt, and Arab countries during the Second World War, when the British Empire was dying 
away".57 Furthermore, soon after the arrest of the students in London, Iran arrested three 
British Anglican missionaries and one businessman58 -  a development which was 
accompanied by growing demonstrations outside the British Embassy. The demonstrators in 
Tehran, some of whom were on hunger strike, chanted 'Death to England', 'Death to America’, 
and 'Death to Thatcher'. British embassy officials in Tehran reported that they had been told 
that they would be "blown up" if anything happened to the students in London.59 Against this 
background, the British government on 18 August announced the temporary closure of its 
embassy, an early indication of serious deterioration in relations. In response to an Iranian 
Foreign Ministry enquiry about the closure, the British Embassy said it was due to staff 
shortages.60 But Britain had good reasons to close its embassy. It was fearful that it would be 
seized, as had the American Embassy, and it thought that its closure would help end the 
Iranian demonstrations against it, or at least reduce their intensity. As a British Foreign Office 
spokesman explained, the British government "just thought at a time of tension it was best to 
pull in a bit".61 It was also because Britain wanted time to act against the students detained in 
London without being concerned about the safety of its diplomats and embassy in Tehran. 
Meanwhile, British public opinion, fed by the media, was turning against Iran and the 
students. Articles and comments in newspapers were asking the government to deport them.62
57 The Times, 6 August 1980.
58 British missionaries who were arrested, on 6 and 10 August, were Jean Waddel, John Coleman and his wife, 
Audrey Coleman. The fourth Briton was Andrew Pyke. For more elaboration on this issue, see Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXVI, 1980, p. 30631; and Leslie Keith, "Iran's Spy Phobia Extended to Press and 
Missionaries"', The Christian Science Monitor, 12 August 1980.
59 Daily Telegraph, 12 August 1980.
See Shokrani, Op. Cit., p. 185.
01 The New York Times, 18 August 1980.
02 British public opinion was so hostile to the Iranian students that an Iranian embassy official in London 
accused the media of misleading the public. See, Daily Telegraph, 12 August 1980. On British newspapers 
demanding the deportation of Iranian students, see The Observer, 10 August; The Sunday Times, 10 August; and 
Daily Telegraph, 18 August 1980. For instance, Daily Telegraph "Iranian students who have been invited to 
study here should be invited to return home immediately . . . .  The country would be well rid of them". See "Go 
Back to Iran", Daily Telegraph, 18 August 1980.
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Prior to the official closure of the embassy, the cooling of diplomatic relations had led to the 
British refusing entry to many Iranian travellers. For instance, from the revolution until 
March 1980, 2540 Iranians were turned back at Heathrow Airport.63 The British government 
then suspended the 1973 visa abolition agreement, and announced that from 19 May 1980 all 
Iranian passport-holders must obtain visas before travelling.64 More than 10,000 Iranian 
students were studying in Britain in the academic year 1979-1980, representing a 10 per cent 
fall compared to 1978-1979. Under Iran's agreement with Britain, Iranian students were 
required to pay only 40% of the costs of their courses. But due to the cooling in relations 
since the Iranian revolution, Dr Rhodes Boyson, Secretary of State for Education and Science, 
announced that Iranian students beginning courses on or after 1 September 1980, would be 
required to pay full costs.65
The British Embassy was officially closed in early September 1980, with Britain retaining 
only a small interests section located in the Swedish Embassy. The reasons for this 
development, which did not amount to complete severing of relations with Iran, were 
threefold. The first was that Britain's hope and expectation that figures such as Banisadr, as 
one British official said, "would bring significant influence to bear on the Ayatollah's 
[Khomeini] followers" had vanished.66 The second was related to the warning by Iran's 
Islamist Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai, that Iran would "show an appropriate 
reaction" unless Britain stopped its "cruelties" against Iranian students arrested in London. He 
angrily criticised British hostility towards Iran and London's lack of appropriate sensitivity to 
the realities of the revolution.67 These remarks exacerbated the anti-British mood in Iran, and 
endangered the British Embassy and interests there, especially after the British government 
decided to deport 44 Iranian students. The third concerned the expectation of a future working 
relationship with Iran, as the British hoped to re-open the embassy "once the deportation flap 
die[d] down".68 In general, as one British official reports, the closure was the result of two
63 The Sunday Telegraph, 30 March 1980. On the issue of advising Iranians and British businessmen by Iranian 
and British officials* not to travel to London and Tehran respectively, see Daily Telegraph, 29 January 1980; and 
Financial limes, o March 1980.
64 Se&Hansard, Vol. 984, 12 May 1980, column: 349; and "Iranians Entering Britain Will Have to Have Visas", 
The Christian Science Monitor, 13 May 1980.
65 It is also important to note that Boyson was Education Minister in the early Thatcher government, which was 
devoted to cutting costs. For more information on the numbers of Iranian students studying in Britain, see 
Hansard, Vol. 991, 29 October 1980, Column 287 and also The Sunday Telegraph, 18 May 1980. On the issue of 
change of law by which Iranian students had to pay the full cost of courses, see Hansard, Vol. 994, 26 
November 1980, Column 122.
66 Alexander Macleod, "Souring Relations Between Britain and Iran Fit Revolutionary Pattem", The Christian 
Science Monitor, 13 August 1980.
67 The New York Times, 5 September 1980. Also then speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, attacked Britain and labelled it "an Amerian satellite". See The Guardian, 5 September 1980.
68 Rushworth M. Kidder, "Britain Closes Doors of Embassy in Tehran", The Christian Science Monitor, 11 
September 1980.
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elements: the past history of British intervention in Iran and the deep preoccupation of 
Iranians with Britain's conspiratorial role in their country, although London's concerns about 
the security of its diplomats in Tehran also played its part in the process.69
In sum, besides its immediate negative effect on relations between Tehran and London, the 
closure of the British Embassy strengthened the Iranian view that British policies towards 
Iran were always in conformity with those of the United States. The closure was seen as a 
further show of British support for the US government, and as aimed at doing further harm to 
Iran's international position. This view was so strong among the revolutionary leaders that 
even a few years later, when Britain wanted to re-open its embassy, one of Iran's demands 
was that Britain apologise for closing it during the American hostage crisis. Had the British 
government known that re-opening would take almost eight years, it might not have closed it. 
The Iranian government wanted to keep Britain handicapped by its very small representation, 
so requests for re-opening went unanswered until 1988.
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
The closure of the embassy, and Lord Carrington's visit to Iraq a few weeks before the 
beginning of the Iran-Iraq War on 22 September 1980, strengthened Iranian suspicions that 
Britain was involved in wider conspiracies against Iran. This was important, as Iranians 
viewed the war as little more than a conspiracy hatched by the West, in which Saddam 
Hossein played a major role, to overthrow the new revolutionary regime in Iran. The war 
emerged as another obstacle to enhancing relations between the two sides. Iranian-British 
relations during the war (1980-1988) can be examined in three phases.
The initial phase (1980-1982): Iraq on the offensive
This phase was characterised by*e iraqiL military's predominance and occupation of large areas 
of Iranian territory. During this phase the Iranian government expected Britain, like other 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, to condemn the invasion. However, the 
British failed to do so. As Sir John Moberley, British ambassador to Iraq (1982-1985), 
explicitly put it to the author, British reluctance to condemn the invasion or to attempt to 
achieve a balanced resolution in the Security Council had two main causes. The first was the 
W est's general concern about the destabilising effects of the Iranian revolution on Middle 
Eastern countries, particularly Britain's traditional friends in the Persian Gulf region, and
69 Author’s interview with a British official dealing with Iranian issues, London, 2 April 1996.
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Britain's perception of the Iranian government as an outlaw regime. The second was the US 
hostage crisis and its emotional impact, which left no room for sympathy in Western 
countries, particularly Britain, towards Iran.70 In fact the hostage crisis "had alienated 
international opinion to the extent that no state was ready to come to Iran's defence".71 
Furthermore, the detention of four Britons in Iran since August 1980 on charges of espionage 
also played its part in London's silence over the Iraqi invasion.
Britain did not even go so far as to call for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. After the Iraqi 
invasion, the UN Security Council did not meet until 28 September. The first resolution (No. 
479), backed by Britain and other permanent members of the Security Council, divested the 
Iranian government of any hope of support. The resolution termed the war a 'situation' instead 
of a 'conflict', thus reducing its importance to endangering international peace, and made no 
reference to the need for an urgent decision to end it. It merely advised both sides to resort to 
peaceful means 72 It made no mention of respect for Iran's territorial integrity, and sought 
neither a cease-fire nor withdrawal to the recognised international borders. It only called for 
the cessation of hostilities, which would leave Iraq occupying large parts of Iran. The initial 
Iranian suspicion of the British at the beginning of the war was re-enforced by London's 
silence on the Iraqi invasion and the absence of Britain's call for an Iraqi withdrawal. As 
Halliday states, at the outset of the war, Britain, a permanent member of the Security Council, 
was correctly seen "as having connived at Iraq's aggression by not demanding an immediate 
cease-fire and withdrawal" 73
The Security Council's bias in general, and that of the British in particular, infuriated Tehran, 
and Security Council Resolution 479 further reinforced the Iranian government's general 
mistrust of international organisations. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati’s words are 
indicative of the dominant perception among Iranians of the war as a Western conspiracy 
against Iran. In his speech at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly in October 1985 
he asked:
70 Author's interview with Sir John Moberley, 25 April 1996, London. He was former British ambassador to 
Jordan (1975-1979), former Assistant Under-Secretary of the UK Foreign Office supervising the Middle Eastern 
and Northern African Department (1979-1982), and former British ambassador to Iraq (1982-1985). At the time 
of interview he was a consultant to the Middle East Program in the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
London.
71 Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe", in Ramazani (ed.), Iran's Revolution; p. 79.
72 Documents of the United Nations, SC/Res. 479(1980). There is a difference between dealing with a 'situation'
and a 'conflict'. For more information on this issue, see Nasrin Mosaffa, etal, Tajavoz-e Iraq bi Iran va 
Mozeagiri-e Sazman-e Melal-e Mottahed (in Persian), [Iraqi Invasion of Iran and the United Nations Stances], 
Tehran: Entesharat-e Markaz-e Motaleat-e Aali-e Beinolmelali-e Daneshkaday-e Hoqooq va Oloom-e Syasi, 
1987, P. 69; and also Abbas Maleki and Sohrab Shahabi, "Gozareshi az Seminar-e Iran bad az Atashbas" (in 
Perisan), [A Report from Seminar; Iran After Ceasefire], Booltan-e Daftar-e Motaleat-e Siyasi va 
jBeinolmelali , [Bulletin of the Institute of Political and International Studies], Vol. 34, Tehran: Daftar-e
Motaleat-e Siyasi va Beinolmelali Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah* 1989, pp. 21-22.
10 Fred Halliday, "An Elusive Normalisation: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution", Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 312.
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Why did the Security Council, despite its precedence in other international disputes, 
not condemn the flagrant aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran by Iraq at 
the very beginning of the imposition of war . . . ? Why did the Security Council, 
despite its well known behaviour in other international disputes, not request the 
withdrawal of Iraq's occupying forces in its first resolution in this war? Does all this 
negligence not point an accusing finger at those who urged Iraq to invade Iran... ?7^
Earlier, at the 38th session of the General Assembly in September 1983, Velayati had 
condemned "the Security Council's silence . . .  [as] in perfect harmony with the evil desires of 
the Iraqi Foreign Minister [as expressed] in his letter of 24th October 1980" in which he had 
announced that any call for withdrawal of Iraqi forces before Iran's recognition of Iraqi 
sovereignty over the disputed borders would be impossible.75 The sense of Iran's international 
isolation in the war was reflected when Velayati said: "... we are convinced that . . .  we are 
alone and have to fight an enemy . . .  single-handedly".76
Britain's silence over Iraq's aggression was compounded by its refusal to supply Iran with 
spare parts for the modified British Chieftain tanks bought by the Shah, and to release a 
warship which Iran desperately needed for use against the Iraqi forces.77
Once the War had begun, the Iranian government realised that the American hostages in 
Tehran could no longer serve to consolidate domestic politics or to enhance the capacity of 
Iran's war machine against Iraq. It therefore decided in January 1981 to release them; and 
while desiring more international support in the war, it accepted mediation by a special envoy 
of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Terry Waite, through the Swedish embassy in Tehran, to 
release the four British detainees in February 1981. The Iranian government expected their 
release to make the British government break its silence and condemn the Iraqi aggression. 
However, London saw the release as removing a major obstacle to normalising British- 
Iranian relations and re-opening its embassy in Tehran, but not sufficient to prompt it to 
condemn the Iraqi aggression. In fact, the Thatcher government wanted the release of the
7  ^For the full text of Ali Akbar Velayati's speech, see Didgahhay-e Jahani-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in 
Persian), [Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs on Global Perspectives of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran], Address to the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 1985, Tehran: Daftar-e 
Ravabet Omoomi-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 1985, pp. 1-26.
75 Velayati's speech in September 1983, New York. See Didgahhay-e Jahani-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in 
Persian), [Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs on Global Perspectives of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran], Address to the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 1983, Tehran: Daftar-e 
Ravabet Omoomi-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 1983, pp. 6-7.
76 Ibid., p. 7.
77 On this issue, see David K. Willis, "West Europe Survey Post-Hostage, Reagan Era", The Christian Science 
Monitor, 21 January 1981.
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detainees to lead to what Lord Carrington described as "proper representation" in Iran.78
Since early 1981 the British government had realised that Iran's revolution was well- 
established, and that Iraq's assumption that its invasion would cause the Islamic Republic to 
disintegrate had been mistaken. Thus, Britain attempted to resume its working relationship 
with Iran and re-open its embassy. Douglas Hurd on 14 January 1981 clearly showed 
Britain's intention in this respect when he said:
We have no quarrel with the Iranian revolution and no desire to interfere in their 
affairs or influence how they run their affairs or who they choose to govern them. 
Whatever may have happened in the past, whatever may have been the past nature 
of our involvement with Iran, its present nature is clear: we have no desire to 
interfere in matters which the Iranians rightly regard as entirely their own affairs. 
Iran is an important country in the Middle East, an important country in our eyes, 
and we would wish to return to our traditional relationship with it.79
During 1981 and 1982, the British government tried several times to improve relations with 
Iran and discussed the re-opening of its embassy. But every time Iranian anger over British 
silence in the war, London's official policy of neutrality, and the anti-Western policy of the 
idealists in the Iranian government prevailed. From the British perspective, as one British 
official informed the author, since Summer 1981 Britain had wanted to re-open its embassy 
but Iran, wanting to keep Britain handicapped, rejected London's requests.80 In addition, 
Iran's rejection stemmed from suspicion of the British which, in turn, could not allow Iran to 
trust them if they were provided with more diplomatic opportunities. In a meeting in 1981 
between Deputy Prime Minister Mohammad Hashemi and the Head of the British Interests 
section in Tehran, Hashemi said:
. . .  The nation of Iran can no longer trust Britain. The British government during the 
hostage crisis, under the pretext of a breach of human rights, supported the United 
States. At present, while the war which America has imposed on us using Saddam is 
going on, while our civil areas, schools, and even hospitals are bombarded by Iraq 
and many Iranians are dying or being injured, the British government as a neutral in 
the war is keeping silent . . . .  The past relations and the bitter memories of the 
Iranian Muslim nation of Britain, and also the British stances towards post­
revolutionary Iran have not left any room for Iranians to trust Britain.* 8 *
The release of the American hostages and British detainees in early 1981 led only to Britain
78 Ibid.
79 Hansard, Vol. 996, 14 January 1981, Columns: 1121-24.
8® Author's interview with a British official, London, 2 April 1996.
8 1 "Molaghat-e Moaven-e Nokhost Vazir ba Kardar-e Englestan" (in Persian), [Deputy Prime Minister's Meeting 
with the British Head of Mission], Azadegan Daily, 30 April 1981.
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increasing the number of officers in its Interests section in the Swedish Embassy from five to 
seven in March 1981. Relations between Tehran and London were so unpleasant that during a 
Friday sermon in July 1981 in Qom, Ayatollah Meshkini, an influential cleric, expressed 
Iran’s support for the "oppressed and deprived people of Northern Ireland", wished their 
victory over the "old fox of British colonialism", and prayed for overthrow of the oppressive 
colonialist government.82 Meanwhile, a main street in central Tehran was renamed Bobby 
Sands Avenue.83
The middle phase (1982-1987): Iran on the offensive
The main feature of this period was that Iran regained most of its occupied territory, and in 
some areas was even fighting inside Iraq. Having consolidated their position, the Islamists 
were much more stronger and united domestically, and could direct the war more 
confidently.84 Meanwhile, as much as Iraq was ready for a negotiated peace, Iranians were 
eager to continue the war until their demands were met, including denunciation of Iraq as an 
aggressor by the UN Security Council, and the removal of Saddam Hussein.
As Iraq was in fact asking the Western countries and international organisations for initiatives 
to end the war, British attempts to help in this respect were in contradiction with Iranian 
policy. While fearing further escalation of the war, Britain had good reasons to want it ended. 
The first of its concerns was the danger of the conflict spreading to other Persian Gulf states. 
Mrs Thatcher stated: "I was chiefly concerned to prevent the conflict spreading down the Gulf 
and involving the vulnerable oil-rich Gulf States, which had traditionally close links with 
Britain".85 Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Richard Luce, said: "If 
fighting were to spread, the danger to friendly countries in the Gulf and thus to British 
interests could be serious. We therefore take every opportunity of encouraging an early 
negotiated settlement".86 Its second concern was related to a possible Iranian military or 
political victory, and the effect this might have on the interests of Western countries in 
general, and Britain in particular. The British feared that Iran might force a change of regime 
in Baghdad to one friendly or even subservient to Tehran. Its third concern stemmed from a 
consideration that if Iran won the war and installed a sympathetic regime in Baghdad, this
82 Daily Telegraph, 11 July 1981.
83 Bobby Sands was an anti-British IRA activist in Northern Ireland who was sentenced to 14 years’ 
imprisonment in 1977. He went on hunger strike and died in 1981.
84 For detailed information on the different Iranian war operations during 1982-1987 in which Iran regained its 
territories and took the war into Iraq, see Abbas Hedayati Khomeini, Shouray-e Amniyat va Jang-e Tahmili Iraq 
Alayh-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in Persian), [Security Council and the Iraqi Imposed War on the Islamic 
Republic of Iran], Tehran: Daftar-e Motaleaat-e Syasi va Beinolmelali, 1991, pp. 82-127.
85 Thatcher, Op. Cit., p. 91.
86 Hansard, Vol. 60, 14 May 1984, Columns: 26-27.
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would create a powerful regional bloc with huge oil resources and military capacities. This 
would endanger the rule of the traditional monarchies and Britain's regional friends, who 
from the outset of the war had grouped themselves into the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
In view of Iran's attempts to export its revolution, the British government perceived the war 
as enabling Iran to pose a threat to its traditional friends in the Gulf. Its fourth concern arose 
from a feeling that the war might endanger the free navigation and flow of oil from the Gulf, 
on which the Western economies were heavily dependent. Mrs Thatcher explained this 
concern when she said that after Iraq's initial successes "the Iraqis became bogged down and 
the war threatened both the stability of the Gulf and western shipping".87 Its fifth concern 
related to the possibility that continuation of the war would increase the likelihood of Soviet 
involvement in the region, and also could enhance the Soviet Union's chances of improving 
its position in both Iran and Iraq by supplying both with arms.88
Iranian-British relations in the middle phase were largely affected by their divergent policies 
regarding the war. The British government on many occasions subordinated normalisation of 
its relations with Iran to the need to end the war. For instance, Tim Renton, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said in Parliament: "As a long-term objective we 
will seek to establish a better relationship with the Iranian government. So that once this 
dreadful war is ended,. . .  we may have a reasonable relationship with a country that will be 
of extreme importance in the Middle East" .89 In contrast, a determining factor in Iran's 
relations with other countries was the extent of the latter's sympathy towards Iran or 
understanding of Iran's reasons for continuing the war. Ayatollah Khomeini stated: " . . .  it was 
through the war that we recognised our enemies and friends".90 Velayati's remarks also 
categorised Iran's friends and enemies on the basis of their approach to the War 91 So the 
incompatibility of Iran's and Britain's views on the war was a major obstacle in this phase to 
improving their relations.
To prompt Iran to a negotiated peace without addressing its minimal demands, the British 
government played three roles within three contexts: as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, as an influential member of the EC in the context of Euro-GCC relations,
87 Thatcher, Op. Cit., p. 91.
88 For more information on the perceived Western threat from continuation of the war and particularly British 
concerns, see Barry Rubin, "The Gulf states and the Iran-Iraq War", in Efraim Karsh (ed.), The Iran-Iraq War; 
Impact and Implications, London: Macmillan, 1989, PP. 123-125; and also Roger Matthew, "Foreign Policy 
Aims to be 'Neither East nor West'", Financial Times, 1 April 1985.
89 Hansard , Vol. 106, 3December 1986, Columns: 923-24.
90 Sahifay-e Noor, Collection of Imam Khomeini's Guidelines, Vol. 21, Tehran: Sazman-e Madarek-e Farhangi 
Enghelab-e Islami, 1982, p. 94.
9 * Didgahhay-e Jahani-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in Persian), [Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs on Global Perspectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran], Address to the 41st Session of the UN General 
Assembly, New York, October 1986, Tehran: Daftar-e Ravabet Omoomi-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 1987, 
pp. 15-18.
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and finally as an individual country in the context of an official policy of neutrality.
Almost 22 months after its first resolution of 479 in 1980, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 514 in 1982. This long delay was very meaningful to Iranians, since it was during 
this period that Iraqi forces established themselves on Iranian territory. But when in 1982 the 
tide of war was reversed for the first time, and Iranian forces were able to establish 
themselves at many points in Iraqi territory, the Council adopted a second resolution, at last 
calling for both sides to withdraw to internationally-recognised borders, and eventually 
mentioning the Article of the UN Charter that called for respect of territorial integrity. While 
the Council's earlier delay in meeting, and the first resolution's failure to call for an Iraqi 
withdrawal, had a profoundly negative effect on Iranians, the second resolution's failure to 
explore the origins of the war, and inclusion of a call for withdrawal, strengthened Iran's 
perception that the Security Council had a pro-Iraqi bias.92 The Iranian government believed 
that the permanent members, particularly the Western states, had deliberately adopted pro- 
Iraqi resolutions without paying attention to Iranian grievances. At this point, perceiving that 
it could not influence the Security Council, Iran disassociated itself from Security Council 
meetings dealing with the war, and its delegation ceased to participate in UNSC meetings.
From 1982 until 1987 the Security Council adopted six resolutions,93 but none of them could 
"convince the Iranian government of the impartiality of the Council. No attempt had been 
made to rectify the original omission of exploring the origins of the war" 94 Britain either 
initiated these resolutions or supported them strongly.
Britain's second role was in the context of Euro-GCC relations.95 The Iranian government 
viewed the Gulf Cooperation Council as a group formed by the western powers, particularly 
Britain, because of its traditional influence on GCC members, and intended as a barrier 
against the Islamic revolution.96 Considering the political, military, and financial support 
which the GCC members, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, were giving to Iraq in the war,
92 On this issue, see Sir Anthony Parsons, "Iran and the United Nations, with Particular Reference to the Iran- 
Iraq War", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, 
London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 15-18.
93 These resolutions were SCR 514 (1982), SCR 522 (1982), SCR 540 (1983), SCR 552 (1984), SCR 588 
(1986).
94 Parsons, "Iran and the United Nations, with Particular Reference to the Iran-Iraq War", Op. C if  p. 18.
93 The latest Euro-GCC meeting by the time of this writing was on customs union, held in Doha, Qatar, 1997. 
For details of this meeting and also the Euro-Arab conference held in Dubai in 1997, see Richard Myddleton, 
"Pax Europe", The Middle East, No. 267, May 1997, pp. 9-19.
96 For a general study of the GCC and other groupings in the Arab world, see Joseph A. Kechichian, Security 
Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organisations, RAND Note, prepared for the 
US Under Secretary o f  Defense for Policy, N-3570-USD. Also on the specific perception of Iran on the GCC, 
see Bahman Naimi Arfa, Mabani-e Raftari-e Shouray-e Hamkari-e Khalij-e Fars dar Qebal-e Jomhoori-e 
Islami-e Iran (in Perisan), [The Rules of the GCCs Behaviour Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran], Tehran: 
Daftar-e Motaleat-e Syasi va Beinolmelali, 1991, Chapters 1 and 2.
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the Iranians believed that the GCC was virtually fighting alongside Iraq.97 Tehran radio on 12 
November 1981 described the GCC as moving towards "a military alliance directed by 
imperialist circles", and claimed that "the main reason for [the GCC’s] establishment was to 
counter the Islamic revolution in the region" 98
In this situation, the Thatcher government, welcoming the formation of the GCC, believed 
that the West had to be active in the strategically vital Persian Gulf. In the context of Euro- 
GCC dialogue, Britain, in line with its goal of forcing Iran to a negotiated peace, adopted a 
two-track policy. The first track involved Britain's arms sales, which were directed much 
more to the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, than to the main belligerents 99 In Mrs 
Thatcher's words, Britain was to continue "to supply equipment, training and service" to the 
GCC members.100 By selling arms and services to the GCC states and supporting them 
politically, London intended to improve their confidence, security, stability and strength. 
This, in turn, would enable them to support Iraq actively in the war.101 The second track of 
British policy towards the GCC was to endorse their stances in support of Iraq, and to give 
them full backing for any steps and initiatives which could enable them to prompt Iran to end 
the war.
The British government as an individual country played an important role during the war in 
the context of the official policy of neutrality. Unlike France, Britain saw "her interests more 
plainly as retaining decent relations, to the extent that the policies of either belligerent 
allowed, with both Iran and Iraq".102 For this reason, Britain allowed Iran to retain its 
diplomatic mission in London even though its own representation in Tehran had been reduced 
to an interests section. The British policy of neutrality was based on guidelines which said:
(i) We should maintain our consistent refusal of any lethal equipment to either side;
(ii) subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to fulfil existing 
contracts and obligations; (iii) we should not approve orders for any defence 
equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the capability of either 
side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict; (iv) in line with this policy, we should 
continue to scrutinise rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply of
97 For the GCC support for Iraq in the early stages of the War, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 
x x v n , 1981, pp. 31009-10 and Dilip Hiro, The Longest War; The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, London: Grafton 
Books, 1989, pp. 75-81. On Iran’s relations with the regional countries, particularly the GCC countries during 
the war, see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at the War, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988, 
Chapter. 9.
98 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXIX, 1983, p. 32050.
99 For instance, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Britain for the purchase of military equipment and 
aircraft worth US$ 5.640 million. See Keesing Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXI, 1985, p. 34012.
100 Thatcher, Op. Cit., pp. 162-3.
101 On this issue see John Chipman, "Europe and the Iran-Iraq War", in Efraim Karsh (ed.), The Iran-Iraq War; 
Impact and Implications, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 220.
102 Ibid., p. 218.
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defence equipment to Iran and Iraq. 103
"Since Britain had been Iran's second largest arms supplier, its neutral stance hurt Iran more 
than Iraq".104 Moreover, despite its declared neutral policy, Britain tilted towards Iraq. In 
addition to its general policy of condemning Iran for continuing the war, and its political and 
diplomatic pressure on Iran to end it, Britain provided training for some members of the Iraqi 
armed forces,105 and in 1982 agreed to repair 50 Iranian Chieftain tanks which Iraq had 
captured.106 It was revealed, particularly after the end of the war, that many London arms 
dealers were transferring arms to Iraq during the war, and that the British government and 
some officials were involved.107 Following the Iraqi foreign minister's visit to London in 
March 1981, Iraq concluded a technical and economic agreement with Britain.108 
Furthermore, two protocols were signed, in 1983 and 1984, each providing a £250 million 
line of credit for supply of UK capital goods, equipment and services to Iraq. This line of 
credit was renewed in 1987.109
In 1984, when Iraq was anxious to end the war, it started the 'tanker war'. To pressure Iran 
economically, and also maximise the major powers' involvement in the region, Iraq targeted 
Iran's oil installations and tankers heading to or from Iranian ports. As Iraq had no shipping in 
the area, Iran responded by attacking tankers heading to and from Iraq's financial supporters. 
Although Britain and other major powers had realised that "if Iraq stopped attacking shipping, 
Iran would follow suit immediately"110, they made no serious attempt to persuade or force 
Iraq to stop. Instead, Britain condemned the Iranian actions, and showed its intention to 
intervene militarily alongside the United States to secure free navigation in the Persian Gulf. 
In addition to maintaining its patrol of two warships in the Indian Ocean, London put four 
warships on standby in the Mediterranean.* 111
During this phase, the cut in oil prices was another issue in which Iran suspected British 
involvement. While heavily dependent on oil exports to finance its war effort, Iran perceived
103 Hansard, Vol. 100, Columns: 7-8.
104 Hiro,Op. Cit.,p. 81.
105 Hansard, Vol. 103, 27 October 1986, Column: 74.
106 Daily Telegraph, 11 March 1982.
107 For these revelations and reports, see John Sweeney, Trading with the Enemy; Britain's Arming of Iraq, 
London: Pan Books Ltd, 1993.
108 Hiro, Op. Cit., p. 81.
100 Hansard, Vol. 121, 29 October 1987, Columns: 386-7.
110 Parsons, "Iran and the United Nations, with Particular Reference to the Iran-Iraq War", Op. Cit., p. 19.
111 "Iran Asks Several Countries to Condemn Iraqi Attacks", The Christian Science Monitor, 2 April 1984. In 
1984 two British seamen and three British divers were killed and six injured in the Persian Gulf. Also in 1984 
two British-registered ships were attacked in the Persian Gulf. At least one of these (the British Renown) 
reportedly was attacked by aircraft of the Iranian Air Force. See Hansard, Vol. 73, 29 February 1985, Column: 
490 and Vol. 63, 11 July 1984, Columns: 1044-49.
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that Britain, by cutting its North Sea oil price, followed by some members of OPEC, such as 
Saudi Arabia, intended to hit Iran's economy, and particularly its military strength. Following 
Britain's price reduction of $3 a barrel, and Nigeria's $5.50 cut in early 1983, the official 
OPEC price of $34 a barrel fell quickly to as low as $24. And spot prices sank even closer to 
$20, the price at which Iran was selling most of its oil to attract more customers.112 Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, in 1984 blamed "world 
arrogance", for reducing crude oil export prices in order to force the OPEC countries to 
follow suit.113
During this phase Iraq also occasionally used chemical weapons.114 While asking the Western 
powers, including Britain, to condemn the Iraqi actions, Iran accused Britain of arming Iraq 
with chemical weapons. However, each time the British government denied the charge, 
reiterated its policy of neutrality, and refused specifically to condemn Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons. For instance, when an MP asked whether the government had obtained assurances 
from Iraq that it would cease using chemical weapons, Luce said: "We have already made 
clear to both sides in the Gulf conflict our strong condemnation of the use of chemical 
weapons".115 This British indifference to Iraqi use of chemical weapons was another reason 
for Iranians to be resentful to Britain. Also the British silence, from the Iranian point of view, 
would prove the extent of the British hostility towards Iran and demonstrate London's pro- 
Iraqi policy as well.
Yet in line with its policy of preserving relations with Iran as much as possible, Britain let 
some spare parts for Chieftain tanks be transferred to Iran in 1984, and came under attack for 
doing so from the GCC countries and the United States.116 Defending her actions, Mrs 
Thatcher said: "the spares concerned were due for supply under existing contracts, having 
been fully paid for prior to the 1979 revolution".117 In addition, Britain in 1984 supplied the 
Iranian Navy with two unarmed naval support ships ordered in 1977. Although the Foreign 
Office said that the ships were suited for disaster and earthquake relief, and would not have a
112 For further study of the issue, see David K. Willis, "Oil Prices Tumble Britain Opens Trapdoor", The 
Christian Science Monitor, 22 February 1983; David K. Willis, "Politics Clouds World Oil Prices - and Keeps 
Many Economies on Edge", The Christian Science Monitor, 3 February 1983; David K. Willis, "Showdown in 
the OPEC Corral", The Christian Science Monitor, 25 February 1983; and David K, Willis, "Analysts Doubt 
OPEC Price Cut Will Jold firm", The Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 1983.
113 The Times, 10 November 1984.
114 On 21 March 1986, the Security Council commissioned an investigation into the use of chemical weapons 
by Iraqi forces against the Iranians. This was confirmed by the President of Security by issuing a statement. See 
Parsons, "Iran and the United Nations, with Particular Reference to the Iran-Iraq War", Op. Cit., p. 21.
115 Mr Mikardo, a British Parliamentarian in his question gave evidence of the injuries suffered by a British 
subject, Mr Benford, a British Broadcasting Corporation sound recordist, who was exposed to nerve gas while 
attempting to cover the war in Iran. See Hansard, Vol. 62, 27 June 1984, Column: 986.
116 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXX, 1984, P. 33058;77ze Guardian, 23 February 1984; and 
The times, 24 February 1984.
117 Hansard, Vol. 86, 14 November 1985, Column: 232.
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role in the war, the United States and Iraq's financial supporters, such as Saudi Arabia, 
reacted unsympathetically.118 The Thatcher government also confirmed in 1986 that it had 
sold to Iran static AR-3D Radars, but claimed that they were being installed along Iran's 
northern and eastern borders facing the Soviet Union, and were of no relevance to the Iran- 
Iraq War.119
It should also be noted that during this phase the British government allowed the London 
office of the National Iranian Oil Company, Kala, to continue functioning. In addition to its 
official task of arranging Iranian oil sales, the office was suspected of serving as a military 
procurement office for arms purchases in Europe. When the government came under attack 
from some MPs for allegedly allowing Kala to arrange arms purchases, Renton said that 
"arrangement from the United Kingdom of arms sales to Iran is not illegal unless the goods 
concerned are exported from the United Kingdom in breach of British law. There is no firm 
evidence of this".120
Britain also tried to improve its diplomatic relations with Iran. As Iran was the UK's second 
largest Middle East trading partner in 1985, London was willing to resume full diplomatic 
relations by re-opening its embassy in Tehran. But Iran's continued demand that Britain 
apologise for closing its embassy during the American hostage crisis, and its dissatisfaction 
with the British position on the war, proved major obstacles. However, the dominance of 
idealists in Iran's political structure, who were generally hesitant about improving ties with 
the West, particularly the US and Britain, was also an important factor. The subject of 
restoration of full diplomatic relations was occasionally raised. For instance, in 1982 the 
Thatcher government invited Iran to talk on a "whole bundle of subjects", including re­
opening of the British Embassy.121 Again in 1984, answering a parliamentary question why 
there was not parity between Tehran and London with regard to their missions, Luce said: 
"The diplomatic representation in the respective capitals is a subject of continuing discussions 
with the Iranian government".122
The British increased their efforts for resumption of full diplomatic relations during the 
highest-level talks held between the two sides in Tehran in March 1985. It was said that the 
purpose of the visit to Tehran by the head of the Middle East Department, Stephen Day, was 
to prepare the ground for re-establishing a full embassy, though he did not admit it.123 The 
only result of these discussions was to increase the staff of the Iranian Embassy in London to
118 See International Herald Tribune, 7 August 1984 and also The Times, 20 August 1984.
119 Hansard, Vol. 107, 16 December 1986, Column: 443.
12  ^Hansard, Vol. 112, 18 March 1987, Columns: 924-25.
121 Daily Telegraph, 11 March 1982.
122 Hansard, Vol. 64, 19 July 1984, Column: 315.
123 Daily Telegraph, 15 March 1985.
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27, and that of the British interests section in Tehran to 18, headed by a diplomat of 
ambassadorial rank.
The arrest of Roger Cooper in December 1985 on charges of espionage once again 
complicated Iranian-British relations. Cooper, a British subject, was an employee of 
McDermott International, a US offshore oil equipment company, and also a freelance 
journalist writing for the Financial Times. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office lodged a 
strong protest on 8 December 1986 over his continued detention, and warned that failure by 
Iran to fulfil its international obligations "must inevitably have implications for British- 
Iranian relations".124 But he appeared on Iranian television in February 1987, and confessed 
to a number of espionage allegations which the British government denied.125 The British 
government on many occasions conditioned improvement of relations with Iran on Cooper's 
release. Instead, Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi stated that " . . .  the British 
authorities have set the resolution of the problem of one of their nationals as the pre-condition 
for upgrading relations . . .  and so it is our decision to avoid expanding our relations with that 
country".126
This caused another diplomatic conflict to the further detriment of Iranian-British relations, 
resulting in the British refusal, in February 1986, to accept accreditation of Hossein Malaek -  
one of the student leaders in the 1979 US hostage crisis -  as Iran's head of mission in London. 
Iran retaliated a few months later, by rejecting the nomination of Hugh Arbuthnott to head the 
British mission in Tehran. Finally, in December 1986 a 15-month deadlock over appointment 
of a new head of the British interests section in Tehran was ended, when Iran agreed to issue 
a visa to Christopher MacRae. Meanwhile, some Iranian dailies, particularly Jomhoori-e 
Islami occasionally published articles attacking the British government, and opposing the 
expansion of ties. For instance, after the arrest of Cooper it said in an editorial: "It has now 
been proven that the British interests section is the centre for coordination of espionage and 
sabotage activities of armed and unarmed British spies in Iran. In fact it is another den of 
spies". It warned the Iranian authorities not to allow Iran to become "an arena for mischief by 
wounded colonialists".127
124 See Financial Times, 9 December 1986 and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIII, 1987, p. 
35544.
125 For the full text of Roger Cooper's confessions on Iranian Television, see Daily Keyhan , 18 Bahman 1365 
(Iranian Calendar and Date).
126 Financial Times, 11 December 1986.
127 The Guardian, 17 December 1986.
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The final phase (1987-1988): Internationalisation of the war
This phase started with escalation of the war into the Persian Gulf, endangering free 
navigation.128 It commenced in 1987 with Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil installations and ships 
moving to and from Iranian ports. After unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to force Iraq to stop 
its attacks, Iran decided to retaliate. Iraq was exporting its oil by pipeline to the 
Mediterranean, not by ship from its Gulf ports, so Iran launched sporadic attacks on ships 
moving to and from the ports of other Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As 
indicated in table 4.1, from 1987 the number of Iraqi and Iranian attacks on shipping 
increased dramatically.
Table 4.1: Shipping attacks in the Persian Gulf
Year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 00 00 *
Iraq 5 22 16 53 33 66 153 74
Iran - - - 18 14 41 93 48
Total 5 22 16 71 47 107 246 122
*: From 1 January to 20 August 1988 (Date of Cease-Fire)
Source: New York Times, 22 May 1987 and Gary Sick, "Slouching Toward Settlement: The Internationalisation 
of the Iran-Iraq War, 1987-1988", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), Neither East nor West; 
Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 219- 
242.
In fact Iraq's objective was to deprive Iran of its oil revenues forcing it to a negotiated peace, 
or to goad Iran into closing the Strait of Hormuz, which would have invited US military 
retaliation. Finally, Iraq hoped to prevent Iran launching its much-discussed 'final offensive' 
on the ground. In contrast to Iraq, Iran was trying to prevent internationalisation of the war.129
In this phase, Iranian-British relations suffered from three directions. These included the 
deployment of British warships in the Persian Gulf in early 1987, the deterioration in British- 
Iranian diplomatic relations in mid-1987 and finally the mandatory UN Security Council 
resolution 598 (July 1987) in which Britain had played a major role. The escalation of tanker 
war led Kuwait to approach the United States to re-flag Kuwaiti oil tankers. After some 
hesitation, Washington accepted the request for two major reasons. First, fallout from the
128 por details of the Tanker War and internationalisation of the war, see Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, 
Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980-1988, London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996, especially Chas 6 and 7; Also, see Philip A. G. Sabin, "Escalation in the 
Iran-Iraq War", in Efraim Karsh (ed.), The Iran-Iraq War; Impact and Implications, London: Macmillan, 1989, 
pp. 280-294.
129 por more information on this issue, see R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran; Challenge and Response in the 
Middle East, Baltimore and London: TheJohns Hopkins University Press, 1988, pp. 220-225.
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Iran-Contra affair of 1986 had left a negative impression amongst the Gulf Arab states. To 
regain their confidence, Washington re-flagged 11 Kuwaiti tankers in early 1987. Second, the 
Soviet Union had already agreed to lease three tankers to Kuwait. Washington perceived this 
as likely to enhance Soviet influence and presence in the Gulf. "The Kuwait-Moscow deal 
provided the US administration with a rationale to meet the Kuwaiti request".130
When the US asked its Western allies to follow suit, the European powers initially refused to 
send any warships to the area. But when Iran, unable and unwilling to confront US warships, 
adopted the tactic of planting sea mines along the shipping lanes of the Gulf, the Western 
European powers sent minesweepers and other warships to the area.131 This was the first 
relatively co-ordinated policy by Western Europe towards Iran since the 1979 revolution. 
Although their motive was primarily to protect their own interests, the Iranian government 
interpreted their naval deployment in the Persian Gulf as another sign of Western support for 
Iraq. The Iranian view was based on the fact that the Western naval deployment in the Persian 
Gulf would inhibit Iranian activities in the area, and give greater impunity to the Iraqis to 
prosecute their campaign against Iranian shipping and oil installations.132 Table 4.2 shows 
foreign naval deployment in the Persian Gulf in 1987.
Table 4.2: Foreign naval deployments in the Persian Gulf in 1987
UK France Italy Belgium Holland EC US USSR Total
1987 10 13 8 3 2 36 28 6 70
Source: Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran and the European Community", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and 
Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, London and New York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 
65-66.
Following the Iranian attack on the British tanker Isomeria in the Straits of Hormuz in 
January 1987, the British government delivered a strong protest, and despatched, in line with 
the US and its European partners, warships to the area. London's main objective was now to 
bring the war to an end. Mellor, then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs said: "We share with the Americans a determination to uphold freedom of navigation 
in the Gulf as part of a policy of bringing the wasteful and destabilising Iran-Iraq conflict to a
130 Hiro, Op. Cit., pp. 223-4.
131 It should be noted that as West Germany's constitution prohibited deployment of its military forces beyond 
the NATO area, it sent four ships to the Mediterranean to compensate for the draw-down of other NATO ships 
from the area. Luxembourg, which has no ships, helped pay for the operation.
132 On this issue, see Chipman, Op. Cit, P. 225; Parsons, "Iran and Western Europe", The Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1989, p. 227; Halliday, Op. Cit., p. 312; and Hiro, Op. Cit., p. 225.
110
negotiated end".133 The only major difference between the British and American deployments 
was that the US government emphasised that US warships 'escorted' American-flagged 
tankers,while theBritish government insisted that its warships merely 'accompanied' British 
tankers. Mellor stated that "the Armilla patrol exists to provide reassurance to British ships, 
and to accompany their passage to the best of its limited resources. It provides no guarantee 
of protection, and does not convoy or escort".134 Concerned about a possible American pre­
emptive strike on Iran and provocative US actions in the Gulf, Britain tried to limit the risks 
by 'accompanying' rather than 'escorting' British tankers.135 Furthermore, by 'accompanying' 
rather than 'escorting', the British government freed itself from any possibility of being sued 
for damages by tanker owners or crew members if a tanker which was accompanied by a 
British warship was damaged or sunk by a mine. However, despite this difference in rules of 
engagement, the British naval deployment was seen by the Iranian government as hostile.
From early 1988, the Soviet Union was working to replace the Western warships in the Gulf 
with a United Nations naval force to secure free navigation -  an idea which was acceptable to 
Iran. But the British government rejected the Soviet proposal, claiming that "such a force 
would be impractical in current circumstances".136 London's main concern, however, was to 
avoid enhancing the Soviet political role and naval presence in an area as important as the 
Persian Gulf.
The situation further deteriorated with another diplomatic conflict in May 1987. This was 
initiated by the British arrest of Ahmad Ghassemi, Vice-Consul at the Iranian Consulate in 
Manchester. Accused of shoplifting, he was released on bail. Apparently in retaliation, the 
Iranian government arrested a British diplomat,Edward Chaplin, head of Chancery at the 
British Interests section in Tehran. Although he was released after a few hours, he was 
nonetheless threatened with espionage charges.
The British government in response closed the Iranian consulate in Manchester and expelled 
its five-man staff. The British government regarded the Manchester incident as minor, and 
expected Iran to react cautiously and with moderation. But the spillover of US-Iranian 
tensions and fallout from the Iran-Contra affair had generated a confrontational and anti- 
western mood in Iran. In a tit-for-tat move, Iran expelled four British diplomats. Finally, each
133 Hansard., Vol. 121, 2 November 1987, Column: 542.
134 Ibid.
135 'Escorting' represents a wartime action and, as in a wartime convoy, the civil tankers take orders from the 
senior naval officer. Any attack against the tanker is considered an attack against the warships. 'Accompanying' 
is a much more flexible term. The senior naval officer has no control over the civilian skipper. He also has no 
responsibility to ensure his protection. See William Echikson, "European Powers Step Up the Gulf Role", The 
Christian Science Monitor, 27 July 1987.
136 Hansard, Vol. 126, 3 February 1988, Column: 638.
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country reduced its diplomatic staff to one in each other's capital.137
But London was still not willing to break altogether its relations with Iran, as it was conscious 
to preserve its beneficial economic relationship. However, it should not be overlooked 
that a long-standing feature of British foreign policy is to maintain relations with 
governments of whicfBritain doesiot necessarily approve. In answer to criticism from MPs for 
not severing relations, or at least closing the Iranian arms purchase office in London, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe said:
The Iranian military purchasing offices are conducting purely commercial 
operations, which must operate within the confines of British law. This dispute was 
confined to a consular and diplomatic matter, and it would be wrong, for the sake of 
British industry and jobs, to disregard the fact that in other respects we still have 
substantial export with Iran, which is conducted entirely within the law. There is 
still ample scope for commercial trade unrelated to arms. That commercial trade 
sustains a large number of jobs in British industry and is of great importance.*38
In the meantime, London hoped to use its diplomatic links to secure the release of British 
hostages in Lebanon and two British prisoners in Tehran, and to keep the way open for an 
improvement in relations in the future. 139 In spite of many suggestions from Iranian hardline 
newspapers that Iran should break off its ties with Britain, Tehran was also not prepared to 
sever diplomatic relations, as it needed Britain as the major European centre for financial 
transactions and for arms purchases in Europe. The Iranians also thought that Britain, as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, could play a major role in drafting the 
resolution which was in the pipeline, though Tehran had only a faint hope of British 
sympathy and support at a time where Iran was never more comprehensively isolated in world 
politics.140
A final blow to Iranian-British relations in this phase came from active British diplomacy and
137 On the issue, see "Senior British Envoy in Iran is Kidnapped", The Times, 29 August 1987; Ian Smith, 
"Iranians Produce Medical Report on Vice-Consul", The Times, 4 June 1987; Andrew Gowers, "Howe to 
Consider Iran Sanctions after Kidnap Row", Financial Times, 1 June 1987; Robert Fisk, et al.. "British Envoys in 
Iran Shred Official Papers", The Times, 5 June 1987; Andrew Gowers, "British Protests Continue after Envoy is 
Freed in Iran", Financial Times, 30 May 1987. Also see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIII, p. 
35544.
138 Hansard, Vol. 118, 1 July 1987, Columns: 478-79 and 483-84.
139 For these reasons, see "Measured Response", The Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1987; Robin Gedye, "Britain and 
Iran -  Bound by Trade", Daily Telegraph, 2 June 1987; "Try Him, then Expel Him", The Times, 2 June 1987; 
"Maitaining Bad Relations", The Times, 5 june 1987; "End of an Affair?", The Times, 19 June 1987; and The 
Guardian, 16 June 1987. It is worth mentining that in order to prevent further escalation of the incident, the BBC 
cancelled the broadcasting of the two-part American made drama ’On wings of eagles', tracing the real rescue of 
two American executives from Tehran. See The Guardian, 15 June 1987.
140 See Andrew Gowers, "Tehran Ends up More Isolated than Ever", Financial Times, 23 July 1987.
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initiatives in the UN Security Council in adopting Resolution 598 on 20 July 1987. British 
policy in the Security Council to bring the war to an end was double-tracked. The first track 
entailed lobbying for the adoption of resolution 598 as mandatory, which invoked the 
prospect of an arms embargo for non-compliance by either party. The second involved 
working actively alongside America for an arms embargo against Iran as non-compliant if 
Tehran did not accept Resolution 598 as a whole. During Thatcher's meeting with an Arab 
League delegation on 9 July 1987, the delegation expressed gratitude to Britain for its 
continuing efforts to ensure the adoption of Resolution 598.141 The Resolution, comprising 10 
paragraphs, demanded an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all forces to their 
recognised international boundaries.142 As then Iranian ambassador to the UN, Said Rajaiee 
Khorasani stated, the SC had realised that the only way to end the war was to address some 
Iranian demands. From Iran's perspective the resolution was a mix of positive and negative 
points,143 so it neither accepted nor rejected it. From the Iranian point of view, the positive 
points were deploring the initiation of the War, and the use of chemical weapons, with a 
request from the Secretary-General to form an impartial body to inquire into responsibility for 
the conflict. But Iran still demanded that the resolution be amended so that determination and 
identification of the aggressor be implemented before the other paragraphs.144
The Iranian side, however, viewed resolution 598 in its totality as unfair, pro-Iraqi, and yet 
another instance of Western pressure on Tehran, with Britain strongly influencing its 
wording. This view was strengthened by British officials' claims. One day after the SC had 
issued resolution 598, Howe said in Parliament: the resolution "owes much to British 
initiatives, and is the culmination of many months' work. ". He added: "I trust that Iraq will 
abide by the new resolution. . . it is important for us to continue to urge Iran to respond 
positively to this new step". He continued that "the possibility of an arms embargo being 
imposed by the United Nations would have to be considered against whichever of the parties 
failed to respond to the resolution that we passed yesterday".145
141 Hansard, Vol. 119, 13 July 1987, Columns: 333-34.
142 See UN Security Council, SCR 598 (1987), 20 July 1987.
143 For a general study on Iranian perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, see different chapters in Farhang Raiaee 
(ed.), Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1997. For one particular study 
on Iranian views of the Security Council, see Bahram Mostaghimi and Masoud Taromsari, "Double standard:
The Security Council and the Two Wars", in Rajaee (ed.), Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, Chapter 6. 
For more information on Iranian perspectives on the negative and positive points of Resolution 598, see Abbas 
Hedayati Khomeini, Shouray-e Amniyat va Jang-e Tahmili Iraq Alayh-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran, pp. 144-58.
144 On Iranian stances on the resolution, see the text of Iranian Foreign Ministery’s statement in Daily Keyhan,
21 July 1987, P. 2; the text of Iranian Foreign Minster's detailed response to the letter of 20 July of the UN 
Secretary General in Daily Keyhan, 12 August 1987, p. 3; the speech of then Speaker of Iran's Defense Supreme 
Council, Rafsanjani in Daily Keyhan,, 21 Shahrivar 1366 (Iranian Date and Calendar), p. 2. In a speech to the UN 
General Assembly on 22 September 1987, then Iranian President, Seyyed Ali Khamenei described resolution 598 
as "an indecent, condemnable position" which had been forced on the Security Council "by the will of the big 
powers, particularly the United States". See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIII, 1987, p. 35601.
145 Hansard, Vol. 120, 21 July 1987, Columns: 205-16.
113
Iran's refusal to accept the resolution led the British government to implement the second 
track of its policy to end the war. This was to seek the support of all permanent members of 
the SC, particularly the Soviet Union, for an arms embargo on Iran. In this context, Mellor 
said: "We played a leading role in the adoption of Security Council resolution 598 . . . .  We 
are also seeking to make progress on parallel work on enforcement measures".146 Since 
August 1987, the British government had exerted pressure, as Howe said "to get effective 
commitment" from the Soviet Union "to move on to the enforcement measure" against 
Iran.147 Despite considerable improvement in Iran's relations with the USSR since 1986, Iran 
could not be optimistic about continuing Soviet willingness to reject the collective arms 
embargo. In fact, after the coming of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in 1985, which marked the 
beginning of a new era of cooperation between East and West, Iran found it difficult to play 
the Soviet card against the West.148 The continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and 
Iran's assistance to Afghan Mujahideen fighting the Soviets, were additional major issues of 
dispute between Iran and the USSR. The British government was therefore optimistic about 
the prospects of securing a UN arms embargo on Iran. In this regard, Howe on 6 July 1988 
said:
It was British action that secured the implementation of resolution 598 in the first 
place; it was British action that therefore secured the first meeting since 1972 of 
Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members committed to promoting action to 
implement it. That is why it is necessary, Iraq having accepted security council 
resolution 598, for Iran to do likewise. If Iran does not do that, I repeat that the 
Security Council should proceed to consider a follow-up resolution to enforce 
compliance.140
Considering these three policies which the British government was pursuing to force Iran to a 
negotiated peace, Iran occasionally attacked British tankers in the Persian Gulf, though Iran 
had tried to avoid being involved in the tanker war. Rafsanjani commented on 10 July 1987: 
"if Iraq stops mischief and dose not attack our ships, there will be no aggression against any 
ship by our side whether that ship carries the US flag or not".150 Meanwhile, a Kuwaiti tanker 
the Gentle Breeze which was re-registered under the UK flag, was attacked and badly
146 Hansard, Vol. 122, 18 November 1987, Column: 599-600.
147 Howe's speech in the House of Commons, see Hansard, Vol. 122, 18 November 1987, Column: 1058.
148 For instance, a summit meeting in Washington on December 7-10, 1987, between President Ronald Reagan 
and Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was hailed as a 
success, largely because of the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. See Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIV, 1988, P. 35804. For more information on Gorbachev's policy regarding 
the Iran-Iraq War, see Robert O. Freedman, "Gorbachev, Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War", in Nikki R. Keddie and 
Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), Neither East nor West; Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, New York and 
London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 115-137. On the issue of Iran's playing off its Soviet card against the 
US and West in the first decade of the revolution, see Fred Halliday, "The Iranian Revolution and Great-Power 
Politics: Component of the First Decade", in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), Neither East nor 
West; Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, New York and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 
246-263.
140 Hansard, Vol. 136, 6 July 1988, Columns: 1046-7.
1511 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIII, 1987, p. 35598.
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damaged by Iranian gunboats on 21 September 1987. In response, the British government 
ordered two days later the closure by 8 October of the Iranian arms procurement office 
located in the National Iranian Oil Company building in London. A total of 34 Iranian staff 
were served with expulsion orders.151 Although the Thatcher government had been under 
parliamentary pressure on several past occasions to close the Iranian office, economic and 
financial interests had prevailed, and the office remained open. The Iranian attack on the 
tanker under the UK flag and the closure of the Iranian office in London were more blows to 
the already cool political ties between Iran and Britain.
The psychological and political tension between Iran and the United States led to a US attack 
on Iranian oil installations on 18 April 1988, in retaliation for Iran's mine-laying. This US 
action was strongly endorsed by the Thatcher government. Mellor said in Parliament:
We support the American action as a measured and proportionate response to the
Iranian mine laying-----In the past 12 months, Western navies have been in the Gulf
and their presence has acted to confine the Iranian willingness to get involved in acts 
of international hooliganism and aggression. The greatest threat to the lives of 
British seamen is from the laying of mines in international waters by the
Iranians.1
More importantly, the British government expressed strong support for the US action when 
the USS Vincennes,on 3 July 1988, shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, killing all 290 
people on board. While other Western European governments refrained from expressing any 
support for the US position, emphasising instead the need to find a peaceful solution to the 
conflict, Mrs Thatcher's statement "fully accepted the right of forces engaged in such 
hostilities to defend themselves".153 The statement was widely criticised, including by several 
Members of Parliament. For instance, the 'Friends of John McCarthy' group, concerned with 
the fate of McCarthy and two other British hostages in Lebanon, accused Mrs Thatcher of 
being more concerned with the UK’s relations with America than with the safety of the British 
hostages.154 Answering a question in Parliament, Mrs Thatcher defended her statement, and 
said: "we were in touch with the Americans throughout the day of 3 July. My statement 
naturally took into account these contacts and the content of statements by President Reagan 
and the chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff'.155 The British support for the USA
151 See Hansard, Vol. 124, 12 January 1988, Column: 206; and also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 
XXXIII, 1987, p. 35598.
152 Hansard, Vol. 131, 18 April 1988, Columns: 551-555.
153 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIV, 1988, p. 36170.
154 Also the Church of England privately expressed concern at the statement. See Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, Vol. XXXIV, 1988, p. 36170.
155 Hansard, Vol. 136, 7 July 1988, Column: 657.
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was, from the Iranian point of view, another sign of British hostility. It was also conducive to 
enhancing the Iranian perception that London's policy was to endorse the hostile US approach 
towards Iran.
At this point, Iran was under growing pressure politically from the Security Council and the 
international community, and economically from the decline in oil revenue resulting from the 
tanker war. Iran had also suffered military setbacks, when Iraq unexpectedly recaptured the 
Fao Peninsula on 18 April 1988. The US attacks on Iran's oil installations were another 
burden for the Iranian government. These pressures forced Tehran to accept resolution 598 on 
18 July 1988.156 Ayatollah Khomeini, in his first public statement on the cease-fire, said on 
20 July that "taking this decision was more deadly than taking poison...".157
To conclude, the end of the war ushered in a new era in Iran's foreign relations with the 
international community. But British policies during the war, especially in its third phase, and 
also British identification with US policies towards Iran, particularly in the final months of 
the war, did nothing to improve Iran's view of Britain. In fact Iranian-British relations in the 
1980s, which deteriorated with the closure of the British Embassy in Tehran, proceeded, in 
one form or another, with tension, upheavals, and instability. While the Iran-Iraq War was a 
main obstacle to normalisation of relations, the Iranian perception of Britain as a manipulative 
power played a major part in worsening the ties between Tehran and London. Viewing British 
policy towards Iran as conspiratorial, Iranians perceived all British policies towards Iran, even 
those by which London pursued purely its own interests, as conspiracies and plots against 
Iran. Furthermore, the identification of Britain with the United States in Iranian eyes created a 
situation in which the Iranians had a tendency to link British policies towards their country to 
those of the USA and interpreted them as endorsement of Washington's policies. In the 1980s, 
the only factor which worked towards the maintenance of relations, albeit cool, was Iran's 
need of London as the centre for its financial activities and arms purchasing, and Britain's 
desire to preserve its traditional market in Iran. Also from the British point of view, Iran was 
influential in development of events in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, both of which were 
important to British interests.
15  ^On the reasons for Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 from Iranian perspectives, see "Dalayel-e Paziresh-e 
Qatnamay-e 598 Shoray-e Amniyat-e Sazman-e Melal-e Mottahed" (in Persian), [The Reasons for Iran's 
Acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 598], Daily Salaam, 18 July 1995, p. 2, 9 and 12; "Moroory 
bar Syasat-e America dar Berabar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq" (in Persian), [A Review of the US Policy vis-a-vis th£ 
Iran-Iraq War], Daily Salaam, 18 July 1995, p. 9; and also see Hedayati Khomeini, Op. Cit., pp. 170-75.
157 For full text of Ayatollah Khomeini's statement, see Daily Ettela'at, 20 July 1988, p. 7.
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Chapter 5
Iranian-British Relations from the End of the War to the 
Severance of Relations in 1989
INTRODUCTION
The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 was expected to mark the beginning of a new era in 
Iran's relations with the Western world, including Britain. Although the pragmatist faction in 
Iran's political leadership had become stronger and had even been able to convince Ayatollah 
Khomeini to accept UN Resolution 598 for a ceasefire with Iraq, the idealist faction was still 
making every effort to preserve its hold on power. While there was a movement towards 
normalisation in Iran's relations with the West in general, and Britain in particular, in the post 
Iran-Iraq war era, the Rushdie affair reversed the trend. The Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict 
passing death sentence on Salman Rushdie for his book The Satanic Verses, was music to the 
idealists' ears, as they were opposed to progress in Iran-West relations. The objective of this 
chapter is to examine how in the period from the end of the war to the death of the Ayatollah 
in June 1989, Iranian-British relations unfolded. The focus will be on: 1) Iran's divergence 
from Britain over the issue of human rights, and Tehran's response to London's criticism of 
human rights violations in Iran; 2) Iran’s policy of export of revolution and the emergence of 
the British policy of rejectionism towards Iran; and 3) the Rushdie affair which finally ended 
Iran's relations with Britain in March 1989.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Many Islamic countries, together with the Third World and non-Westem states, take a 
divergent position on the human rights debate. They are united in criticising the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)1 for its dominance by Western values and also in 
attacking Western countries for their double standards in its implementation. In addition, 
Islamic countries, based on Islamic values and culture, take a distinctive position in the 
human rights discourse as they argue that all human rights and freedoms under Islam are
* UDHR was adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (IE) of 10 December 1948. For the 
text of UDHR, see Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, 
Appendix 1, pp. 189-194. For study of human rights and its place in international relations and also the different 
ways in which human rights standards have been developed, see A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, Human 
Rights in the World; An Introduction to the Study of the International Protection of Human Rights, Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994.
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subjected to the rules of the Shari'a.1 The Islamic Republic of Iran, while sharing the common 
position of the Islamic world on the universal human rights issue, has attracted more than 
other Islamic countries international attention. This attention stems from the Islamic 
revolution of 1979 with its impact on the Islamic Middle East, and also from the process of 
'Islamisation' in Iran.2 3 In the controversy between post-revolutionary Iran and Western 
countries on human rights, Britain has occupied a special position. This has been due to the 
fact that Britain, as an important European country in the United Nations, and also as a 
Western country with many non-govemmental organisations such as 'Amnesty International', 
'Interights'4 and 'The Minority Rights Group', which criticise countries with human rights 
violations, has played a major role in this area. Therefore, human rights as a source of tension 
between Tehran and London impacted negatively on their relations. Iran's controversy with 
Britain over human rights can be examined from two distinctive angles: Iran's view on the 
concept of human rights, and Iran's response to Western criticism of human rights violations.
Iran's view on the concept of human rights
At the centre of the debate is a conflict between Islamic and liberal Western perceptions of 
rights. From the Islamic point of view, it is divine law rather than human or natural law which 
grants rights to human beings. Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979), one of the chief architects of 
contemporary Islamic resurgence, writes:
When we speak of human rights in Islam we mean those rights granted by God. 
Rights granted by kings or legislative assemblies can be withdrawn as easily as they 
are conferred; but no individual and no institution has the authority to withdraw the 
rights conferred by God. The charter and the proclamations and the resolutions of 
the United Nations cannot be compared with the rights sanctioned by God.^
Mawdudi's view on human rights has been echoed by many other Islamic scholars. For 
instance, Abdul Aziz Said notes:
2 See Marika Tamm, Freedom of Expression in the Muslim World: A Comparative Legal Study of Blasphemy 
and Subversive Speech in International Human Rights Law and the Laws of the Muslim World, International 
Human Rights Programme of the University of Toronto and The Canadian Centre, International PEN, 1 April 
1992.
3 By 'Islamisation' I mean the Iranian government's policies to subject all laws and legal codes to Islamic 
doctrine and rules.
4 'Interights' stands for the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights.
3 Abul A'la Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam, London: The Islamic Foundation, 1980, pp. 15-16.
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The Western liberal emphasis upon freedom from restraint is alien to Islam. 
Personal freedom [in Islam] lies in surrendering to the Divine Will. . . . Human 
rights exist only in relation to human obligations. Individuals possess certain 
obligations towards God, fellow humans, and nature, all of which are defined by 
Shariah. Those individuals who do not accept these obligations have no rights. The 
West places more emphasis on rights while Islam values obligations.^
Ayatollah Khomeini also believed that human beings had obligations rather than rights. He 
insisted that the first and most important obligation of man was submission to God's 
commands.6 7 8
The other area of difference lies in the concept of Western individualism. From a liberal 
Western perspective, man is the measure of all things. It is from this view that individualism 
becomes the centrepiece of Western liberalism. From a similar stand, there is also a conflict 
between the individual and the state. In Islamic scholarship neither individualism nor the 
conflict between individual and the state have been accepted. For instance, A. K. Brohi, who 
has written a number of pieces on human rights in Islam, rejects the philosophical 
underpinnings of Western human rights. He says:
The individual if necessary has to be sacrificed in order that the life of the organism 
be saved. Collectivity has a special sanctity attached to it in Islam. The Western 
man’s perspective may by and large be called anthropocentric in the sense that there 
man is regarded as constituting the measure of everything since he is to be regarded 
as the starting point of all thinking and action. The perspective of Islam, on the other 
hand, is theocentric, that is, God-consciousness, the absolute here is paramount; man 
is here only to serve His Maker. [In the West] rights of man are seen in a setting 
which has no reference to his relationship with God . . . 8
On the issue of the relationship between the individual and the state in Islam, Cherif 
Bassiouni explains how from the Islamic perspective, there is no conflict between individual 
and state and there is no dichotomy between their rights:
The individual is neither apart nor separate from society, and his rights are neither
6 Abdul Aziz Said, "Precept and Practice of Human Rights in Islam", Universal Human Rights, No.l, 1979, pp. 
73-77. For further exploration of the Islamic concept of rights, see Sheikh Showkat Hussain, Islam and Human 
Rights, Selangor Darul Ehsan: Budaya Ilmu Sdn Bhd, 1991, Chapter II.
7 For Ayatollah Khomeini's views, see A'iin-e Enghelab-e Islami; Gozidayi az Andishahava A'ra-e Imam 
Khomeini (in Persian), [Blueprint of the Islamic Revolution; Selection of Imam Khomeini's Thoughts and 
Views], Tehran: Moassesay-e Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Imam Khomeini, 1994, pp. 1-2, and also Farhang 
Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics, Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1983, pp. 42-45.
8 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights; Tradition and Politics, Boulder and San Francisco: Westview 
Press, 1991, pp. 60-61.
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different from nor conflicting with those of the community. He is part and parcel of 
society, and the fulfilment of his obligations and those of the other members of the 
society constitutes the reservoir of social rights which are then shared by all. Unlike 
Western philosophical and political perceptions on the separability of the individual 
and the state, Islamic social concepts do not make such a distinction. [From the 
Islamic point of view] the individual does not stand in an adversary position vis-a- 
vis the state but is an integral part thereof. The consequence of this relationship 
which flows from the concept of Islam . . .  is that there is no apparent need to 
delineate individual rights in contraposition to the stated
In addition to espousing the Islamic view which rejects the tenets of secular rights and 
Western individualism, Ayatollah Khomeini politicised the human rights debate as well. He 
stated: "What they call human rights is nothing but a collection of corrupt rules worked out by 
Zionists to destroy all true religions" .10 On another occasion, he said that the world was 
suffering from organisations with meaningless names such as Human Rights or Amnesty 
International which were the lackeys of superpowers, particularly the United States. These 
organisations had no mission but to condemn the oppressed nations of the world while serving 
big powers .n  From a similar standpoint, the former Iranian President and Iran's present 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asserted:
When we want to find out what is right and what is wrong, we do not go to the 
United Nations; we go to the Holy Koran . . . For us the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is nothing but a collection of mumbo-jumbo by disciples of Satan. ^
Iran's response to Western criticism
Given Iran's rejection of secular rights, it was expected that post-revolutionary Iran would 
stay out of the universal human rights issue. But this was not the case. It was important for 
Iran as a member of the international community to respond to the UDHR and the extensive 
international human rights debate. Furthermore, using human rights in formulating its policy 
towards Palestinian, Kashmiri and Bosnian issues, as well as addressing the question of 
Muslims living in Western countries, the Iranian government became involved in the 
international human rights debate. Besides, as Iran found it necessary to respond to Western 
criticism of human rights' abuse in Iran, Tehran inevitably entered this arena. Finally, under 
pressure from some groups inside Iran for greater liberalisation and democratisation, the
0 Cherif Bassiouni, "Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights" in Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), The 
Islamic Criminal Justice System, New York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 13-14 and 23.
10 Cited in Edward Mortimer, "Islam and Human Rights", Index on Censorship, October 1983, p. 5.
11 Sahifay-e Noor, Collection of Imam Khomeini's Guidelines, Vol. 17, Tehran: Sazman-e Madarek-e Farhangi 
Enghelab-e Islami, 1982, pp. 189-190.
Cited in Mayer, Op. Cit., p. 34.
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Iranian government was in no position to stay out of the debate.13
Iran adopted three distinctive approaches. The first approach has been 'acceptance' or 
'endorsement' regarding human rights notions based on Islam. Iranian officials asserted that 
Islam had offered these rights centuries before the UDHR emerged. They claimed that they 
were a sketch of those rights which 1400 years ago Islam had given to man.14 In responding 
to the 1993 report of the UN Human Rights Commission, which was highly critical of Iran, 
the Foreign Ministry defended Tehran's commitment to human rights, but as based on Islamic 
teachings rather than the UDHR:
Based on the supreme teachings of Islam, the Islamic republic of Iran considers 
respect for human rights and the lofty character of mankind in all material and 
spiritual dimensions as a fundamental duty for all governments. According to this 
belief, the Islamic Republic of Iran, without paying attention to any propaganda hue 
and cry, will continue its efforts to strengthen the principles which guarantee support 
for the rights of all citizens. 13
In this respect, Iranian officials have often referred to Articles 3.14 and 20 of the Iranian 
constitution which clearly define human rights as matters of high importance, and explain 
them in the context of Islamic laws.16 In practical terms, in April 1995, the Iranian 
government established the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC). Its Secretary- 
General, Mohammad Hassan Zia'ifar, announced that since the inception of the EHRC over 
1300 complaints from inside the country had been received.17
The second approach adopted by the Iranian government has been 'particularism' or 'cultural 
relativism'18 regarding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Iranian officials have 
rejected the perception that "there are universal standards by which all cultures may be 
judged" and have denied "the legitimacy of using values taken from Western culture to judge 
institutions of non-Westem cultures".19 From the Iranian point of view, it is not acceptable to 
impose norms taken from the UDHR on Iran, whose culture and norms are based on Islam.
13 For one exploration, see Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation; Religion and Politics in the 
Middle East, London and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996, p. 135.
14 For more information on this view, see Majid Ali Khan, "A Comparative Study of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the Declaration of Human Rights in Islam", Islam and the Modem Age, XXII, No. 3, 1991, 
pp. 175-176.
15 Cited in Halliday, Op. Cit., pp. 145-146.
See Ghanoon-e Asasi-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in Persian), [The constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran], Edaray-e Kol-e Ghavanin va Mogharrarat-e Keshvar, Nehad-e Riyasat Jomhoori, 1995.
17 "Iran: Official Comments on Islamic Human Rights", Reuters News Service, 17 July 1997.
18 The terms 'particularism' and 'cultural relativism’ have been used by Halliday and Mayer. For an extensive 
study of these two terms see Halliday, Op. Cit. and Mayer, Op. Cit.
19 Mayer, Op. Cit., p. 9.
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"Evaluative comparisons of Islamic rights concepts and international ones are impermissible 
because such comparisons are believed to involve judging Islamic norms by the criteria of 
international law" which the Iranian government views "as an alien, Western system".20
The former Iranian ambassador to the UN, Said Rajaiee Khorasani, defending Iran against 
charges of human rights violations, argued that the international standards could not be used 
to judge Iran's human rights record. He stated that the UDHR, which represented secular 
understanding of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims and 
did not accord with the system of values recognised by the Islamic Republic of Iran.21 The 
former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, asserted at the 40th session of the UN 
General Assembly in October 1985 that "the basic concepts and fundamental values of this 
organisation [the UN], were all formulated in the framework of the historic-cultural values of 
the victors in the Second World War; that is why they do not represent the shared values of 
the majority of the members of the world community".22 In this line, the present Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, said in an interview in September 1997:
. .  We believe some international law has to be modified to include new elements of 
cultural differences. The case of human rights is one of these. It has been based on 
Western culture. But other cultures have other things to say. For example, 
individualism in Western culture is the first priority. But in Eastern countries, in 
Islamic countries, social responsibility has its own place as well. There should be a 
balance between individualism and social responsibility reflected in any 
international convention.22
In a response to critical remarks made by the UN Human Rights rapporteur, Maurice Danby 
Copithome, in 1997 regarding human rights conditions in Iran, Zia' ifar said that the mistake 
made by the UN officials was that they compared the Islamic values of Iranian religious 
society with the values of Western countries. He added that they did not pay attention to the 
fact that in a religious society, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic values were being 
implemented.24
20 Ibid., pp. 9-10. For further study of 'particularism' and 'cultural relativism', see Casses, Op. Cit., pp. 48-67, 
Halliday, Op. Cit., pp- 137-8, and also Neil Hicks, "Islam and Human Rights", Muslim Politics Report, No. 12, 
March/April 1997, pp. 1, 4 and 5.
21 Quoted by Mayer, Op. Cit., P. 10.
22 Didgahhay-e Jahani-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in Persian), [Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs on Global Perspectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran], Address to the 40th Session of the UN General 
Assembly, New York, October 1985, Tehran: Daftar-e Ravabet Omoomi-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 1985, 
p. 4.
22 Robin Wright, "Interview: Kamal Kharrazi; Directing Iran's Foreign Policy for a New and More Open 
Government", Los Angeles Times, 28 September 1997.
24 "Iran: Official Comments on Islamic Human Rights", Op. Cit.
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The third approach pursued by the Iranian government has been 'counter-attack' or 
'confrontation' in the face of the Western attack on Iran's record of human rights. Iran, 
together with some Third World countries, argues that Western countries are not qualified 
either to judge or criticise human rights records elsewhere. Since the West has the 
imperialistic record and its own history of human rights violations including torture, 
genocide, religious persecution, racism, and centuries of slavery, as well as record of 
exploitation of the Third World in the era of Western colonialism, from the Iranian 
perspective the West is disqualified from acting as judge of the rights records of others.25
The West's 'double standards’ has been the other issue which in Iranians' eyes weakened 
Western criticism of Iran's human rights record. A case in point is the West's divergent human 
rights policy towards Iran under the Shah and after the revolution. Tehran claimed that while 
the West tolerated human rights abuses under the Shah, it showed deep concern for the rights 
of people in Iran after the revolution.26 In general, the Iranian regime believes that Western 
countries "ignore human rights abuses by friendly pro-Western regimes and bring up human 
rights issues only to discredit regimes that defy Western hegemony and reject Western 
cultural values".27 Ayatollah Khomeini stated that the "so-called 'human rights organisations'" 
are only to protect superpowers' interests and guarantee the interests of their lackeys in the 
world".28 Speaking at the UN in 1993, Velayati said that " . . .  the only way to lend real 
support to human rights and promote such principles throughout the world is to end the 
practices of having double standards and exploiting human rights issues for political 
objectives".29 Such political objectives, from the Iranian point of view, involve Western 
efforts to tarnish the image of Islam and to portray Islamic culture and values as primitive and 
cruel, and Western culture as advanced and the best for all to follow. It was precisely for 
these reasons that the Iranian government initially did not allow international observers to 
monitor the human rights situation in Iran. It took a decade to provide them access.
The human rights issue and Iranian-British relations
The divergent conceptual views of Iran and the West on human rights were a stumbling block 
in Iran's relations with Western countries. However, Ayatollah Khomeini's deep pre­
occupation with secular and Western culture and values as anathema to Islamic values further 
widened the gap between Tehran and Western countries. In this context, those Western
25 See Mayer, Op. Cit., p. 5-6.
For more information on Western policy of double standards, see Halliday, Op. Cit., p. 144.
27 Mayer, Op. Cit., p. 6.
28 A'iin-e Enghelab-e Islami, p. 428.
29 Cited in Halliday, Op. Cit., pp. 145-^46.
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countries which were active in criticising Iran's human rights behaviour were viewed by many 
Iranians as hostile not only to the Iranian revolution but also to its Islamic foundation and 
culture. Given the existing unfriendly relations between Iran and Britain, the latter's criticism 
of Iran's human rights record caused further deterioration in Iranian-British relations.
The Thatcher government assailed Iran's international reputation on two fronts. The first was 
at the UN, where Britain was active in condemning Iran's human rights record and co­
sponsoring resolutions criticising Iran at the General Assembly or UN Human Rights 
Commission. During the 1980s, British representatives at the UN almost every year co­
sponsored resolutions to this effect. These resolutions largely targeted Iran's treatment of 
Baha'is, its executions of some of the Shah's military and civil officials, and its treatment of 
anti-revolutionary elements.30
The second front was related to active criticism of Iran's position by non-governmental 
organisations based in Britain. Although these organisations were presumably outside British 
official policy decision-making, their criticisms and policies were attributed to Britain which 
was their host country. Amnesty International was regarded as one of the most active 
institutions monitoring human rights in the world and criticising governments suspected of 
violations. From its headquarters in London it produced an extensive record of human rights 
violations in Iran.31
The similarity between London's official criticism and that of British-based non­
governmental organisations, such as Amnesty International, was interpreted, rightly or 
wrongly, by the Iranian Islamic leaders as deliberate efforts by the British government aimed 
at damaging Iran's international image. In sum, this interpretation caused further deterioration 
of Iran's relations with Britain in the 1980s.
30 On the British government's active policy in condemning Iran's human rights record and London's official 
statements, see British Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons -  Hansard, Vol. 16, 27 January 1982, 
Column: 386; Vol. 19, 3 March 1982, Columns: 184-85; Vol. 58, 10 April 1984, Column: 191; Vol. 78, 10 May 
1985, Column: 516; Vol. 88, 10 December 1985, Column: 573; Vol. 103, 4 November 1986, Column: 404; Vol. 
119, 13 July 1987, Columns: 331-2; Vol. 144, 11 January 1989, Column: 702.
31 The first report of Amnesty International on Iran's human rights violations was published in February 1980. 
The report "Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran” covered events within the seven month 
period following the revolution of February 1979. It was very critical of Islamic legal laws and the execution of 
the Shah's military officials. In addition to the Amnesty International annual reports which cover all countries 
including Iran, Amnesty International has also produced several special publications on human rights problems 
and violations in post-revolutionary Iran. Amongst them are Human Rights Violations in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, May 1980; Iran Briefing, 1987; Iran: Violations of Human Rights; Documents Sent by Amnesty 
International to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1987; and Iran: Violations o f Human Rights; 
1987-1990, 1990.
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EXPORT OF REVOLUTION
The attempt to export revolution was the most significant feature of Iran's behaviour during 
the first ten years after the 1979 revolution. The Iranian government was accused of a variety 
of activities in this context, including propaganda, subversion, and terrorism. However, a 
distinction should be recognised between Iran's legitimate efforts to spread its political 
message and the subversion of which it was accused. There is a need to examine the nature, 
magnitude, and record of Iran's subversive activities,32 and the way the export of revolution 
constituted a dynamic interplay between Iran's foreign policy and its domestic politics.
As mentioned earlier, in the period between 1979 and 1989, the balance of power, in general, 
was in favour of idealists who believed in active export of the revolution in the Middle East 
through financial, moral and military assistance to different Islamic movements. However, 
Western and also many Muslim states' exaggerated views on Iran's ability to export revolution 
should not be overlooked. Many Western countries, especially the United States, did so to 
justify a policy of containing and isolating the Islamic Republic, and many Muslim countries 
did so to discredit their opposition Islamic movements.33 Notwithstanding these 
exaggerations, there is no doubt that in the 1980s "Iran represented the embodiment of the 
Islamic threat, and Ayatollah Khomeini served as the symbol of revolutionary Islam".34 For a 
decade, fear of export of the revolution dominated much of Western and Middle Eastern 
politics. To grasp the nature of Middle Eastern and also Western fears, Esposito and Piscatori 
write:
Its friends and foes alike agree that the Iranian revolution has had a major impact 
upon the Muslim world and the West. For some, it has been a source of inspiration 
and motivation; for others, revolutionary Iran has symbolised an ominous threat to 
the stability of the Middle East and the security of the W est. .  .33
Two geographic zones were most significant for Iranian activities: the Persian Gulf region
32 For more elaboration on these issues, see R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, 
and Means", in John Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International 
University Press, 1990, p. 41, and also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World; Continuity in a Revolutionary 
Decade, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 174.
33 On the Western and Islamic countries' exaggeration of the threat of Iranian revolution and its export, see 
different chapters in John Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality!, New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992, Halliday, Op. Cit., Chapter 4, and also Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of 
Revolutionary Islam", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 1988, p. 730.
34 Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?, p. 101.
33 John Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "The Global Impact of the Iranian Revolution: A Policy Perspective", in 
John Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International University Press, 
1990, p. 317.
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and Lebanon. An examination of Iran’s policies in these areas can shed useful light on the 
development of the British policy of rejectionism toward Iran -  a policy, which 
overshadowed all British-Iranian interactions in the 1980s.
The case of the Persian Gulf states
When the Iranian revolution became a reality, it threatened the Gulf states from two 
directions. The first was that Islam could play a determining role in changing social and 
political systems in the Middle Eastern countries. The second was that the Iranian model 
could be followed by other states of the region. While the latter consideration gradually lost 
its initial impact, the former factor retained a profound influence.36
The Iranian policy of exporting the revolution confronted the Persian Gulf states with 
challenges to the status quo and political instability. While pre-revolutionary Iran was itself a 
prime target of radical Arab propaganda and subversion, post-revolutionary Iran became a 
source of propaganda against both pro-Westem and radical Arab Persian Gulf states. The 
hostile relations between the two sides reflected "a conflict between the forces of change and 
those of the status quo" in the region.37 The Iranian revolution's injection of inspiration and 
assistance to opposition forces in the region produced political instability which threatened 
the monarchies. The "socio-political fragility" of the Arab states, rooted in the "overall 
inability of the ruling elites to meet the mounting demands of their people for a better 
standard of living and for social justice and political participation", worked as a catalyst for 
the current of political instability.38 The problem was exacerbated in countries such as Iraq, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait, where the Shi'a population was considerable.
To export revolution, Iran used two different means, which can be categorised as peaceful and 
coercive. Peaceful means included dissemination of revolutionary messages by media such as 
radio, distribution of pamphlets, seminars for Muslim activists, scholarships for foreign 
Muslim students to study in Iranian seminaries and universities, and annual rallies in Mecca
36 For more information on this issue, see James A. Bill, "The Arab World and the Challenge of Iran", Journal 
of Arab Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1982, p. 32. For a broader discussion on this issue, see James A. Bill, "Resurgent 
Islam in the Persian Gulf', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1, Fall 1984, pp. 108-127, and Nikki R. Keddie, Iran 
and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution, New York: New York University Press, 1995, Chapter 7.
37 Shireen T. Hunter, "Islamic Iran and the Arab World", Middle East Insight, Vol. V, No. 3, August/September 
1987, p. 24.
38 R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran; Challenge and Response in the Middle East, Maltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, p. 53. For another exploration of this issue, see James A. Bill, "The 
Challenge of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War to Stability in the Gulf', in Philip H. Stoddard (ed.), 
The Middle East in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects, Proceedings of a conference held at The National 
Defence University, Washington, D.C., June 8-9, 1983, Published by the Middle East Institute in cooperation 
with The Defence Intelligence College, 1983, pp. 123-4.
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during the Haj.39 While regarding revolutionary Iran as a vanguard of Islamic movements in 
the region that could become the nucleus for resistance movements in the Islamic world, the 
Iranian government made every effort to spread its political message throughout the region. 
This message mainly called for creation of true Islamic governments in the Arab states, for 
genuine independence of the Arab rulers, and for unity of politics and religion.40 Iranian 
leaders emphasised that the Gulfs Arab states' dependence on the West contradicted Islamic 
authenticity and the interests of Muslims; henceforth, the peoples of the region and 
particularly Muslim activists should try either to force their leaders to eliminate their 
dependence on the West or to change their political systems.41 By calling for unity of politics 
and religion, the Iranian government spread the notion that governments which propagated 
their separation were not Islamic. This gave courage and confidence to opposition forces, 
even those with a secular outlook, to stand up against their governments.
While these revolutionary messages in the volatile socio-political environment of the Gulf 
states posed a threat to their rulers, the Iranian government was also accused of using coercive 
means such as subversion, and military training of opposition forces, complicity in coups and 
bombing of Western targets in countries of the region.42 The Arab states of the Persian Gulf 
responded to export of the Iranian revolution by forming the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in May 1981. The GCC comprised Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates. Iran took a negative view of this organisation, primarily because it 
perceived the grouping as anti-Iranian, aiming to contain and pressure Iran and exclude it 
from Persian Gulf affairs.43 In the volatile atmosphere of the 1980s, the 1987 Haj pilgrimage 
turned into a bloodbath. The tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the conduct of the Haj 
climaxed on 31 July 1987, when Iranian demonstrators in Mecca clashed with Saudi security 
forces, resulting in several hundred deaths and many more injuries. The Iranian government
39 On the peaceful means, see Farhang Rajaee, "Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of 
Revolution", in John Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International 
University Press, 1990, pp. 72-77, Hunter, "Iran and the Spread of Revolutionary Islam", Op. Cit., pp. 743-744, 
and Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", Op. Cit., pp. 54-56.
40 On the general issues of Iran, export of revolution and the Persian Gulf states, see Ramazani, Revolutionary 
Iran; Chapters 1-9. For more information on specific issue of Iran’s call for true Islamic system, see Ibid., pp. 
28-29.
41 On the call for Islamic authenticitysee Mahmood Sariolghalam, "Conceptual Sources of Post-Revolutionary 
Iranian Behaviour Toward the Arab World", in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), Iran and the 
Arab World, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, pp. 21-6.
42 Subversion, allegedly inspired, motivated, or sponsored by Iran included the rebellion at the Great Mosque in 
Mecca in late 1979, uprisings in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in the Autumn of 1979 and spring of 1980, 
an attempted coup in Bahrain in December 1981, a Shi'a uprising in Iraq in the early 1980s, and a series of 
bombings targeting the US embassy in Kuwait City in December 1983. As these actions occured during the Iran- 
Iraq War, in which most Arab states of the Gulf, in one form or another, politically and financially supported 
Iraq, Iran's complicity in these activities was given additional credibility.
43 On the Iranian view of GCC, see Bahman Naimi Arfa, Mabani-e Raftari-e Shouray-e Hamkari-e Khalij-e 
Fars dar Qebal-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in Perisan), [The Rules of the GCC's Behaviour Towards the Islamic 
Republic of Iran], Tehran: Daftar-e Motaleat-e Syasi va Beinolmelali, 1991, Chapter 3, Ramazani, Revolutionary 
Iran, Chapters 8 and 9, Hunter, Iran and the World, pp. 120-1.
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called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime, and Rafsanjani said "If Imam [Khomeini] 
dictates, Fahd will not remain alive". In response, Prince Nayef ibn Abdul Aziz, the Saudi 
Interior Minister said: "... The Kingdom hopes ... to remove from Iran the authority which 
sends the people of Iran to their death".44
The case of Lebanon
Lebanon is the most salient example of Iran’s influence beyond its borders. The historical 
connection between Lebanese Shi'as and Iran played a major role in Iran's success there. The 
connection was rooted in the fact that many Lebanese Shi'a leaders studied in Shi'a 
seminaries in Najaf, Iraq, alongside many Iranian clerics. A large disaffected and deprived 
shi'a community in southern Lebanon, which Iran was able to organise through these 
contacts, contributed to Iran's success. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which 
radicalised and militarised the Lebanese shi'as in the South, facilitated Iran's export of the 
revolution to Lebanon 45 The Iranian government dispatched Revolutionary Guards to 
Southern Lebanon. They equipped and trained the Shi'as, set up a network of social services, 
and assisted them financially. These factors made Lebanon the area most receptive to Iran's 
Islamic message and influence.
While for Iran Lebanon was "a unique opportunity to prove its pro-Arab and anti-Israeli 
credentials, to propagate its revolutionary ideology, and to develop a core of supporters", it 
was the emergence of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Hizballah (Party of God) which played a 
crucial role in Lebanon.46 Hizballah's pro-Iranian orientation was clearly explained in its 
manifesto:
We, the sons of Hizballah 's nation, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran 
and which has established the nucleus of the world's central Islamic state, abide by 
the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme 
Ayatollah Khomeini. 47
As Esposito has argued, Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran became spiritual and financial
44 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. XXXTV, 1988, p. 35677.
4^ For more exploration on these reasons, see Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the 
Iranian Connection", in John Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida 
International University Press, 1990, pp. 119-24, and Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?, pp. 140- 
45.
4^ Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 123.
47 Robin Wright, "Lebanon", in Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), The politics of Islamic Revivalism, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 66.
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godfathers for the Lebanese Shi'as. Posters of Ayatollah Khomeini were to be found in 
homes, mosques and public places, and his speeches and writings were echoed in sermons 
and political speeches.48
Iran had already reversed the tide of the war against Iraq and was dominant on the war fronts 
by mid-1982. Meanwhile, Islamists had consolidated their power in Tehran, and were keen to 
export the revolution. Lebanon was considered the best opportunity. The deployment of a 
Multi-National Force (MNF) made up of US, French, British and Italian troops in Lebanon, in 
the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, was interpreted by Lebanese 
Muslims, particularly the Shi’as, as support for Israel and the Christian-dominated Lebanese 
political system. Iran found the ground prepared to maximise its foreign policy agenda which 
had three items. The first was to triumph over the United States and humiliate the Western 
powers, particularly France and Britain, which were at odds with Iran and were also pursuing 
a more or less pro-Iraqi policy in the Iran-Iraq War. The second item was the Islamisation of 
Lebanon. As Southern Lebanon was being called 'little Tehran' by Lebanese, Iranian leaders 
were optimistic that Lebanon's future political sy stem would be modelled after that of Iran.49 
The third reckoning was that Iranian leaders could prove their anti-Israeli policy by stationing 
troops alongside Lebanese and Palestinian militias fighting Israel.
As the Hizballah and the associated radical Shi’a groups, such as Islamic Jihad (Holy War) 
took part in such actions as the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983, the 
car-bomb attacks on US and French military installations in Beirut on 23 October 1983, the 
hijacking of TWA flight 847 on 14 June 1985, and hostage-taking mainly of US, French and 
British subjects during the 1980s,50 Iran was accused of masterminding the groups' activities. 
Iran's leaders denied involvement, with Rafsanjani claiming after the car-bomb attacks on US 
and French military installations that: "it is impossible that Iran was behind these bombing 
incidents. Iran, in fact, does not support terrorist acts. Iran supports popular movements in the 
struggle against occupation forces. We do not consider it just to interfere in such things".51
48 Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?, p. 147.
49 On this issue , see Robin Wright, In the Name of God; The Khomeini Decade, London: Bloomsbury, 1990, P.
114, and Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, pp. 183-7.
50 It should be noted that Iran was itself the first victim of hostage taking in Lebanon when four Iranians, three 
diplomats and one journalist were taken hostages on 4 July 1982. See Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, PP. 188-94 
and Wright, In the Name of God, pp. 115-21.
5 1 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), South Asia (SA), 27 October 1983, Vol. 8, No. 209. On the 
other hand, the former Head of Iran's Judicial Branch, Musavi Ardabili said that the Muslim people of Lebanon 
had learned "the lesson of revolution from Iran". The Iranian revolution taught the Americans and the French the 
lesson "not to embark on aggressions and attacks on oppressed nations". See FBIS, SA, 24 October 1983, Vol. 8, 
No. 206.
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The export of revolution and the British policy of rejectionism towards Iran
The British policy of rejectionism, which initially emerged as a result of Iran's anti-status quo 
policy and the destabilising effect of its export of the revolution, gained more support and 
momentum after Iran became involved in Lebanon. Since post-revolutionary Iran's policy in 
the Persian Gulf was detrimental to the interests of conservative Arab states and their Western 
allies, and the overall pattern of British policy was directed against the forces of change in 
the region, London adopted a policy of rejectionism. Based on this policy, Britain even 
ignored Iran's legitimate demands, such as for Western acknowledgement that Iraq had been 
the aggressor in the war.
The policy of rejectionism was rooted in the initial British perception that Iran would not 
conform to international norms of behaviour. As Sir John Moberly, a former British diplomat, 
informed the author, Iran's anti-status quo policy with its destabilising effect in the region 
produced a negative view in Britain.52 This was fundamental for development of the 
rejectionist approach by the Thatcher government.
Iran's involvement in Lebanon and its perceived complicity in various events there in the 
1980s intensified British rejectionism. One of the most important misdemeanours of which 
Iran was accused was hostage-taking in Lebanon. The culprits, who originally pursued their 
own agendas and demands, and acted to enhance their own international profile, were viewed 
in Western countries as agents of Iran. The Western view of Iran's complicity was 
strengthened by recognition of the fact that those organisations' demands and interests 
sometimes converged with those of Iran, particularly their calls for a change in Western 
countries' policies towards Iran. For instance, the abduction of a British citizen, Jack Mann, in 
May 1989, was a result of Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa  against Salman Rushdie and 
subsequent ruptured relations between London and Tehran.53
In response to hostage-taking in Lebanon, America, France, and Britain all adopted a public 
policy of no negotiation with hostage-takers and no concession to their demands. While 
despite their declared policy, America and France practically conducted direct and indirect 
negotiations with hostage-takers, the British government stood firm on no-negotiation policy 
and upheld its rejectionist approach towards Iran until 1988, when the last French hostage 
was released.
This was possibly because of the low priority that Britain accorded to the hostage issue in its
52 Author's interview with Sir John Moberly, London, 25 April 1996.
53 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb' Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, United States of 
America: ST. Martin Press, 1997, p. 103.
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foreign policy. In contrast, France, where the hostage issue dominated domestic politics, was 
very keen to secure the release of its hostages in whatever way possible. In fact, unlike its 
French counterpart, the Thatcher government was spared considerable pressure from public 
media or interest groups. Lebanon being a former French colony, the French government 
naturally was more concerned with events there than the British. Furthermore, as the Thatcher 
no-negotiation position had broad cross-party support, the British hostages in Lebanon, 
relatively few compared to the French and American hostages, did not become a major issue 
in British elections.54 This contributed to the Thatcher government's success until 1988 in 
refusing to negotiate directly with hostage-takers or indirectly with countries such as Iran or 
Syria which could influence them.55 In this context the British government repeatedly 
distanced itself from the mediatory role of Terry Waite, a special envoy of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, who himself was held hostage for several years.
The French negotiations with hostage-takers and indirect dialogue with Tehran on the fate of 
hostages, however, was condemned by the Thatcher government. When the last French 
hostage was released in 1988, the British government showed its disapproval. "I was ... none 
too happy," Thatcher said, "about the arrangements which led to the release of French 
hostages form Lebanon and which were widely considered to have overstepped the mark as 
regards the principle of refusal to deal with terrorists".56
French negotiations with Iran, aimed at encouraging Tehran to exert its influence over 
hostage-takers, were based on the settlement of financial disputes between Tehran and Paris, 
and also the expulsion of several Iranian counter-revolutionaries residing in France.57 By the 
same token, to release its hostages from Lebanon, the British government was required to 
make political concessions to Iran -  something which it was not prepared to do. That such a 
concession was demanded is evident in the comments of Mohammad Javad Larijani, former 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for International Economic Affairs. He said that Iran played 
a "vital and constructive role" in the release of the French hostages, thanks to "ideological 
links" with groups in Lebanon, and added "we could and can do the same for British 
hostages" on condition that "London should change its policy towards the Islamic 
Republic".58
54 For exploration of this issue, see Ibid., p. 173.
55 It should be noted that the British success in keeping pressure groups and public media quiet on the British 
hostages lasted until the last French hostage was released in 1988. It was at this time that some criticised the 
British government for not attempting to secure the release of the hostages.
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, pp. 730-1.
57 For more information on French-Iranian negotiations, see George Joffe, "Iran, the Southern Mediterranean 
and Europe: Terrorism and Hostages", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the 
International Community, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 77-79 and Keesing's Record o f Events, Vol. XXXIV, 
1988, pp. 35619, 35670-1 and 35980.
58 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXII, 1986, p. 34585.
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Pursuing rejectionism, the Thatcher government had virtually no relations with countries that 
could exert pressure on hostage-takers in Lebanon. Iranian-British relations were cool, and 
Britain had severed its relations with Syria in 1986.59 While coolness between Iran and 
Britain had constrained British manoeuvrability in resolving the hostage problem, 
rejectionism made British-Iranian rapprochement very difficult. While London, in the 
absence of British-Syrian relations, seemed to view Iran's role in releasing British hostages as 
potentially influential, any British official contacts with Iran and any progress over the 
hostages were subordinated to the larger issue of improvement in British-Iranian diplomatic 
relations.
THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR
Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence for blasphemy passed on the British author, Salman 
Rushdie for his book, The Satanic Verses, on 14 February 1989, was the straw which broke 
the camel's back in Iranian-British relations. The fatwa (religious decree) not only ended 
Iran's relations with Britain but also created an international conflict. The Rushdie affair 
occurred when by the end of the Iran-Iraq war in July 1988, the pragmatist faction had 
achieved ascendancy in Iran's politics. While the pragmatists had made efforts to break Iran's 
international isolation and improve its relations with Western countries, including Britain, the 
Rushdie affair reversed the trend.
Burgeoning relations between Iran and Britain
From mid-1988, following the July 1987 incident which caused the expulsion of diplomats 
from both Tehran and London, both Britain and Iran were motivated to improve relations. For 
a number of reasons, the Thatcher government was prepared to enter into negotiations with 
Tehran. It had become clear to it that without normal relations with Tehran the release of two 
British detainees in Iran charged with espionage would not be possible. In fact, Roger 
Cooper's detention since 1985 had spanned a very difficult time in Anglo-Iranian relations, 
which had reached an all-time low in 1987 after a series of mutual expulsions of diplomats. 
Tim Eggar, former Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, cited the Cooper case as one reason for Britain's decision to improve relations. He 
asserted: "one of the main considerations was our hope and belief that by restoring our 
representation in Tehran we would be able to speed up the release of Roger Cooper and of
59  Britain broke off its relations with Syria in 1986 after the complicitly of Syrians in the attempt of Nezar 
Hindawi in placing a bomb on an E l A1 aircraft at Heathrow.
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Nicolas Nicola".60
The fate of the British hostages in Lebanon was another reason for the Thatcher government 
to improve its ties with Tehran. The policy of rejectionism and no-negotiations, which had 
come under criticism, lost momentum after the last three French hostages were released in 
May 1988.61 The British government realised that its policy had not aided British long-term 
or short-term interests. As to long-term interests, other Western countries, particularly France, 
were seen in British eyes as "up to its neck in negotiation".62 So, if Britain's objective had 
been to teach a lesson to hostage-takers it had not worked, as France and the USA had not 
followed suit. As to short-term interests, London came to the point that the British hostages in 
Lebanon were the only ones who felt abandoned. Given the failures of its stance on hostage­
taking and of its policy towards Iran, the Thatcher government was preparing to change 
policy and improve ties with Iran. Although since June 1988 London had repeatedly and 
correctly denied that the hostage issue was an agenda item in negotiations with Tehran, there 
was considerable evidence that it was of paramount importance to London's initiative to 
improve ties with Tehran. If the release of British hostages "is the fruit of a new Anglo- 
Iranian relationship, it is all to the good", The Times wrote.63 Following the resumption of 
British-Iranian relations in late 1988, Waldegrave stated:
This [resumption of relations] of course is only the start. . . . The fate of our 
hostages in Lebanon, Terry Waite and John McCarthy, together with Brian Keenan, 
is of enormous concern for us. We have said , and continue to say, that Iran should 
use what influence she has to help secure their release.6^
The East-West rivalry also encouraged Britain to improve relations with Iran. Like the United 
States, Britain under Thatcher viewed the Soviet threat and the Kremlin's exploitation of the 
cool relations between Iran and Western countries seriously. Thatcher believed that the 
Soviet Union "would extort subsidised credits from a West anxious for peace in periods of 
'thaw', and seize new territories by subversion and conquest in periods of 'chill'". From 1983 
to 1987, Thatcher asserted, "there was a new chill in East-West relations. We had entered a 
dangerous phase. . . . The Cold War had never really ended, at least from the Soviet side:
60 Hansard, Vol. 145, 18 January 1989, Columns: 458-464.
On the issue of Franco-Iranian negotiations and also French deal with hostage takers in Lebanon, see 
Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. XXXIV, 1988, pp. 35619, 35671, 35980, and 36001.
"Starting to Talk is the Difficult Thing", The Guardian, 9 June 1988.
63 "Iranian Overtures", The Times, 8 June 1988.
Speech by William Waldegrave, former UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affair, at 
Chatham House Conference on 19 January 1989, Verbatim Service, VS007/89, London, Thursday 19th January 
1989, pp. 2-3
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there were merely variations of chill".65
During 1987 the Soviets sent no fewer than 17 diplomatic and economic missions to Tehran. 
Also in the same year, Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov visited Tehran three times, 
and Moscow was host to 77 Iranian delegations, with Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati 
and four of his deputies spending a total of 42 days in the USSR. The Soviet bloc diplomatic 
presence in Tehran was its strongest in the entire Middle East.66 While Iran had no relations 
with the USA or France, and virtually none with Britain after mid-1987, other Western 
countries, such as Germany and Italy had no political leverage with Tehran, and were mostly 
concerned with their economic interests. At the same time, Iran was under the strongest 
pressure from the West to end the war, and was suffering setbacks in the Persian Gulf during 
the "Tanker War" as well as on land. The Thatcher government was willing to develop its 
relations with Iran for fear the Soviets would exploit Iran's international isolation.
Economic interests also motivated Britain to resume relations, because after the 1987 
incident, the Iranian government had instituted a policy of 'Buy British Last', issuing a 
directive to all Iranian organisations and ministries considering importing goods from Britain 
to make a "close and accurate examination of the possibility of replacing such goods from 
other sources".67 In the first seven months of 1988, British exports to Iran were 14 per cent 
lower than in the same period in 1987.68 To overturn the 'Buy British Last' policy, London 
had to reestablish relations with Tehran.
Iran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 and the end of the Iran-Iraq War in July 
1988 marked the beginning of a new era in Iran's economic relations with Western countries. 
President Khamenei stated that "in reconstruction of the country, we must use the knowledge, 
expertise and resources of the foreigners".69 It had become clear to Whitehall that those 
countries which had managed to maintain normal relations with Iran throughout the war, such 
as Germany, Italy and Japan, would have the bigger share in Iran's post-war reconstruction. 
This prompted London to become more active in order to gain a slice of the reconstruction 
pie, given Britain's position as a traditional trading partner of Iran.70 It was in this context 
that Britain's Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) hinted that it might resume
65 Thatcher, Op. Cit., pp. 9 and 450.
66 See The Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1987, and Abbas Hedayati Khomeini, Shouray-e Amniyat va Jang-e 
Tahmili Iraq Alayh-e Jomhoori-e Islami-e Iran (in Persian), [Security Council and the Iraqi Imposed War on the 
Islamic Republic of Iran], Tehran: Daftar-e Motaleaat-e Syasi va Beinolmelali, 1991, pp. 133-34.
67 Financial Times, 9 September 1988.
68 The decline was also due to Iran's shortage of foreign exchange and limitation on importing of some kinds of 
goods. See Financial Times, 9 September 1988.
69 Financial Times, 12 September 1988.
76 The Guardian, 28 September 1988.
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medium-term export credit covering Iran in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War ceasefire.71
The Iranian government also desired improved relations. Close to the end of the war, the 
pragmatists had become stronger, and were able to direct effectively Iran's foreign policy. In 
fact, Ayatollah Khomeini's acceptance of Resolution 598 was largely the result of pragmatists' 
lobbying. As such, Iran's tentative opening to the West was launched before the end of the 
war, and rapidly gained momentum after the ceasefire. The pragmatists skilfully used the 
changing situation to enhance their approach towards the West. Rafsanjani stated: "one of the 
incorrect measures was that, in the revolutionary atmosphere, we made enemies [of some 
Western countries]. We pushed those who could have been neutral into hostility . . . Now the 
Foreign Ministry has been instructed to tread the correct path at this stage".72 One day after 
the ceasefire, he said: "our post-war foreign policy will be more open than that during the 
war".73
Tehran now urgently wished to end Iran's international isolation. The resumption of Iran's 
relations, close to the ceasefire or after it, with countries such as Canada74 and France, and the 
re-opening of the Kuwaiti embassy in Tehran, all manifested this desire. Even the issue of 
relations with the United States was canvassed in some newspaper editorials. Jomhoori-e 
Islami wrote:
We must begin to believe that, if necessary, we can have relations with the United 
States with complete self-reliance and confidence from a position of strength. . . . 
We have nothing to lose by establishing proper relations with the superpowers of the 
West based on justified rights of the Islamic Republic. Not only will we have 
nothing to lose, but also by using proper means we will . . regain our lost rights in 
the world.7^
It was Iran's hope that by resuming relations with Britain, the latter might assist Iran in its 
case against Iraq at the United Nations over implementation of Resolution 598. Iran had not 
been able to win the war with Iraq; it deemed it necessary to re-establish links with the outside 
world, so that the opportunities afforded by peace should not be lost for lack of friends. Iran’s 
willingness to improve its ties with London was premised on an expectation that Britain
71 Medium term cover for Iran had been suspended in 1979. During the war, ECGD maintained limited medium 
term cover for Iraq. See Financial Times, 11 August 1988.
72 Cited in Wright, In the Name of God, p. 192.
73 Ibid.
74 For eight years, Iran had subjected the resumption of its relations with Canada to a demand that Canada 
formally apologise for sneaking out six American embassy employees hidden for three months during the 1979- 
81 hostage crisis.
7  ^ "Editorial Assesses Relations with the United States", Jomhoori-e Islami [Islamic Republic], cited in Right, In 
the Name of God, p. 195.
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would support Iranian efforts to have Iraq branded as the aggressor.
This temporary mutual attraction between the two sides led to negotiations in mid-1988. Two 
issues were used by them to give momentum to the talks. The first was mutual compensation 
for past damage to their respective embassy buildings. London agreed to pay Iran £1.9 million 
for damage caused to the Iranian Embassy in London during its storming by the SAS to 
rescue its staff in 1981, and Iran agreed to pay £900,000 compensation for damage to the 
British Embassy in Tehran. Settlement of this long-standing issue was the prelude to further 
exchanges on political issues. The second issue was British condemnation of Iraqi use of 
chemical weapons against Iran during the war. Mehdi Karoobi, former Deputy Speaker of the 
Iranian Parliament, during a meeting with a British Parliamentary delegation in Tehran, said: 
"I am thankful for the British stance condemning the Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the 
war".76
In late 1988, the two sides exchanged delegations and negotiated on resumption of relations. 
High-level meetings, including one between Geoffrey Howe and Ali Akbar Veiayati in New 
York in September 1988, finally led to restoration of relations in November 1988. Britain re­
opened its embassy, with Gordon Pirie as Charge d' Affaires. As a consequence, Iran released 
Nicolas Nicola, and Britain freed an Iranian who was serving a 12-year sentence for 
involvement in a bomb explosion at a London hotel, and Tehran also allowed Cooper to 
receive a visit by his family in Tehran jail. Furthermore, British Airways resumed flights to 
Tehran, and more than 50 British companies participated in Iran's 1988 international trade 
fair, at which Britain figured as the second largest participant after West Germany.
Full resumption of diplomatic ties and exchange of ambassadors were dependent on further 
warming of relations. But pressure on the part of the Iranian 'idealists', and their opposition to 
the pragmatists' open-window foreign policy, undermined these prospects. Ali Akbar 
Mohtashemi, former Minister of the Interior and a key figure in the 'idealist' faction, 
suggested Cooper be punished according to Islamic law, and added: "Britain's request that its 
spy not be tried stems from its arrogant nature. How can we trust a country which interferes in 
the internal affairs of others and which dispatches spies to Iran"?77 The hard-line Iranian 
newspaper Jomhoori-e Islami, describing Britain's fence-mending efforts as a "filthy 
handshake", said: "London wants to open its embassy in Tehran to reorganise its shattered 
intelligence service in Iran and revive Freemasonry".78
76 "Hei’At-e Parlemani-e Englis" (in Persian), [British Parliamentarian Delegation], Ettel'at, 31 Khordad 1367 
(Iranian Calendar), cited in Shokrani, p. 191.
77 Financial Times, 27 January 1989.
78 Quoted in The Guardian, 18 August 1988.
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Given the idealists' opposition to any progress in British-Iranian relations, the lack of 
progress on the fate of British hostages in Lebanon was also understandable. The Iranian 
government was prepared to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of British 
hostages only in return for British efforts to compel Israel to release four Iranian detainees. In 
addition, the delays in release of the British hostages stemmed partly from the complex nature 
of hostage-taking in Lebanon, and also the inability of the Iranian pragmatists to overcome 
the idealists’ influence on the politics of pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Waldegrave 
underlined the problems as follows:
It is sensible to identify the problems which remain. We would like these problems 
solved. The most important are:(i) The continued, and wholly unjustified, detention 
of Roger Cooper in Iran. Iran has no reason to detain him in custody, (ii) . . . The 
fate of our hostages in Lebanon . . .  is of enormous concern to us. We have said, 
and continue to say, that Iran should use what influence she has to help secure their 
release, (iii) British companies continue to suffer from discrimination, in the form of 
a circular instruction in Iran to 'Buy British Last', (iv) We are concerned by the 
continuing reports, more numerous in recent months, of human rights abuse. It is 
important that these problems should be resolved soon, Otherwise they will 
obviously limit the possibility of constructing a full and warm relationship with
Iran. 79
In sum, the absence of a long-term strategy by which Tehran and London could improve their 
relations, together with the unresolved problems between them, and, more importantly, 
idealist opposition to the pragmatists' policy of more openness to the West, prevented the 
resumption of full diplomatic relations. Eventually this short period of burgeoning relations 
ended with the Rushdie Affair in February 1989.
The Satanic Verses and the storm in Iranian-British relations
The Satanic Verses was published by Salman Rushdie, an Indian-born British author, on 26 
September 1988. The novel was declared blasphemous and banned in India on 5 October. 
Later, the governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Malaysia, Qatar, 
Indonesia and South Africa followed suit. On 20 October Seyed Pasha, Secretary of the Union 
of Islamic Institutions in Britain, demanded prosecution of Rushdie. The book won the 
Whitbread Prize for novels on 8 November. Muslims in Bradford burned it publicly on 14 
January 1989. Their action was met with approval from the Hindu and Christian communities 
in Bradford.80
79 Speech by William Waldegrave MP, former UK Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at 
Chatham House Conference on 19 January 1989, Op. Cit., pp. 2-3.
80 Hasmukh Shah, general secretary of the Virat Hindu Sammelan said: "We are totally with our Muslim
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Rushdie targeted Muslim sanctities: the Quran, the Prophet, his wives, and Islamic rules. 
Rushdie gave the Prophet a name Wabound, which Rushdie himself described as 'the Devil's 
synonym'. Rushdie depicted him as incapable of distinguishing between inspiration from an 
angel and inspiration from a devil, or between what he dictated and what the scribe 
deliberately substituted.81 Thus, he not only abused the Quran as the word of God, but also 
questioned it even as the work of the Prophet. Muslims were also outraged by his denigration 
of the Prophet's wives. He did not say that they were prostitutes, but gave them names of 
prostitute characters.82 He also ridiculed Islamic rules.83 In sum, Rushdie "insulted the faith, 
ridiculed the Prophet, trivialised the sacred -  and the sin was compounded because it was 
committed by a bom, though not a practising, Muslim".84 Muslims were further infuriated by 
the fact that Rushdie "had been lionised, praised, and lavishly rewarded and financed by 
enemies and critics of Islam".85 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a Fatwa, on 14 February 1989, 
declaring that
The author of The Satanic Verses book, which is against Islam, the Prophet and the 
Quran, and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its content, are 
sentenced to death. I call on zealous Muslims to promptly execute them on the spot 
they find them so that no one else will dare to blaspheme Muslim sanctities . . .  .8^
The impact of the fatwa was felt throughout the world. Rushdie went into hiding under police 
protection.
brothers. It's them today, it could be us next". The Bishop of Bradford declared publicly that the book "should 
never have been written". See Dipankar De Sarkar, "Bradford: The First Sparks", India Today, 15 March 1989, 
pp. 30-31.
81 The Persian scriber in Rushdie's book says: "Little things at first. If Mahound recited a verse in which God 
was described as all-hearing, all-knowing, I would write, all-knowing, all-wise. Here's the point: Mahound did 
not notice the alterations. So there I was, actually writing the Book, or re-writing, anyway, pulling the word of 
God with my own profane language.. . .  So the next time I changed a bigger thing, He said Christian, I wrote 
down Jew .. He'd notice that, surely; how could he not? But when I read him the chapter he nodded and thanked 
me politely, and I went out of his tent with tears in my eyes". See Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Versus, Dover: 
The Consortium, 1992, pp. 367-8.
82 "The fifteen-year-old whore 'Ayesha' was the most popular with the paying public, just as her namesake was 
with Mahound . . . .  The fifteen-year-old whispered something in the grocer's ear TMusal. At once a light began 
to shine in his eyes. 'Tell me everything', he begged. 'Your childhood your favourite toys,. . .  tell me how you 
played the tambourine and the Prophet came to watch'. She told him, and then he asked about her deflowering at 
the age of twelve, and she told him that, and afterwards he paid double the normal fee, because 'it's been the best 
time of my life' ". See Rushdie, Op. Cit., pp. 380-1.
83 " . . .  Rules about every damn thing, if a man farts let him turn his face to the wind, a rule about which hand 
to use for the purpose of cleaning one's behind.. . .  Which sexual positions had received divine sanction, so that 
they learned that sodomy and the missionary position were approved of by the archangel, whereas the forbidden 
postures included all those in which the female was on top . .  See Rushdie, Op. Cit., pp. 363-4.
84 William E. Smith, "Hunted by an Angry Faith; Salman Rushdie's Novel Cracks Open a Fault Line Between 
East and West", Time, 27 February 1989, p. 17.
85 Ali A Mazrui, "Satanic Versus or a Satanic Novel? Moral Dilemmas of the Rushdie Affair", Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1990, p. 118.
8^ For the full text of the Fatwa, see "Matn-e Fatway-e Imam Khomeini dar Rabetah ba Ghatl-e Rushdie", (in 
Persian), [Text of Imam Khomeini's Fatwa on Rushdie], Ettela' at, 15 February 1989.
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The question is: why did Ayatollah Khomeini issue thzfatw al Various scholars and experts 
on Iran have answered the question from different angles.87 Thzfatwa seemed to be rooted in 
two fundamental facts which many Western scholars have overlooked. The first was 
Ayatollah Khomeini's absolute conviction that The Satanic Verses was blasphemous, and that 
the punishment for blasphemy, particularly committed by a bom Muslim, was death.
Ayatollah Khomeini had made a similar outburst on another religious matter a few weeks 
earlier. An Iranian woman suggested in a Radio interview that a Japanese television 
personality rather than the Prophet's daughter, Fatimah, was her role model. Ayatollah 
Khomeini called for severe punishment of the radio officials responsible for broadcasting that 
program, if they had done so intentionally.88
The second fact, even more important, was Ayatollah Khomeini's view of The Satanic Verses 
as a Western conspiracy against Islam and the Quran. Among Western countries, Britain had 
a long history of involvement in Iran, where many regarded it as a power conspiring against 
Iran and Islam. The Rushdie affair was taken to confirm Iranian suspicions, when it was 
learned that Rushdie had been paid over US $800,000, or according to another report US $1.5 
million in advance royalties.89 To Ayatollah Khomeini, the book was seen "as a deliberate 
assault against Iran and the Muslim world as a whole, designed to demean, mock, and weaken 
Islamic culture".90 Thzfatwa explicitly revealed his view of the book as a conspiracy and his 
intention to prevent further attempts of this kind. He said ". . .1 call on zealous Muslims to 
promptly execute them [Rushdie and all those involved in the publication of the book] . . .  so 
that no one else will dare to blaspheme Muslim sanctities".91 His speech on 24 February 1989 
reinforced this stance:
87 These can be summed up as follows: (i) enabling him to re-assert his Islamic leadership internationally, (ii) 
consolidating his domestic and international standing (iii) appeasing Iran's idealist or hard-line revolutionary 
clerics, (iv) balancing between the idealist and pragmatist factions (v) mobilising people in Iran by identifying a 
distant enemy, and (vi) distracting attention from Iran's pressing socioeconomic post-war problems. These 
reasons, in one form or another, were extracted from the practical or perceived consequences of the Fatwa. For 
deatils of these arguments, see Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality ?, p. 116; Halliday,Op. Cit., PP 71 
& 123; Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the Persian Gulf States", in David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution 
and the Muslim World, Oxford: Westview Press, 1990, p. 83; R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Resistance to the US 
Intervention in the Persian Gulf', in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (eds.), Neither East nor West; 
Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, New York and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 53—4; 
Judith Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 454; Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami, "Wheels Within Wheels: Iran's Foreign Policy Towards the Arab World", in Hooshang Amirahmadi 
and Nader Entessar (eds.), Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992, p. 182; and Wright, In the Name of God, pp. 200-1.
88 On Ayatollah Khomeini's outburst, see Maziar Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 1979-1988", in Keddie and Gasiorowski (eds.), Neither East nor West, Iran, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States, New York and London: Yale University Press, 1990, p. 31.
89 Mazrui, Op. Cit., p. 137.
90 Graham E. Fuller, The 'Center of the Universe': The Geopolitics of Iran, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p. 
254.
91 See "Matn-e Fatway-e Imam Khomeini dar Rabetah ba Ghatl-e Rushdie" Op. Cit.
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I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that . . . The Satanic Verses . . .  is 
against Islam, the Prophet and the Quran. . . . The issue of the book. . . is that it is a 
calculated move aimed at rooting out religion and religiousness, and above all, Islam 
and its clergy. . . .  The issue for them [the western countries] is not that of defending 
an individual-the issue for them is to support an anti-Islamic and anti-value current, 
which has been masterminded by those institutions belonging to Zionism, Britain 
and the USA which have placed themselves against the Islamic world, through their 
ignorance and hate.92
This view was repeatedly emphasised in the Iranian press. Keyhan wrote: "the Western aim 
undoubtedly was to destroy a culture [Islamic culture] whose growth endangered all its 
colonialist goals".93 Along this line, the then Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammad 
Javad Larijani, asserted: " . . .  The Rushdie affair was planned by the United States and 
Zionism to deliver a blow against Iran.. . ”.94
The fatwa received varying reactions in the Muslim world. For instance, Sheikh Mohammad 
Hossam el Din of Cairo's A1 Azhar Mosque said that the execution of Rushdie would be 
virtually impossible under the tenets of Islam, and that the issuing of a death sentence would 
make Islam seem brutal and bloodthirsty. He suggested that Muslims should only ban and 
bum the book and give Rushdie a chance to repent.95 Kalim Siddiqi, the late Secretary of the 
British Muslim Parliament, supported th& fatwa.96 The Organisation of Islamic Conference, 
an important body in the Muslim world, did not explicitly endorse the fatwa  but in its 
resolution published on 16 March 1989, it declared Rushdie an apostate. From Iran's point of 
view, this was a big victory, as apostasy is punishable by death.
For Western countries, Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence was an unexpected occurrence, 
not because of his order to kill someone outside Iran, but because of his openness in declaring 
the fatwa to incite the whole Muslim community to kill a person. Furthermore, since Rushdie 
was a British citizen and the book had been initially published in Britain, and under pressure 
from British human rights organisations and the press, the Thatcher government found itself 
at the centre of controversy, and moved into the forefront of opposition to the fatwa and the 
government in Iran.
The Iranian government declared the day after the fatwa a day of national mourning. 
Immediately thereafter, many Iranians gathered in front of the newly re-opened British 
embassy in Tehran and shouted 'Death to Rushdie', 'Death to Thatcher', 'and Death to Britain'.
92 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1989.
93 Keyhan, Tehran, 11 March 1989, cited in Fuller, Op. Cit., pp. 254-5.
94 Keyhan, 11 March 1989, cited in Fuller, Op. Cit., p. 255.
95 See Smith, "Hunted by an Angry Faith", Op. Cit., p. 18.
96 John Mortimer, "Blasphemers Must Die", The Spectator, 22 September 1990, pp. 18-20.
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On 15 February, Ayatollah Sanei of the 15 Khordad Foundation of Iran, a non-governmental 
organisation, offered a considerable reward to anyone who would kill Rushdie.
Some Iranian officials tried to reduce the damage which the fatwa could have inflicted on 
Iran's relations with the West. On 17 February, the then Iranian president, Ali Khamenei, 
called on Rushdie to apologise for his blasphemy, since "then it is possible that the people 
will pardon him", and warned Iranian students against storming the British Embassy.97 To 
pragmatists it seemed that the Rushdie affair would destroy all the preparations for 
normalisation with the West. On 18 February Rushdie issued a statement, in which he 
regretted the distress which his novel had caused to many Muslims throughout the world. The 
official Iranian reaction was contradictory, first rejecting, then accepting and finally again 
rejecting Rushdie's apology. The situation became clear only with an announcement from 
Ayatollah Khomeini's office on 19 February that even if Rushdie repented and became the 
most pious man of his time, it was still incumbent on every Muslim to use his life and wealth 
to send him to hell.98
For more than a week after the fatwa , neither Thatcher nor the Leader of the Opposition 
expressed any view, let alone protest. However, in the context of an EC decision on 20 
February, the British government finally withdrew its entire diplomatic staff, all of whom had 
only recently arrived in Tehran. Foreign Ministers from 12 EC member countries met in 
Brussels. Condemning the fatwa as an unacceptable violation of the most elementary 
principles and obligations governing relations among sovereign states, they agreed to recall 
simultaneously their heads of missions in Tehran "for consultation" and to suspend exchanges 
of high-level official visits 99 The British initial silence and reluctance to take any unilateral 
position on the Salman Rushdie issue and its subsequent withdrawal of diplomats from 
Tehran in the context of the EC decision was aimed to make the issue an all-European one, so 
as to maximise the pressure on Iran.100
In reaction to the EC decision, Iran announced on 21 February the withdrawal of all its 
diplomats from EC countries, and even those pragmatists who were thought to be moderate 
issued strong statements in support of this reciprocal measure. For instance, the then speaker
97 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 1989, p. 36450.
98 For the text of this statement, see Ata’ ollah Mohajerani, Naghd-e Toteay-e Ayat-e Sheitani (in Persian), 
[Critic of Satanic Verses Conspiracy], Tehran: Ettela' at Publication, 1994, p. 157.
99 On the EC decision, see Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 1989, p. 36450.
100 por more information on British reluctance to act immediately, see Stuart Weir, "The Sound of Silence",
New Statesman & Society, 24 February 1989, pp. 10-11; and Stuart Weir and Yasmin Alibhai, "Death Sentence", 
New Stateman & Society, 15 February 1991, p. 17. On the British aim to make the issue an European one, see Ali 
Rahmani and Said Ta’eb, "Introduction", in Rahmani and Ta'eb (eds.), Goftogoohay-e Iran va Oroopa (in 
Persian), [Iran-Europe Dialogues], Tehran: Moassesay-e Chap va Entesharat-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 
1996, p. 8.
141
of Parliament, Rafsanjani, said that Iran did not fear confrontation with the West in countering 
"global blasphemy". Larijani described the EC decision as "amateurish, hasty and very 
counter-productive," and asserted that Iran would "stand by its position that Salman Rushdie 
should be punished".101
The pragmatists' new stance was due to their earlier inability to lift thefatwa when President 
Khamenei had suggested Rushdie apologise, and also to an attack by Ayatollah Khomeini on 
their open-window policy towards the West. On 22 February 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini said:
It is not necessary for us to go seeking to establish extensive ties because the enemy 
may think that we have become so dependent and attach so much importance to their 
existence that we quietly condone insults to beliefs and religious sanctities, those 
who still continue to believe that and warn that we must embark on a revision of our 
policies and diplomacy;. . .  those who believe that if we act in a pragmatic way they 
[the West and the East] will reciprocate humanely and will mutually respect nations, 
Islam and Muslims-to them this [Rushdie's novel] is an example.103
There was also a perception amongst Iranian officials that Iran's frustration stemming from 
being forced to end the war and its need for Western resources, technology, know-how and 
assistance, had led the Western powers to believe they could do anything against Iran. This 
dominant perception was reflected by President Khamenei when he said: "Western powers 
should not perceive that Iran for its needs in the post-war era is prepared to neglect its 
sanctities".103 Along this line, Prime Minister Mousavi asserted that although the second 
decade of revolution was the decade of construction and development, it was also the decade 
of resistance over revolutionary principles and slogans.104
Meanwhile the idealists within the Iranian leadership attempted to take full advantage of the 
fatwa and reverse the course of normalisation of relations between Iran and the West. They 
were dominant, by and large, in the parliament, and succeeded in passing, on 28 February 
1989, an ultimatum allowing Britain one week to reconsider its "unprincipled stand over 
Islam, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Rushdie affair", before breaking off diplomatic 
relations.105 Although the British Foreign Secretary said that the novel had regrettably been 
offensive to Muslims and also to Britain, which Rushdie had compared to Hitler's Germany,
IO* Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 1989, p. 36450.
102 $ee ß ß c  Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1989.
103 Cited in Mohammad Shokrani, Amalkard-e Yazdeh Salay-e Doulat-e Mohafezehkar-e Margaret Thatcher (in 
Persian), [The Eleven Year Record of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government], Tehran: Moassesay-e 
Chap va Entesharat-e Vezarat-e Omoor-e Kharejah, 1993, p. 227.
104 Ibid., p. 226.
105 For the full text of the ultimatum, see "Mosavvabay-e Majlis-e Shouray-e Islami ba 180 ray-e Movafegh" (in 
Persian), [Parliament's Ultimatum Passed with 180 Votes], Daily Resalat, 28 February 1989.
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the idealists were determined to break off relations, and did so on 7 March. This was the first 
time that Iran had taken the initiative in breaking diplomatic ties since its decision in early 
1979 to end relations with Israel, Egypt and South Africa.106
The Rushdie affair and severing of diplomatic relations with Britain were seen in Western 
countries as the return of revolutionary Iran to its confrontational stance against the West. 
They concluded that as long as Ayatollah Khomeini was alive there was no room for 
developing constructive relations with Iran.
Following Iran's severance of relations with Britain, EC member countries for political and 
economic reasons decided to return their heads of missions to Tehran on 20 March 1989. 
Scorning their decision, Ayatollah Khomeini said the diplomats were returning to Iran 
"humiliated, disgraced, and regretful of what they did".107 On 3 June 1989 Ayatollah 
Khomeini died. This apparently marked the end of the 'Khomeinism' era, but ten years after 
the Iranian revolution, the Rushdie affair had destroyed "the results of nearly ten years of 
generally cautious British diplomacy towards Iran".108
As the foregoing chapter demonstrated, the human rights issue was a source of tension 
between Iran and Britain. Viewing British criticism of Iran's human rights record as a 
deliberate policy to damage Iran's international Islamic position, the revolutionary Islamic 
leaders became more resentful of the British. Meanwhile, London's previous silence over the 
Shah's abuses of human rights, contrasted with its deep concern about Iran's revolutionary 
regime's behaviour in the field of human rights made the new Iranian leaders suspicious of 
true British objectives. At the same time, Britain's active policy of criticising Iran's human 
rights violations strengthened Iran's perception of Britain as a conspiratorial power which 
aimed to isolate Iran in the international community. The Thatcher government's concern over 
the issue of export of the revolution led London to adopt a rejectionist policy towards Tehran. 
This policy made Iranian-British rapprochement very difficult. Eventually, close to the end of 
the war and particularly after it, while pragmatists dominated Iran's power structures, 
Britain, realising the failure of its policy to produce any short or long term results, changed its 
policy. Meanwhile, Tehran found it expedient to strive for improving its ties with London. 
But the Rushdie affair reversed the trend. Viewing the Rushdie issue largely as a Western 
conspiracy, orchestrated by Britain with its conniving nature in the Iranian eyes, the Iranian 
government broke off relations with Britain. In fact, Iranian-British relations in the 1980s, 
characterised by tension and instability, climaxed in March 1989 when Iran finally ended its
Iran's decision to end relations with Egypt and South Africa was because of Egypt's signing of ja peace treaty 
with Israel (Camp David) and South Africa's policy of Apartheid.
107 Quoted in Julian Baum, "Arab-British Ties Ride Out Storm Over Rushdie Affair", Christian Science 
Monitor, 29 March 1989, p. 4.
1°8 Hunter, Iran and the World, p. 148.
relations with Britain.
Chapter 6
Iranian-British Relations in the Post-Khomeini Era
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INTRODUCTION
The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, followed by the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 
1989, ushered in a new era in Iran's domestic and foreign policy. The rise of pragmatists, 
headed by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, after one decade of idealists' dominance in Iran's 
power structure, and Rafsanjani's ability through his technocrat cabinet to redesign Iran's 
foreign policy, marked the beginning of the post-Khomeini era. Furthermore, the extensive 
changes which Iran experienced in its regional and global environments and the pragmatic 
handling of them by the new administration strengthened the pragmatists' hold. The twin 
crises of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Kuwait War in the early 1990s 
provided the post-Khomeini leadership with opportunities to de-link Iran's foreign policy 
from the previous decade and improve Iran's international image.
The Rafsanjani government initiated the necessary adjustment in Iran's foreign policy. This 
adjustment was based on domestic priorities of post-war reconstruction and the corresponding 
changes in the region and the world, involving both Iraqi expansionism and the Soviet 
dissolution. It was rooted in Iran's national reconstruction and foreign policy diversification. 
The outcome was an inward-looking mood and a re-defined version of the export of 
revolution, and its ends and means. This chapter will examine European-Iranian relations 
generally, and Iranian-British ties in particular in the post-Khomeini era in the light of the 
new changes introduced by Rafsanjani and his government.
NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
The end of war with Iraq necessitated reconstruction. A preliminary report by a UN 
inspection team estimated Iran's economic losses in the 1980-88 war at "$940bn in direct 
damage and the balance of $440bn in indirect losses".1 The UN mission found that "the 
damage inflicted on the country's infrastructure was of a magnitude and nature that will 
require several years of repair and reconstruction".2 In the aftermath of the war, Iran's
1 Peter Feuilherade, "The Cost of the War Before Last", The Middle East, October 1991, No. 204, p. 34.
2 Ibid., P. 34; For more information on the economic costs of the War, see Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Economic 
Costs of the War and the Reconstruction" in Cyrus Bina and Hamid Zangeneh (eds.), Modem Capitalism and 
Islamic Ideology in Iran, London: Macmillan, 1992, Chapter 10.
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economic difficulties, including widespread unemployment, the increasing gap between rich 
and poor, high inflation and reduced industrial productivity, underlined the significance and 
necessity of post-war reconstruction.
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini was followed by the inauguration of Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani as President in August 1989. This event marked the beginning of a new era, in 
which the balance of power shifted to the relative dominance of pragmatists in the political 
arena. This development was a turning point in post-revolutionary Iranian politics which can 
be interpreted as the 'Thermidor' in the course of the Iranian revolution.3 The main task of 
Rafsanjani and his technocrat administration was to restructure Iran's economic system and 
end Iran's political isolation.
Following the acceptance of UN resolution 598, and particularly from the beginning of the 
Rafsanjani administration, Iran's first priority was to consolidate the Islamic revolution at 
home. During the 1990s, the requirements of Iran's national interests and economic 
reconstruction created an inward-looking atmosphere. At a news conference in June 1994, 
Rafsanjani said: "We have said that we would elucidate our ideology and those interested 
could accept. We will employ all our potential for the development of our country".4 In the 
1990s, the ideological orientation was complemented by a renewed emphasis on Iran's 
national interests. This emphasis was indicative of the fact that the slogan of 'Islam-Islam' of 
the 1980s had been replaced by 'Islam-Iran', if not Tran-Islam' in the 1990s. This new policy 
was set in motion during the Persian Gulf crisis, when Iran cooperated with the United 
Nations and rejected Iraq's proposal to link the Palestine question to its withdrawal from 
Kuwait, a position which reflected the primacy of Iran's national security interests, as Iran 
characterised the conflict as one between two evil forces.5
The end of the Iran-Iraq War aroused expectations that the era of sacrifice would give way to 
an era of economic security and prosperity. Economic and social problems could no longer be 
blamed easily upon the war. The imperatives of post-war economic and political 
reconstruction were conceptualised in Iran's First Five-Year Economic and Political Plan 
prepared by the Rafsanjani administration in 1989. The plan provided an important 
framework within which the government could embark on a program of economic reform.6 It 
included some policy initiatives, such as privatisation of many industries and mines, the
3 For a general discussion on different phases in revolutionary movements, see Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of 
Revolution, London: Jonathan Cape, 1953, Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
4 Middle East Insight, Vol. 10, No. 4/5, May-August 1994, p. 53.
5 Hooshang Amirahmadi, "The Islamic Republic and the Question of Palestine", Middle East Insight, Vol. 10, 
No. 4/5, May-August 1994, p. 52.
6 Massoud Karshenas and M. Hashem Pesaran, "Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian 
Economy", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1, Winter 1995, p. 90.
146
revival of the Tehran stock exchange, the abolition of the multiple exchange rate mechanism 
and its replacement with a single free market floating rate, establishment of a number of free 
trade zones, encouragement of direct foreign investment, and the easing of foreign investment 
regulations.7 In sum, the objectives of these measures were to create the appropriate 
conditions to stabilise and normalise what had become a war economy, in the hope of leading 
Iran's economy on to the path of progress.8
The Five-Year Plan abolished, in particular, limits on foreign investment and ownership, and 
allowed the government to secure foreign credits: "The new principles allowed foreign 
investors to own up to 100 percent of a business and repatriate profits unhindered".9 Under 
the economic reform measures, "foreigners were allowed to take a share of up to 49 percent in 
joint ventures; higher than the 35 percent under the Shah".10 The Second Five Year Plan, 
which began in March 1995, allowed for continued economic reform.
The Rafsanjani government also tried to extend Iran's cooperation with world economic 
organisations, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this line, 
Tehran implemented the IMF's recommendations for improving the economy, paving the way 
for securing the IMF's future financial assistance. These recommendations included the 
elimination of subsidies for most goods, the lifting of price control, devaluation of the rial, 
and reduction of the size of the government. With these policies, Rafsanjani initiated the 
stabilisation phase in Iran's economic reform, and put it through the phase of structural 
adjustment.11
Meanwhile, Rafsanjani's pragmatism opened up a new avenue on its relations with the West. 
To implement its economic plans, and to transform Iran's war-led economy to a market-led 
one, Rafsanjani required access to the West's financial and technological resources. As 
Colburn argues, revolutionary states make verbal commitments "to break out of the capitalist- 
dominated world economic order, and to construct an independent economy", yet they do not
7 For a broad analysis of the issues relating to Iran’s economic liberalisation strategy under Rafsanjani, see Ibid., 
PP. 89-111; and L. Haddad, "Open Door Policy and the Industralisation of Iran", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
Vol. 24, No. 1, 1994, pp. 81-94.
8 For more information on these issues, see Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The Politics of Economic Restructuring in 
Post-Khomeini Iran, CMEIS Occasional Paper, No. 50, University of Durham, July 1995, pp. 10-13; and also see 
Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iranian Economic Reconstruction Plan and Prospects for its Success", in Hooshang 
Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, London 
and New York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 113-135.
9 Dilip Hiro, "The Iranian Connection", The Middle East, No. 207, January 1992, p. 21.
"Come in, the Door is Ppen", The Middle East, No. 213, July 1992, p. 34.
11 For different phases of stabilisation and structural adjustment in Middle Eastern economies, see Henri J. 
Barkey, "Introduction: Economic Reform in the Middle East" in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), The Politics of Economic 
Reform in the Middle East, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 2-3; For general discussion on economic 
liberalisation, see Ronald L. Mckinnon, The Order oj economic Liberalisation; Financial Control in the 
Transition to a Market Economy, Baltimore and London: The JohniHopkins University Press, second edition, 
1993.
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succeed.12 Iran was no exception.
Tehran realised that if it wanted Western European countries to invest in Iran, give credit, and 
cooperate with Iran in its reconstruction phase, it had to enter a "period of relative quietism"13 
instead of militancy in its foreign policy. In short, Iran's national reconstruction could not be 
implemented without a new approach to Iran's foreign policy. In fact, "a good deal of 
stimulus for rethinking and redesigning Iran's foreign policy was economic in origin".14 Thus, 
the pragmatists of the post-Khomeini era tried to reduce their revolutionary rhetoric whilst 
increasing their emphasis on Iran's national interests. By giving priority to problems at home 
and pursuing an inward-looking mood, Iran behaved as a state rather than as a revolutionary 
movement. The resumption of Iran's relations with Britain in 1990 and the improvement in 
Tehran's ties with other Western European countries demonstrated Iran's new foreign policy 
approach. The Iranian desire for better relations with Western Europe was reflected in 
Tehran's attempts to use its influence in Lebanon for securing the release of Western hostages 
in the early 1990s.
EXPORT OF REVOLUTION REDEFINED
The dominance of revolutionary idealists in Iran's foreign policy in the 1980s had posed a 
threat to the security of the states in the region.15 Since the foundation of the "Westphalian 
international society is unacceptable to revolutionaries" and principles of diplomacy, such as 
reason of state and the rights of great powers are seen "as the antithesis of revolutionary 
values", the Iranian idealists had used any means to export the revolution, without being 
concerned about Iran's relations with other countries.16 In fact, the revolutionary idealists had 
focused on the external setting of the revolution, and maintained an outward-looking 
perspective.17
On the other hand, the revolutionary pragmatists, who achieved ascendancy in the post-
12 Forrest D. Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 
p. 70.
13 Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World, Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, Bloomington & Indiananpolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 189.
14 K. L. Afrasiabi, After Khomeini; New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 
41.
13 For a brief explanation of Iran's export of the revolution by the idealists in the first decade and the response of 
the Gulf states, see James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, London: Foresman/Little, 
Brown Higher Education, 1990, pp. 386-398.
16 David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order; The Revolutionary State in International Society, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 251-272.
17 For an elaboration on revolutionary idealists and realists, see Houman A. Sadri, Revolutionary States,
Leaders, and Foreign Relations; A Comparative Study of China, Cuba, and Iran, London: Praeger Publishers, 
1997, pp. 11-15.
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Khomeini era understood "realpolitik and the limits to the power of their revolutionary 
states".18 Rafsanjani explained that today's world meant "we do not always have the power to 
choose. I believe our principles are obeyed, but in some cases, we may be limited, and we 
may have to forego some of these principles".19 In this context, the means for implementing 
the major principle of Iran's foreign policy, the export of revolution, found a new framework 
and definition. In the 1990s, exporting the revolution meant presenting Iran to the world as 
the Islamic example of "an economically prosperous and politically progressive" country, and 
creating an acceptable type of society with social popularity.20 Rafsanjani acknowledged that 
"if the meaning of exporting revolution is to bring a message to people's ears, I must say that 
our aims are not yet sufficiently clear in the mind of the people of the world".21 Adhering to 
the notion of export of the revolution, Rafsanjani asserted:
If under the present [post-war] conditions we manage to create an acceptable type of 
society and set up a suitable model of development, progress, evolution, and correct 
Islamic morals for the world, then we will achieve what the world has feared; that is, 
the export of the Islamic revolution.22
In his speech to a group of Ulama, Rafsanjani said: "By demonstrating its independence to the 
world, and as a dignified model, Iran can be effective in introducing Islam".23 It can be 
concluded that from Rafsanjani's point of view, the export of revolution, including the 
introduction and spread of Islam throughout the world, should be achieved by creating a 
model society.24 The imperatives of Iran's post-war economic and political reconstruction, 
and changes in the styles and methods for the export of the revolution, helped Iran improve its 
international image and opened a new era in Iran's place in the international system.
Furthermore, despite its deep ideological mistrust of current international organisations, the 
requirements of international life led Iran to strengthen its ties with such organisations.25 In 
contrast to the idealists, the pragmatists believed in an interdependent world. As Ramazani 
argued: "Both revolutionary Russia and China tried to reject the concept of an interdependent 
world culture, and both have ended up accepting it. They had no other choice; nor does
18 Ibid., p. 14.
19 Foreign Broadcasts Information Service , (FBIS), South Asia (SA), 17 April, 1987.
211R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means", in John Esposito (ed.), The 
Iranian Revolution; Its Global Impact, Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990, p. 57.
21 FBIS, Near East and South Asia (NES), 14 February 1989.
22 FBIS, NES, 17 October 1988, and 14 October 1988.
23 "Ulema Before a Serious Test: President", IRNA News Agency, 31 December 1996.
24 For a discussion on the issue of model society and Iran’s particular view of that, see, Farhang Rajaee, "Iranian 
Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution", in John Esposito (ed.), The Iranian Revolution; Its 
Global Impact, Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990, pp. 71-73.
25 Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 173.
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revolutionary Iran".26 While in the 1980s, the idealists assumed that a rejection of 
international organisations would promote Iran's revolutionary message and enable the export 
of revolution to other nations, the pragmatists of the 1990s concluded that to export the 
revolution, Iran had to work within the system.27
Although the Rafsanjani government desired to see the emergence of like-minded regimes in 
the Middle East generally and in the Persian Gulf in particular, as did its predecessors, it did 
not appear to do anything substantive through the export of the revolution to bring this about. 
In fact, it was Rafsanjani’s government which cut back substantially Iran's support to 
Hizballah, showed some signs of disengagement in Southern Lebanon, allowing the Lebanese 
government to restore its authority.28 While Iran could not give up its revolutionary rhetoric 
for the sake of tempering its place in international Islamic movements, at the same time Iran 
needed to be a part of the world community. The dilemma for Rafsanjani was how to 
reconcile these two contradictory imperatives. He skilfully kept using the terminology of the 
export of revolution while presenting its politics, means, and ends in a manner which would 
make it more acceptable to the international community. This was crucial to reducing the 
concern of Britain's traditional friends in the Persian Gulf, leading to better working relations 
between Iran and these states, and between Tehran and London.
FOREIGN POLICY DIVERSIFICATION
One of the most important features of the post-Khomeini leadership was the diversity 
exhibited by its foreign policy. Rafsanjani's administration made overtures for wider and 
better foreign relations taking into account Iran's geostrategic position in the region and its 
national interests. The Iranian government, adopting a friendly posture towards its 
neighbours, embarked upon the notion of coexistence with the international community -  a 
change which coincided with the Kuwait war of 1990-1991 and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. While Iran's pragmatic policies had already begun by the end of the 
Iran-Iraq war, these two crises provided ample opportunity for the post-Khomeini leadership 
to accelerate the pace of change and pragmatism.
Iran's foreign policy between the Iran-Iraq and Kuwait Wars
Iran's diplomacy since the cease-fire with Iraq was conditioned by the primacy of the Iraqi
26 R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations", in R. K. Ramazani (ed.), Iran's Revolution: 
The Search for Consensus, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 65.
27 Hunter, Op. Cit., pp. 170-171.
28 See "Reconciling Revolution with Reality", Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 19 February 1993, pp. 8 -  
11.
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threat. While Iraq still occupied large parts of Iranian territory, there was no hope for progress 
in Iran-Iraq negotiations. Besides the Iraqi military dominance in the region, the Western 
military build-up in the Persian Gulf, combined with Iran's strained relations with its Arab 
neighbours, and Tehran's isolation in the Arab world, heightened Iran's concern for its 
vulnerability and regional stability. To remove these concerns and return to normality, Iran 
needed to improve its relations with the West, and to consolidate its influence in the region. 
Therefore, Iran adopted a policy of containment of Iraq through "rapprochement with the 
West and its Gulf Arab allies" and "opening of hitherto closed Arab doors".29 The 
improvement of relations between Iran and France, the restoration of London-Tehran ties in 
September 1990, and the lifting of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran by the 
European Community (EC) in October of the same year, were all manifestations of the 
improvements made in Iran's relations with Western Europe.30
The end of the Iran-Iraq War ushered in a new political environment in the Persian Gulf 
region. It reduced the perception of the Arab states of the region and of Western European 
countries that Iran was attempting to export its revolution to the region, and threatening their 
interests through the war with Iraq. Tehran further reduced the concerns of its Persian Gulf 
neighbours by energetically pursuing a policy of normalising relations with them. Iran's active 
diplomacy, reflected, for example, in visits to the Gulf states by high-level delegations, 
played a part in achieving this aim. Iran restored relations with all its Gulf neighbours except 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and reopened channels of communication even with the latter.31
Iran's policy of normalising relations with its Arab neighbours opened a new era in its 
relations with Britain, which could now deal with Iran without jeopardising relations with its 
regional Arab friends. The end of the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran's attempts, through moderate, 
cooperative, and less militant behaviour, to integrate itself into the international community, 
displaced Britain's perception of Iran as a source of regional instability. This change of view 
was a fundamental and necessary step for improvement in Iran's relations with Britain.
The emergence of 'new thinking' in the former Soviet Union after Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to 
power in 1985, led Iran to embark upon a policy of reconciliation with Moscow.32 The
29 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 147- 
151.
30 For more information on these issues, see Keesing's Record o f World Events, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1990, pp. 
37423-^1 and 37727.
3 1 For a discussion on improvement in Iran's relations with the GCC since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, see 
Gerd Nonneman, "The GCC and the Islamic Republic: Towards a Restoration of the Pattern", in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991, pp. 116-123.
32 For a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachevindthe emergence of 'new
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underlying factor in Gorbachev's 'new thinking' was deideologisation of Soviet foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the coincidence of Rafsanjani's economic reforms with Gorbachev's 
Perestroika, as well as the pragmatic approach of both leaders to regional and international 
issues, prepared the ground for rapprochement.33 In addition, the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 
1988, followed by Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan less than a year later, and the 
virtual diminishing of the Soviet position as a neighbouring superpower were all factors 
which contributed to the beginning of the era of reconciliation.34
The first sign of reconciliation was Ayatollah Khomeini's letter of January 1989 to 
Gorbachev, in which he congratulated the Soviet leader for his "boldness" in "revision" of 
Soviet ideology.35 The letter was, as former Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze 
observed, "'a turning-point' in Soviet-Iranian relations".36 Gorbachev responded in February 
of the same year. In his response, Gorbachev observed that "we now have a sound basis for 
solidifying our ties", and affirmed that they would be based on "mutual respect and equal 
rights and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another".37
The process of reconciliation was completed by Rafsanjani's visit in June 1989 to Moscow, 
where he received a warm welcome and signed the 'Declaration of Principle between the 
USSR and Iran'. The two sides also signed several economic and industrial agreements and 
initiated projects worth $6 billion. The Soviets also agreed to strengthen Iran's defence 
capability.38 It is worth mentioning that in the first Friday prayer sermons attended by 
Rafsanjani after his return from Moscow, the slogan of 'Marg Bar Shoravi’ (Death to the 
Soviet Union) which traditionally followed the slogan 'Marg Bar America' ( Death to 
America) was absent. Rafsanjani noted and appreciated its removal.39
Iran's Lebanon policy also came under review. Rafsanjani’s realisation of the key role Tehran
thinking', see Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev", The World Today, March 1989, pp. 
40-45.
33 On "Rafsanjani's Perestroika", see Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's Economy Under the Islamic Republic, London 
and New York: I.B. Tauris& Co Ltd Publishers, 1993, pp. 316-18; On Gorbachev's Perestroika, see an extract 
from Gorbachev's address in London, "The Progress of Perestroika", The World Today, June 1989, p. 94.
34 For Gorbachev's new thinking and Iran-Soviet relations in the late 1980s, see Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 
"Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' and Islamic Iran: From Containment to Reconciliation", in Hooshang Amirahmadi 
and Nader Entessar, Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992, Chapter 10, particularly pp. 266-278.
35 For the full text of the letter in Persian, see Daily Kayhan, 9 January 1989, p. 2; for an English translation of 
the letter, see Kayhan International, 14 January 1989, p. 3.
36 Mesbahi, Op. Cit., p. 270.
37 For Shevamadze’s meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini and Gorbachev's letter, see Kayhan, 28 February 1989.
pp. 1-2
3  ^ See Mesbahi, Op. Cit., p. 272.
39 Rafsanjani said: "I am very grateful to you all for your keen perceptivity for having eliminated the slogan 
Death to the Soviet Union the moment you became aware of the change in relations.. .  it is a wise choice, 
because at this level of relations, which we have, it is pointless to chant such slogans". Quoted in FBIS, NES, 13 
July 1989, pp. 63-70.
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could play in resolution of the hostage issue led his government to embark on a "tireless effort 
to end Iran's indirect 'hostage diplomacy' and, if possible, to telescope this effort into a 
normalisation of relations" with the West.40 It was along this line that Rafsanjani tried to 
marginalise the idealists' position in Iran's Lebanon policy, and to influence the hostage-takers 
to release the Western hostages. This effort resulted in Iran's involvement in negotiations with 
Western countries such as France, Germany and Britain, as well as the Lebanese groups. 
Although the Iranian government was not completely successful in its attempts to secure the 
release of all hostages, and the last Western hostage was not freed until 1992, Rafsanjani's 
efforts received a positive reception in Western capitals. For instance, after the release of 
Frank Reed, the US director of the Lebanese International College, in April 1990, President 
Bush thanked Iran for its assistance.41 This initiative, helping Iran's reintegration into the 
international community, assisted Iran to consolidate its relations with the West generally, 
and contributed to the improvement of Iranian-British relations in particular.
Rafsanjani's initiatives in improving Iran's foreign relations, and particularly Tehran's ties 
with London, however, were constrained by several factors. His idealist rivals, though 
weakened, were still propagating their militancy and adventurism of the early 1980s. This 
factionalism which was playing an important role in domestic and foreign policies 
occasionally forced Rafsanjani's government to wrap its policies in militant oratory.42 
However, Rafsanjani's position had been strengthened by the constitutional amendments of 
1989, the most significant of which was the abolition of the office of Prime Minister and 
centralisation of executive power in the presidential office.43 Related to this were British 
suspicion and uncertainty as to whether the new foreign policy of the post-Khomeini era was 
a long-term strategic initiative or merely a short-term tactic. Also Rafsanjani's failure to 
secure rapid and total release of the British hostages in Lebanon played its part in the process. 
Finally, lack of progress in the Iran-Iraq peace negotiations was another constraint. From the 
cease-fire in August 1988 to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the situation was one 
of 'no peace, no war' between Iran and Iraq. The stalemate in UN-brokered negotiations, and 
Iraq's continued occupation of 2,600 square miles of Iranian territory, transformed Iran's 
policy of containment towards Iraq into the form of 'resistance in negotiations' (Moqavemat 
Dar Mozakerat), as Rafsanjani described it. However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait served as
40 Afrasiabi, Op. Cit., p. 58.
41 Keesing's Record of World Events, 1990, p. 37391.
42 Afrasiabi, Op. Cit., p. 59. On the development of factionalism in Iran, see Saeed Barzin, "Factionalism in 
Iran", The World Today, October 1995, pp. 202-5; also from the same author, "Political Factions and Groupings 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Iran-e Farda (in Persian), April/May 1995, pp. 36-41.
43 The amended Article 113 of the Iranian Constitution says: "Next to the Leader, the President of the ReDuhlic 
is the highest official authority of the country who is responsible for the enforcement of the Constitution and 
presides over the executive power with the exception of those matters which directly relate to the Leader". Lor 
more information on the constitutional amendments, its process, impact, and outcome, see Ehteshami, After 
Khomeini, pp. 34-41.
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a breakthrough for Iran's diplomacy.44
Iran’s foreign policy and the Kuwait crisis
The Kuwait crisis helped the Rafsanjani government to accelerate the process of adjustment 
to the new realities of the post-Khomeini era. Iran's policy of neutrality in the Kuwait war, 
Iran's de facto endorsement of the US-led coalition forces in the Persian Gulf, and the 
convergence of Tehran's and Washington's interests in dislodging Iraq from Kuwait were 
based on a number of reasons. They included: Iran's geostrategic concern over the long-term 
danger posed by Iraq, particularly after its annexation of Kuwait; its fear of destruction or 
marginalisation if Iran supported Iraq; Iran's and other regional states' inability to force Iraq 
out of Kuwait without foreign support; and Iran's desire to capitalise on playing a status quo 
role in the region to maximise the benefits it would reap from its relations with its neighbours 
and Western European countries.
Nonetheless, the Rafsanjani government's policy towards the crisis was not without domestic 
implications. These were more serious if viewed in the light of the idealists' willingness to 
undermine the pragmatists' position by projecting them as deviating from Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s anti-US path. These complex and interrelated fears, opportunities, and concerns 
caused the Iranian government to adopt a multidimensional strategy towards the crisis.
Condemning the invasion, the Iranian government endorsed the relevant UN resolutions and 
cooperated with the international community in their implementation. By this, Iran behaved 
as an international law-abiding state, taking the view that there should be no change in the 
status quo of the region. While calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the Rafsanjani 
government did not object to the presence of the Western forces in the region. Rafsanjani 
said: "The Iraqis must definitely pull out.... Here, we have no objection to them [the foreign 
forces] obstructing aggression; anybody may help in any way".45
However, at the same time Ayatollah Khamenei, opposing the presence of Western powers in 
the region, was promoting another dimension to Iran's regional strategy. This was Iran's 
condemnation of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which had invited Western forces to 
protect them from Iraqi attacks. Ayatollah Khamenei claimed that the presence of American 
forces in Saudi Arabia was "in the interest of Zionism and arrogance, to the detriment of
44 For a brief discussion on Iraq's miscalculations in invading Kuwait, see Farhang Jahanpour, "A New Order for 
the Middle East?", The World Today, May 1991, Vol. 47, pp. 74-5.
45 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Middle East (ME), 27 August 1990.
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Islam and Muslims and against the Islamic revolution".46 On another occasion, he said: "In 
this region of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East today international oppression and the 
United States are planning to expand their power. They are thinking in terms of their 
expansionist policies. They are not after ending aggression. They themselves are the 
aggressors .... Their presence poses a danger to the Islamic nation".47
By employing two different approaches towards the Kuwait crisis, pragmatic and ideological, 
Iranian diplomacy was calculated to extract maximum benefit from both sides involved in the 
crisis. However, the biggest benefit for Iran came from the Iraqi side. In the wake of his 
invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein, aiming to redeploy his forces from the Iranian border to 
the new battlefront, offered to settle his differences with Iran. After two years of obstructing 
the peace talks, Saddam Hussein in his letter of 14 August 1990 offered Rafsanjani 
"everything you wanted".48 This included Iraq's recognition of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, 
acceptance of Iran's joint sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, withdrawal from 
Iranian territory, and the start of the exchange of war prisoners. Saddam's surprise move to 
grant huge concessions to Iran was also due to his hope of creating a possible alliance with 
Iran in his declared Jihad against the coalition forces. He misconstrued Iran's condemnation 
of the presence of the Western forces in the region as signifying Iranian support to the Iraqi 
cause. In the words of Velayati, Iraq's capitulation and Saddam's concessions became Iran's 
greatest victory since the Islamic revolution.49
The benefits brought to Iran from its cooperation with the UN emerged in various forms. 
Iran's condemnation of Iraq, and its endorsement of the UN resolutions concerning the 
Kuwait crisis, were received by the Persian Gulf states with satisfaction and gratitude. 
Following the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Qatar in December 1990, 
the GCC members declared that they would welcome better ties with Iran. Again "the GCC 
affirmed, on December 25 1991, its eagerness to lend momentum to bilateral relations with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran in the service of common interests".50 The invasion of Kuwait 
helped make it easier for regional Arab states and European countries to admit openly that Iran 
had been the victim of Iraqi aggression.
The Kuwait War brought Iran's relations with its individual neighbours in the Persian Gulf,
46 Iranian News Agency (IRNA), 15 August 1990.
47 SWB, Part IV, 22 August 1990.
48 See Matn-e Namehay-e Mubadeleh Shodeh Beyn-e Ro'asay-e Jomhoori-e Iran va Jomhoori-e Iraq (in 
Persian), [The Texts of the Letters Exchanged Between the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Republic of Iraq], Tehran: Daftar-e Motaleat-e Siyasi va Baynolmelali, 1369 [1991], p. 73.
49 Farhang Jahanpour, "Iran I: Wars Among the Heirs", The World Today, October 1990, p. 185.
50 R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, 
Summer 1992, pp. 401-2.
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and with the Arab states of the region as a group, to their highest point in ten years. From the 
early 1990s onwards, bilateral relations expanded through official talks and by exchanges of 
delegations between the states of the region. The announcement of the Iranian policy of non- 
acceptance of any invasion or changes of borders of states in the region, and Iran's emphasis 
on regional cooperation and peaceful co-existence, were steps by which Iran showed its 
determination to enhance its relations with other regional states.
The reopening of the Iranian Embassy in Saudi Arabia on 1 April 1991, and the visit of the 
Saudi foreign minister to Tehran, followed by King Fahd's two invitations to President 
Rafsanjani to visit Saudi Arabia, were all signs of improvement in their relations. Bahrain’s 
relationship with Iran also improved after the end of the Kuwait War in 1991.51 After 12 
years of break in relations with Egypt, Iran opened its interest sections in Cairo. Iran also 
resumed ties with both Jordan and Tunisia.
Iran's policy of self-restraint in the Iraqi civil war in the wake of the Kuwait crisis was 
indicative of Iran's determination not to destroy its emerging image as a status quo power.52 
This policy was in line with Rafsanjani's desire to prove that his country was a responsible 
member of the international community. Besides, Tehran did not wish to be "accused of 
conspiring with the United States in the break-up and destruction of another Muslim 
country".53
Despite these significant windfalls, the Kuwait war and its aftermath brought a number of 
uncomfortable developments for Iran in the region. These included the presence of the 
Western forces and the formation of a Pax Americana in the Middle East. While Iran 
expected by the end of the war to be included in any security arrangement in the Persian Gulf, 
the Gulf sheikhdoms formed in March 1991 in Damascus a new group of '6+2' or 'GCC plus 
two', that was Egypt and Syria, but not Iran. Iran's campaign against the Damascus meeting's 
security formula, and also Washington's lack of enthusiasm for such a formula for fear of its 
authority being replaced by Arab solidarity, shelved the 'GCC plus two' formula as soon as it 
was adopted.54 However, the elimination of this new formula did not lead to a development 
satisfactory to Iran. After the departure of Syrian and Egyptian forces, the United States 
succeeded in concluding a network of bilateral security arrangements with the Gulf Arab 
states. The other uncomfortable consequence of the Kuwait war for Iran was the participation
5 1 The improvement was shown by the reception of the Bahraini ambassador by both foreign minister Velayati 
and President Rafsanjani, a cordial message from the Emir, the upgrading of diplomatic ties, the establishment of 
shipping lines, direct flights, joint tourist and transportation companies, and projects for industrial cooperation. 
See Ibid., p. 401.
52 Afrasiabi, Op. Cit., p. 72.
53 Shaul Bakhash, "Iranian Politics Since the Gulf War" in Robert B. Satloff (ed.), The Politics of Change in the 
Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 65-66.
54 Afrasiabi, Op. Cit., pp. 91-93.
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of all relevant Arab countries in the US-brokered Middle East peace talks. It was painful for 
Tehran to see Syria, its only ally in the Arab world, enter into a dialogue with Israel in the 
autumn of 1991. The beginning of the Madrid conference of October 1991, with the support 
of most of the Arab countries, was indicative of Iran's isolation.
Meanwhile, on 9 December 1991, Iran achieved a victory in the UN when Secretary-General 
Javier Perez de Cuellar declared Iraq the aggressor in the Iraq-Iran war. More importantly, 
Iran's restraint and neutrality in the Kuwait war resulted in further mending of fences between 
Iran and the West. The resumption of Iran's relations with Britain in 1991 and closer ties with 
several Western European countries, which now resolved to participate in Iran's economic 
reconstruction, were other windfalls from the Kuwait crisis for Iran. In sum, Iran's 
cooperative policy towards the United Nations and implicit coordination of efforts with the 
Western coalition in the Kuwait war underlined Iran's new position as a norm-binding state, 
ready to play the role of a status quo power, and prepared to work within the international 
system. This change of Iran's image and position played a major part in normalisation and 
improvement of Iranian-British relations.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Iran’s foreign policy
The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 presented both risks and opportunities for Iran. In the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran could no longer play the Soviet card against 
the United States and its Western allies. Iran, however, found opportunities to improve its 
relations with the newly emerged Central Asian Muslim Republics, by drawing on its unique 
position as the only country with access to both important regions of the Persian Gulf and 
Central Asia. These developments led the post-Khomeini leadership to design a new policy 
towards the Central Asian Republics and Russia, and also to consolidate its ties with 
European Union countries.
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one of the Western concerns was how 
the Islamic Republic of Iran would shape its policies towards the Muslim Republics of 
Central Asia. Would Iran attempt to fill the power vacuum left behind by the USSR with its 
Islamic ideology, or would it design its policy with a more geopolitical and economic 
orientation? Despite Iran's initial call for the revival of traditional Islamic values in the 
republics, by the beginning of 1992 it was clear that Iran had determined to play "a 
geostrategic -  not an ideological -  game in Central Asia".55
55 Olivier Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications, A report of the Study Group on the 
prospects for conflict and opportunities for peacemaking in the Southern Tier of former Soviet Republics, United 
States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., December 1993, p. 24.
157
Looking at the Central Asian region as a potential market of $8-10 billion for Iranian 
exports,56 the Iranian government resolved to improve its ties with these republics. According 
to Roy Allison, Iran's foreign policy towards Central Asia was premised on two principles: 
expansion of trade and development of stability.57 From 1992 onwards, Iran pursued a 'bunch 
of flowers' policy (Siasat-e dast-i gol) towards the former Soviet republics. By this policy 
Iran would welcome and greet with a banquet any official from these republics, regardless of 
the political character of those in power there.58 Iran opted for exporting commodities and 
strengthening its economic and political ties, rather than for exporting ideological 
merchandise to these republics.59
Iran's geographical proximity, linguistic and ethnic ties, historical relations, and shared 
regional interests helped it to promote its ties at both bilateral and multilateral levels.60 The 
Iranian government also initiated multilateral cooperation with these states. Having broken 
out of Moscow's orbit, the newly independent republics were anxious to "distance themselves 
in every conceivable way from Russia, both to assert themselves and to legitimise the 
political elites now in power".61 This was done through the formation of a new group called 
the 'Caspian Sea Grouping' in February 1992, consisting of all five Caspian littoral states; 
Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Turkmenistan. Along this line Iran expanded the 
Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) by championing the Muslim republics' 
membership.62 Another show of Iran's diplomacy in the newly emerged republics was its role 
as a conflict manager. Iran's mediatory role in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
by which Iran became the host of an agreement between the two sides in March 1992, led the 
UN Secretary-General to praise Tehran for its constructive role, even though the agreement 
was soon breached.63 Also, it is worth mentioning that Iran adopted a cautious policy towards 
the civil war in Tajikistan, whereby Tehran avoided identification with either side in the 
conflict. The Rafsanjani government tried, in line with Russian policy in the conflict, to bring
5° This was the view of Iran's former Minister of Economy and Finance Mohsen Nourbakhsh. See MEED, 15 
November 1990, p. 5.
^7 "Interview", Motaleat-e Asiyay-e Markazi v Qafqaz (in Persian), [Central Asia and the Caucasus Review!,
Vol. 5, No. 13, Spring 1996, p. 305.
58 Fred Halliday, "The Empires Strike Back? Russia, Iran and the New Republics", The World Today, November 
1995, p. 221.
59 For more elaboration on this issue, see Dmitry Volsky, "Iran-Central Asia: Export of Commodities, and not 
of Ideological Merchandise", New Times International, Russian Weekly Newsmagazine, No. 44, October 1993, 
p. 24.
60 For a brief review of Iran's bilateral relations with these states, see Afrasiabi, Op. Cit., pp. 125-7.
61 Alexei Vasilyev, "Is Central Asia to be a Middle East?", New Times International, No. 20, May 1992, p. 5.
62 Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were the first new members approved by 
the ECO summit of the heads of states of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in February 1992.
63 For more information on this issue, see Afrasiabi, Op. Cit., pp. 140-5 and Ramazani, "Iran’s Foreign Policy: 
Both North and South", Op. Cit., pp. 409-410.
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peace to Tajikistan.64 In general, these developments enabled the British to develop a 
perception of Iran as a conflict-manager, not a trouble-maker, and facilitated the 
normalisation of relations between Tehran and London.
Meanwhile, Iran developed good relations with Moscow for both national objectives and 
shared regional interests.65 While under pressure from the United States, Iran doubled its 
efforts to achieve good relations with Russia, which could offer "options in trade, acquisition 
of weapons, and in development of nuclear energy".66 Iran's shared regional interests with 
Russia, such as their common views on the territorial division of the Caspian and exploitation 
of its oil and gas, were other reasons for improvement in Iran-Russia relations.
Given Iran's concern about the roles of Saudi Arabia and of Turkey, particularly its fears that 
the latter would be a 'front' for the United States in Central Asia, Iran found Russia the best 
partner for cooperation in this region. In addition, Iran's realisation that the newly 
independent republics retained political, economic and cultural relations with Moscow, 
contributed to its policy of cooperation with Russia in Central Asia 67 It was within this 
context that Iran's approach to the different issues in Central Asia was subjected, in one form 
or another, to following the Russian line. In fact, Iran's policy towards Russia on events in 
Central Asia was one of cooperation with Moscow. This meant that Iran designed its policy in 
Central Asia so as not to oppose or contradict Russian policy and interests. An example of 
this was Iran’s collaboration and cooperation with Russia in the Tajikistan conflict. Iran not 
only refrained from calling for the withdrawal of Russian army units from Tajikistan, but also 
welcomed in Tehran in July 1995 Tajik President Rahmanov, who had been installed in 
power by Moscow. Overall, Iran's new foreign policy orientation had a positive effect on 
Iran's international position, which in turn improved Tehran's ties with London.
THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR AND RESTORATION OF IRANIAN-BRITISH  
RELATIONS
By early 1990, however, Iran had either restored or improved its relations with the Western 
European countries. The only exception was Britain. Yet both Tehran and London were 
prepared to restore ties and each had its own motivation and objectives for doing so. Both
64 On a broad issue of diplomatic efforts in Tajikistan particularly Russia, see "Diplomatic Efforts in Tajikistan",
International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1997.
6* 5 6For one explanation on Iran's cooperation with Russia, see Dmitry Volsky, "A New Look at Cooperation with
Iran", New Times International, No. 15, April 1993, p. 27.
66 Halliday, Op. Cit., p. 221.
67 For more information on Russia-Central Asia relations, see Dmitry Volsky, "Russia-Central Asia: Nostalgia
for the Past or Concern Over the Future", New Times International, No. 34, August 1993, p. 23.
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were anxious to find a way to break the impasse in their relations, and were even prepared to 
make some concessions for that purpose.
Britain's desire to reestablish relations with Tehran was partly driven by economic interests. It 
was clear that Iran in the reconstruction era could potentially be a good market for Britain. 
Although overall trade relations between Iran and Britain did not follow all the ups and 
downs of political relations, they were occasionally affected by political upheavals between 
the two sides. While the British share of Iran's total imports was around 7 per cent in the mid- 
1980s, it had fallen to 4.8 per cent by 1989 (see table 6.1).68 The table also indicates that after 
restoration of relations, Britain's exports to Iran increased again from £384 million in 1990 to 
£512 million in 1991.
Table 6.1: British exports to Iran
Exports 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
£ Million 272 412 257 384 512
Source: UK Department of Trade and Industry, UK Overseas Trade Statistics, Various Years; Committee for 
Middle East Trade (COMET), COMET Bulletin, London, Various Years; and The Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU), EIU Country Report, London, Various Years.
Related to economic motivations was that Britain's partners in the EC had already returned 
their envoys to Tehran. In fact the EC in the 1980s was not in a position to pursue a collective 
foreign policy line, and this was beneficial to Iran as it could play one European state off 
against another. This was the case when Iran broke off relations with Britain and used its 
trade relations with other European countries as political leverage. It was in this context that 
Britain's partners in the EC acted individually and returned their ambassadors to Tehran in 
order not to lose their share of Iran's market, and perhaps increase it at Britain's expense. 
Therefore, Britain found it imperative to see a restoration of its relations with Iran as soon as 
possible.
Furthermore, Britain had realised that there was no benefit in linking restoration of relations 
with Iran to resolution of the fatwa, Cooper and hostage issues. In fact, Cooper's letter from 
prison had strengthened the view that in the absence of relations his release was in doubt. 
Cooper had stated that "it would be wrong for the British government to insist on my freedom 
as a pre-condition for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Islamic
68 British Department of Trade and Industry, Middle East Branch, Iran Desk, Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Economic Report, Quarter ending 31 March 1994.
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Republic".69 It was also obvious that, given the lack of an official channel of communication 
with Britain, Iran was reluctant to use its influence for release of the British hostages in 
Lebanon. In this sense, London was satisfied that the fate of Cooper and the hostages had a 
better chance of being settled after relations were restored.70
However, to open a channel of negotiations with Iran, London had to make some concessions. 
While Iran's former Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for Euro-American affairs, 
Mahmoud Va'ezi, had stated in late 1989 that Iran would restore relations if the British 
government convinced Iran that its intentions were "genuine" and that it would "respect 
Islamic principles and values"71, the ground was prepared for the then UK Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, to take the necessary step. In his 
letter of 1 August 1990, to a Conservative MP, Sir Peter Blaker, Hurd stated his country's 
respect for Islam and its values, accepted that The Satanic Verses had been offensive to 
Muslims, and distanced the British government from any involvement in its publication.72 
While concluding that its demand for the fatwa to be revoked was not feasible, and while 
preserving its stance on freedom of expression and opposition to the death sentence on its 
subject, Britain opted to restore relations with Iran.
The Iranian government also had its reasons to be as amenable as Britain to the restoration of 
relations. It was clear to Tehran that it could not warm up its relations with other states of the 
EC unless it restored its ties with Britain. Furthermore, Iran viewed Britain as a country with 
significant leverage on the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Since Iran had initiated 
rapprochement with its Arab neighbours in the region and was redesigning its foreign policy 
as stated earlier, Britain could contribute to the process of normalisation between Tehran and 
the regional states by encouraging the latter to adopt a more positive attitude towards 
Tehran.73
00 For the full text of Roger Cooper's letter, see "Wrong to Insist on My Freedom . . The Independent, 29 
September 1990.
70 "Trying Again with Iran", Financial Times, 28 September 1990.
71 See Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 36, N o.l, 1990, p. 37423.
72 Hurd wrote: "Our position on this issue [Salman Rushdie] is quite clear. Islam is one of the world’s great 
religions, with a proud history and long traditions. We have the greatest respect for it and its values. ... We 
understand that the novel, The Satanic Verses was found deeply offensive by people of the Islamic faith.... The 
British government had nothing to do with the publishing of The Satanic Verses. Nor has it encouraged its 
publication in other countries. There is no question of the British Government or people wishing to insult 
Islam...". For the full text of the letter, see "Letter From Whitehall Led to Burying the Hatchet", The Guardian, 
28 September 1990.
73 The Independent, 4 May 1990.
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The Rushdie affair and Iran’s factional debate
It was a fact that after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, it was extremely difficult for 
any Iranian official or faction to revoke his fatwa, and that it would be political suicide for 
anyone to attempt it. This stemmed from the political atmosphere in which Ayatollah 
Khomeini's legacy was still fresh, and all post-Khomeini leaders sought political legitimacy 
by trying to present their stance and policies as compatible with the spirit of the Ayatollah's 
pronouncements and orders.
In the post-Khomeini era, the two political clusters, moderates or pragmatists and hardliners 
or idealists, presented the Rushdie affair from their factional standpoint. While pragmatists 
were struggling to reconcile Iran's national interests with revolutionary ideas, and trying to 
moderate Iran's militant outlook of the 1980s, idealists were adhering to militancy and 
radicalism, and giving high priority to the maintenance of revolutionary ideals. Since there 
was a close linkage between domestic politics and diplomacy74, the fatwa and the Rushdie 
affair were differently interpreted by these two factions. The moderates tried to reduce the 
impact of the fatwa on Iran's international relations, and if possible push the Rushdie issue 
aside. In fact, for Rafsanjani's government and his moderate faction, to improve Iran's 
relations with the EU countries without revoking the fatwa was a dilemma, since "central 
decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously".75 
In order to understand how moderates and hardliners saw the Rushdie affair, it is necessary to 
analyse their diverse perceptions of Iran's foreign policy objectives and priorities.
Mohammad Javad Larijani, whose remarks were a reflection of his moderate faction's 
outlook, believed that the objectives of Iran's foreign policy were threefold: advancing Islam, 
safeguarding the Islamic revolution, and securing the prosperity and development of the 
Islamic Republic. He believed that in case of conflict between the revolution and the system 
of the Islamic Republic, priority should be given to the system. On the issue of the fatwa, 
Larijani drew a distinction between a 'Fatwa' and a 'Decree'. He argued that the term 'Decree' 
denoted supremacy and entailed the exercise of power, while the term Fatwa was a matter of 
jurisprudence and a declaration of a divine ordinance. He concluded that the West was trying 
to project Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa as a decree, as a pretext for anti-Iranian propaganda 
which the Iranian government should neutralise.76 Based on this perception, moderates 
attempted to focus on the theological aspect of the fatwa, in order to depoliticise it, to present 
it as the personal view of a jurisconsult, to reduce the Iranian government's responsibility, and 
finally to minimise the fatwa's impact on Iran's relation with the EU countries, in particular
74 For a comprehensive discussion on the linkage between diplomacy and domestic politics, see Robert D. 
Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", International Organisation, 
Summer 1988, Vol. 42, Number 3, pp. 427^460.
75 Ibid., p. 460.
76 On Larijani's remarks, see "Roundtable: Discussion on Foreign Policy", Daily Resalat, 29 October 1995, p. 2.
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with Britain.
The idealists, however, had another view of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy and the 
fatwa. The views of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, a famous figure in that faction^were indicative of 
its outlook. Since the idealists had lost power in the post-Khomeini era, they were not 
concerned about diplomacy and Iran's foreign relations. Mohtashemi believed that the 
objectives of Iran's foreign policy consisted of negating domination over mankind, complete 
independence through severance of all dependence, export of the Islamic revolution, 
elimination of Israel, irreconcilable struggle against the United States, and practical support 
for the oppressed and deprived. If there was a conflict between the safeguarding of the 
Islamic Republic and the revolution, Mohtashemi stressed that safeguarding the revolution 
should take precedence. He criticised those who believed that for the sake of the system 
revolutionary principles and values should be relinquished. In criticising the Rafsanjani 
government, Mohtashemi attacked those policies which had resulted in flexibility, and 
reconciliation and closeness with the Western world, and argued that the foreign policy of 
Rafsanjani and his moderate faction was based on cordial relations at whatever cost.77 While 
attacking those officials who reduced Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa to an expert's opinion, 
Mohtashemi asserted that the fatwa was a decree, not a simple religious opinion. It can be 
concluded that idealists, not facing the difficulties of formulating Iran's foreign policy, 
attempted to preserve the fatwa as both a political and a religious pronouncement, and 
therefore a decree which would obligate the Iranian government to enforce it.
Iran’s official approach to the Rushdie affair and the restoration of relations
While the idealists used the Rushdie affair to the utmost in their efforts to gain the upper hand 
in the factional debate, the Rafsanjani government tried both to win the debate and to 
formulate a policy which could minimise the Fatwa's impact on Iran's relations with the 
West, especially Britain. He adopted a two-track policy designed to minimise his 
government's connection with the death sentence placed on Rushdie.
The first aspect of Iran's policy was to project th& fatwa as a purely religious pronouncement 
by a purely religious leader, unrelated to Iran's political system. To strengthen this idea, the 
Rafsanjani government emphasised Ayatollah Khomeini's religious and spiritual, rather than 
political and administrative, leadership. In a sermon delivered at Tehran Friday prayers, 
Rafsanjani referred to Ayatollah Khomeini's decree as "his personal view as a religious 
expert", instead of as a Fatwa. In trying to find a solution, he added: "If today a lawyer said
77 For more reading on Mohtashemi's remarks, see Ibid., p. 2.
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on the basis of a legal analysis that such and such a person who had committed an offence in 
such and such a country is sentenced to death on the basis of laws, should that lead to so 
much sensationalism?".78 What Rafsanjani had in mind was to distance the Iranian 
government from the fatwa. However, Rafsanjani's remarks caused outrage. For instance, 
Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the head of the judiciary stated that Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa 
was not a personal view, but an Islamic decree, issued by an Islamic leader in his capacity as 
the country's supreme judge.79
Rafsanjani, nonetheless, pressed on with his interpretation, and pursued the second part of 
Iran's policy which was to assure Britain and other EU countries that the Iranian government 
had no intention of implementing the fatwa. Determined to restore Iran's relations with 
Britain, the Rafsanjani government used Hurd's letter of August 1990 to advantage. Although 
the content of the letter was not exactly what the Iranian parliament had wanted, it was, in one 
form or another, satisfactory to the government. The influential Ayatollah Mohammad Imami 
Kashani, in his sermon at Friday prayers in Tehran in August 1990, said: "By condemning 
Salman Rushdie and respecting the beliefs of Muslims, Britain has almost met the conditions 
set by Majlis".80 Subsequently, in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iran's National 
Security Council, presided over by Rafsanjani, declared that the legal stumbling block to the 
resumption of ties had been removed, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry "had been 
commissioned to take the necessary steps towards re-establishment of political ties with 
Britain".81
Although the initial British response was cool, due to its previous experience on resumption 
of ties, negotiations nonetheless began. Finally after a meeting in New York on 27 September 
1990, the UK and Iranian Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement that full diplomatic 
relations had been resumed on the basis of mutual respect.82 The re-opening of the embassies 
in Tehran and London in October and November respectively was followed by the release of 
Cooper in April 1991. Also, two weeks earlier, on March 15, Mehrdad Kowkabi, an Iranian 
student held in Britain for 15 months, was deported after charges against him were dropped.
During 1990-1991, Rafsanjani managed to secure the release of the remaining British and US 
hostages in Lebanon. Although Rafsanjani was opposed by the idealists for his initiatives in 
the release of hostages and freeing of Cooper, he was largely able to silence his opponents.
78 See SWB, Part IV, 19 February 1990 and also Keesing's Report of World Events, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1990, p. 
37266.
79 Quoted in Jahanpour, "Iran I: Wars Among the Heirs", Op. Cit., p. 186.
See SWB, Part IV, 6 August 1990, and also Andrew Gulf, "Hurd's Letter on Rushdie Soothes Iran", The 
Guardian, 4 August 1990.
81 SWB, Part IV, 6 August 1990.
82 Keesing' Record of World Events, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1990, p. 37727.
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The victory of his supporters in the October 1991 elections for the Assembly of Experts, a 
body responsible for selecting supreme leader, higher oil revenues and Iran's new image in 
the region and the world resulting from the Kuwait crisis, all enabled Rafsanjani to 
marginalise his radical opponents. Yet despite the resumption of relations and the release of 
the last Western hostages in Lebanon in June 1992, the main obstacle to improved relations -  
that is thefatwa -  remained in place.
IRAN’S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN
Economic factors always played a major role in Britain's policy towards Iran. Since as much 
as one-third of the UK's Gross Domestic Product was generated by exports and £17,000 of 
exports -  visible and invisible -  maintain one job in the UK, British economic relations with 
the Middle Eastern countries were of profound importance. For instance, in 1982 the UK's 
total exports to the Middle East were estimated at £9.7 billion, representing some 600,000 
jobs.83 Therefore, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the economic factor 
worked either to maintain or improve, though occasionally and temporarily, Iranian-British 
relations. Commercial relations like political relations, since 1979 did not follow a regular 
pattern. Chart 6.1 shows the fluctuations in Tehran's economic relations with London.
Chart 6.1
UK trade with Iran (1 978-1994) in $ 
million
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Source: Figures used in all charts were extracted from: Committee for Middle East Trade (COMET), COMET 
Bulletin, London, Various Years; Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World; Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, 
Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 195; Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 
Iran Quarterly Report, London, Various Years; The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), EIU Country Report, 
London, Various Years; UK Department of Trade and Industry, Annual Supplement of Monthly Review of 
External Trade Statistics; and UK Department of Trade and Industry, UK Overseas Trade Statistics, Various 
Years.
Despite its cool diplomatic relations with Tehran, Britain had some advantages in establishing 
viable economic relations with Iran. They included the presence of a large number of Iranian 
students in British universities and the use of English as the second language in Iran's foreign
Occasional paper "Britain and the Middle East: The Economic and Commercial Importance of the Middle 
East and the Potential for Growth in British-Middle East Trade Relations", Committee for Middle East Trade 
(COMET), London, 1983, p. 8.
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trade and commercial contacts. Many Iranians retained close personal ties with Britain 
through education or medical treatment, and became familiar with British goods.84
There were obvious commercial benefits for Britain from the training and education of 
Iranians in the UK. Table 6.2 shows the number of Iranian students and trainees in British 
universities and the public sector from 1977 to 1984. At the end of the 1970s, Iran was the 
country which sent the most students to Britain. Although the table shows that their numbers 
had fallen to less than a quarter of the 1977-8 level by the academic year 1983-84, they were 
still substantial.
Table 6.2: Number of Iranian students and trainees in British universities and the public
sector
Year 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84
10,341 9,386 8,365 6,703 5,030 3,056 2,443
Sources: British Council, Statistics of Overseas Students in the United Kingdom, 1983-84; and COMET Bulletin, 
No. 19, November 1985.
These factors caused Iran and Britain to continue their economic relations despite the ups and 
downs in their political relations. Additionally, Britain's commercial and economic 
importance to Iran was underscored by the presence in London of a large number of Iranian 
banks and of Cala UK, the biggest office of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
outside Iran.85 As table 6.3 shows, UK exports to Iran, despite all their political difficulties, 
were considerable since 1979.
Table 6.3: UK exports to Iran 1978-1992
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
£M 745 222 393 402 334 631 703 526 399 308 248 257 384 511 568
Source: UK Department of Trade and Industry, Annual Supplement of Monthly Review of External Trade 
Statistics.
It can be concluded that whilst Britain was enemy number 2 (after the USA) in Iran's political 
calculations, in trade and economic relations Britain was way down the list of enemies. As 
chart 6.2 shows, while economic relations between Iran and Britain were not necessarily 
steady, the fluctuations did not correspond completely with the nature of their political
84 Ibid., pp. 3 and 14.
85 For a list of Iranian and British individuals and organisations offering services to the UK exporters, see UK 
Department of Trade and Industry, Oversease Trade Division, Middle East Branch, Iran: Individuals and 
Organisations Offering Services to the UK Exporters.
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relations. For instance, immediately after the revolution and while political relations between 
the two countries were at a low point, UK exports to Iran were increasing. Even in 1984, 
when Britain had closed its embassy in Tehran, and maintained only an interests section 
under the Swedish flag, UK exports to Iran rose to £703 million, not much less than the £745 
million of pre-revolution 1978.
Chart 6.2
UK exports to Iran (1978-1995) in £ 
million
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As another example, chart 6.3 shows that UK exports to Iran increased to £568 million in 
1992, despite the Rushdie affair. Even in 1987, when diplomatic relations were at an all-time 
low, Iran imported £308 million worth of goods from Britain.
Chart 6.3
UK exports to Iran (1978-1995) in £ 
million
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Meanwhile, Iran tried, though not always successfully, to use its economic relations as a 
political lever with Britain. Iran's desire for linkage between its economic and political 
relations was emphasised by Velayati. In an interview, he stated that Iran tried to coordinate 
the political and economic sectors in order to maximise its use of its economic relations.86
86 Daily Salam, 7 February 1995, pp. 5 & 7; "Velayati Interviewed on Foreign Policy: Part Two", FBIS, NES.
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Chart 6.4 is illustrative of the linkage between trade and politics in British-Iranian economic 
relations. As the chart shows, except in the year of the revolution in 1979, the lowest figures 
for UK exports to Iran were in 1988, when Iran, reacting against Western pressure to end the 
war, was pursuing an anti-Western policy, and then in 1989, the year in which the Rushdie 
affair occurred. As the chart indicates, troubled diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain 
in 1988 caused a reduction in Iran's imports from Britain to only £248 million. The breaking 
off of relations following the Rushdie affair was accompanied by a further slight fall in UK 
exports in that year. The chart shows that since the resumption of relations in 1990 and 
Rafsanjani's policy of post-war reconstruction, UK exports to Iran increased to £568 million 
in 1992.
Chart 6.4
UK exports to Iran (1978-1995) in £ 
million
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Comparing German and UK exports to Iran, chart 6.5 shows that as Germany managed to 
retain a relatively stable political relationship with Iran since the revolution, it was able to 
secure the highest share of Iran's total market.
Chart 6.5
UK and German exports to Iran 
1978-1994 in $ million
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0
78 81 84 87 90 93
Meanwhile, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, prospects for improvement in British 
economic relations with Iran became more visible. As Brian Constant, Senior Manager 
Middle East, Lloyds Bank, points out, Iran was a market which should be looked at positively 
by Britain for a number of reasons. Iran had repaid $8 billion in foreign loans since the
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revolution, while running a war economy. Also by the end of the war, Iran had only a short­
term debt of $4-5 billion and hardly any medium or long-term debt.87
In the wake of Iran's post-war reconstruction and new economic reforms, European states 
were keener than in the past to improve their economic relations with it. Furthermore, the UN 
sanctions against Iraq had forced British companies to look for new business opportunities 
elsewhere. Although the British Department of Trade's Export Credits Guarantee section, 
which insures exporters against non-payment, offered only short-term cover for Iran in 1991, 
British exports to Iran in January-April 1991 were 90 percent higher than in the same period 
in 1990.88 As chart 6.6 indicates, UK exports to Iran from the end of the Iran-Iraq War 
increased to $1000 million in 1992. However, Iran's imports from Britain and other European 
countries decreased from 1993. This was due to Iran's economic difficulties, shortage of 
foreign exchange, and severe restrictions on imports.89 Also related to these factors was the 
concern of some European countries at Iran's delays in the payment of letters of credit and the 
mounting Iranian foreign debt, which caused them to suspend medium or long-term cover for 
Iran.90
Chart 6.6
UK exports to  Iran in $ million since 
the end of the Iran-lraq War
In 1995, Britain exported £332 million worth of goods to Iran, compared with 289 million 
pounds the year before.91 In an attempt to avoid being overtaken by Germany and Japan in 
the race for Iranian contracts and export deals, British businessmen have tried to re-establish
87 In November 1988 the Committee for Middle East Trade mounted a one-day conference entitled "The Middle 
East Post-War, Iran and Iraq and Their Neighbours". Brian Constant's opinions were presented in this 
conference. See COMET Bulletin, No 28, March 1989.
88 "Newspaper Says Rushdie Issue Should not Hinder Closer Ties Between Iran and EU", IRNA, 14 February 
1996.
89 See Linda Golgan "Esports Up, Imports Down", Iran Business Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 8, September 1994.
90 For instance, the UK Export Credit Guarantee Department notified British exporters in 1993 that it had 
suspended medium and long-term cover for Iran. See "Economy and Business", Iran Focus, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 
1993, p. 12.
91 Martin Walker, Simon Beavis and Stephen Bates, "Fury at US Law to Curb Terror", The Guardian, cited in 
Reuter News Service, 6 August 1996.
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the Iranian-British Chamber of Commerce, which ceased functioning in the aftermath of 
Iran's revolution. This has the support of a number of British businessmen who work as 
regional advisors to the Committee for Middle East Trade (COMET)92, including most 
importantly, Roger Barber, Director of Trade Relations of COMET.93 A spokesman for 
COMET stated that "a joint Chamber of Commerce would certainly be a great advantage to 
British businessmen, and would help boost the already encouraging trade figures".94 Since in 
the Middle East, and particularly in Iran, politics and trade are closely related, and a good 
political relationship is an essential ingredient in the development of trade, there has been no 
serious effort from the Iranian side to re-establish the Iranian-British Chamber of Commerce. 
It seems this is because the Iranians have attached lower priority to political relations with 
Britain as compared to some other European countries, such as Germany. Thus, it can be 
argued that Iran is unwilling at the moment to give Britain any more opportunities in the area 
of trade and commerce than it already has.
Iran's efforts to broaden and consolidate its international trading links after the Iran-Iraq war 
were evident at the October 1992 Tehran Trade Fair, which was attended by 54 countries and 
200 foreign companies. Germany, Japan and Italy -  Iran's three leading trading partners -  as 
well as Britain, had the highest profiles at the fair. Iran bought goods and services valued at 
$920m from Britain in 1991, and more than 100 British companies attended the Tehran Trade 
fair in 1992.
At the 21st Tehran International Trade Fair in October 1995, 53 countries participated. British 
companies, including British-based Shell International, British Airways, Lloyds Bank, and 
Leyland Truck, spread themselves across 37 stands. According to the director of the British 
organisers, Andrew Maclean, Britain expected to be the second largest foreign group at the 
fair.95 At the 22nd Tehran International Fair of October 1996, some 1500 foreign companies 
from 54 countries took part. The number of companies from Germany, France, Italy and 
Britain increased by 30 percent over the previous year.96
92 COMET is a British Government sponsored body originally set up in 1963 to advise the Government on 
matters affecting betweeen the Middle East and the UK, and to assist in the promotion of British exports to the 
area. COMET organises occasional high-level industrial missions to the Middle East for discussions on British 
trade prospects, and is regularly involved in the reception of ministers and high-level visitors to the UK.
93 Based on the author's meetings and interviews in COMET, London, April 1996.
94 "Trade Ties", The Middle East, August 1991, No. 202, p. 37.
95 "Britain Boosts Presence at Tehran Trade Fair", IRNA, 27 September 1995. It is worth mentioning that 
according to Mr P Dowrick from Orient Exhibitions, the body responsible for organising the participation of the 
UK companies at the Tehran fair, the UK had won the second prize (after Bosnia) of the 1994 Tehran 
international trade fair in the competition held by the fair to reward national organisers for the quality of their 
stands. See Discussion Group Meeting Report, Middle East Association, London, Tuesday, 18 October 1994, 
London.
96 Daily Iran , 1 and 2 October 1996.
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Another major improvement in Iranian-British relations was an agreement on settling pre- 
revolution debts. The British Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) confirmed in 
September 1995 that an agreement in principle had been made to settle them. Clearing all 
outstanding amounts between the two countries should pave the way for resumption of 
medium-term credit cover to Iran, which had been suspended by ECGD in 1992.97
IRANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IRAN-EU 
’CRITICAL DIALOGUE’
From 1992 and following the emergence of the European Union, the evolution of Iranian- 
British relations transformed within the broader framework of Iran-EU relations. To analyse 
Iranian-British relations in the context of the EU policy of 'critical dialogue', it is necessary 
first to examine how and why this policy emerged. Since the early 1990s and following the 
end of the Cold War and Kuwait war, resulting in the establishment of Pax Americana in the 
Persian Gulf, Iran's strategic importance to superpower rivalry and East-West relations 
seemed to be reduced. The disappearance of the Soviet Union meant that in Western eyes Iran 
no longer enjoyed the status of a barrier to Soviet expansionism. These developments, and US 
dissemination of the notion of a 'New World Order' suggested that Iran had lost its earlier 
crucial importance for the West, particularly for Europe.98 This phenomenon was intensified 
by the US policy of isolating and containing Iran, and Washington's attempts to discourage its 
European allies from improving their ties with Tehran.
In light of these developments, the Iranian government made new efforts to demonstrate its 
strategic significance to the world and the region. To be more precise, Iran tried to prove to 
European countries that its strategic importance was neither reduced nor increased, but its 
form had changed. It set out to demonstrate that Iran was now a force to be reckoned with 
because of its position and role in relation to Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Iran's position as the easiest and, more importantly, cheapest way to connect Europe to 
Central Asia for trade and investment was a factor, the implications of which could not escape 
the Rafsanjani government. In addition, a number of political and economic motivations 
helped to enhance Iran's importance to the EC countries. Major amongst these was Iran's role 
as a potential long-term agent of stability in Persian Gulf99 and Central Asian conflicts. Iran's
97 "Iran and Britain Reach Agreement on Settling Pre-Revolution Debt", Reuters, 16 September 1995.
98 For a discussion of Iran's view of the 'New World Order', see Scheherazade Daneshkhu, "Iran and the New  
World Order" in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), The Gulf War and the New World Order, 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994, pp. 293-314.
99 See Shahram Chubin's paper entitled "Regional Overview" at MEED's conference on Iran. The conference 
was held on 25 February 1991 at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre in London.
171
mediatory role in some conflicts in Central Asia proved effective in this respect. For instance 
Iran acted as a peace-broker to help end the conflict in Tajikistan between the government 
and the Islamist opposition groups. "Iran not only did not tilt towards the latter but in fact 
tried to act as an 'honest' broker between the two factions".100
Furthermore, Iran still had influence in the Islamic world, which Europe could use for 
resolving conflicts. Iran had proved that it was a major player in releasing the Western 
hostages from Lebanon. Finally, Iran would be potentially a market of 100 million people at 
the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. This became more important for the EU 
countries when it was seen that Iran was undergoing an era of reconstruction from which 
European countries could benefit economically. Iran's potential utility in helping to reduce the 
Central Asian Republics' dependence on Russia was another factor which caused the 
European countries to maintain or enhance their relations with Iran. Since these Republics 
were keen to find alternatives for the old Soviet economic arrangements, and so were Western 
companies engaged in joint ventures with them, particularly in relation to traditional pipelines 
and rail routes through Russia, Iran was an attractive option. For instance, Turkmenistan has 
already linked its railways to the Iranian system, and worked on building a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Iran, which commenced operation in 1997. The involvement of European oil 
and gas companies, such as BP, British Gas, Agip, and Total, in developing Caspian and 
Central Asian resources underlines the significance of Iran-Europe relations.
Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War caused the Iranian leadership to reconsider the role 
played by a united Europe. Iran's approach to Western countries not only was for the purpose 
of obtaining technology, investment, and foreign credit to help Iran's post-war reconstruction, 
but also had a political dimension. While in the past, Iran viewed the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc as a counterbalance to the West, it was now deemed necessary to place more 
emphasis on Europe as a counterweight to the United States. The end of the Cold War had 
reduced Iran's ability to manoeuvre between East and West.101 In this context, whereby Iran 
expected European countries to conduct more independent policies towards it, and to distance 
themselves more from US policy, Iranian policy-makers attempted to improve and promote 
Iran's relations with Europe. In other words, Iran tried to open an independent avenue in its 
foreign policy towards the European countries -  countries which were in the process of 
formulating their own common security and foreign policy.
Furthermore, the new nature of Europe since 1992, in the form of the European Union, 
increased European countries' independence in their foreign policies towards Iran. In the
100 Adam Tarock, "Iran's Policy in Central Asia", Central Asian Survey, 16(2), 1997, p. 190.
1°1 Fred Halliday, "Introduction", in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and 
International Community, London and New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 4.
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previous decade, US-Iran contention had negatively affected Iran's relations with Western 
European countries, most of which followed almost the same policy as the United States. 
"Given the United States and Western European countries' shared interests in the Middle East, 
and given their membership in NATO under US direction", as Fred Halliday argues, "the 
European countries could not, even if they were minded to, act in a manner radically at odds 
with the United States".102 But with the end of the Cold War, Western Europe no longer 
needed to rely on the US umbrella, and was therefore less inclined to follow America's way of 
viewing Iran and determining the nature of their relations with it.
Another factor which facilitated dialogue between the EU and Iran, leading to improvement 
in their ties in the 1990s, wasof aneconomic nature. The increasing economic competition 
amongst the key regional groups in the world, such as NAFTA, the EU, and ASEAN caused 
the EU, while remaining a political ally of the USA, to become an economic rival of it. As a 
result most European countries were more willing than before to face US displeasure and 
have relations with Iran in order to trade with it.
As an economic and political power in the 1990s, the EU had a prominent position in Iran's 
national security as well. The EU countries and Japan as the major importers of Iranian oil, 
the main partners for Iran's foreign trade, and the only sources of technology for Tehran, were 
playing a special role in Iran's foreign policy calculations. For these reasons the economic 
substance of the Republic was not dramatically different from that of the ancien regime ,103 
In fact, the OECD countries, particularly the EC states, worked as a supermarket in which 
Iran was able to sell its crude oil, buy its manufactured consumer and capital goods and 
management services, purchase the military parts it needed, and also have access to the 
network of shipment facilities and financial services. Iran's dependence on selling its oil to the 
West is reflected in the fact that "while in 1979, Western Europe and Japan together 
accounted for 50 per cent of Iran's total oil exports, by 1985 this share had increased to 58 per 
cent of the total, rising to 71 per cent in 1987".104 Also in the area of Iran’s imports from 
Western and European countries, it should be noted that while the share of industrial 
countries in Iran's total imports in 1980 was 66 per cent, this had increased to 79 per cent by 
1987. Furthermore, the European countries' share of the total had increased during the same 
period from 7 to 14 per cent.105 In the political sense, given their occupation of 3 out of the 5
102 Fred Halliday, "An Elusive Normalisation: Western Europe and the Iranian Revolution", The Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 312.
103 See Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran and the European Community" in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and 
Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, London and New York: Routledge, 1991, pp. 
60-61.
1^4 Kamran Mofid, "The Political Economy of Iran's Foreign Trade Since the Revolution: Ideals and Practice"in 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, London and 
New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 149.
105 Ibid., p. 155.
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permanent seats on the UN Security Council, European countries were of political 
significance to Iran as well.
In the light of these factors, the EU in 1992 initiated a policy of 'critical dialogue' with Iran. 
At their meeting in Edinburgh, Scotland, on 11 and 12 December 1992, the heads of the 12 
states of the EU issued a statement expressing concern over Iran's military plans, human 
rights record and alleged terrorism abroad, and pointed out the importance of undertaking a 
critical dialogue with Tehran. President Rafsanjani, in his response of 21 February 1993, 
stated that Iran was also prepared for serious discussion and dialogue with the EU in order to 
resolve the problems and challenges present in the world and the region.106 Also in a message 
of 1993 to British Prime Minister and then head of the European Community John Major, 
Rafsanjani stated: "The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to international law, opposes 
interference in the internal affairs of other states, recognises the observance of domestic laws 
as a democratic move, and denounces the use of force in international relations".107 In fact, 
the policy of 'critical dialogue' was rooted largely in two main developments: Iran's 
determination to improve its relations with the EU, and the emergent perceptions among the 
EU countries concerning Iran's strategic role in the region with its huge potential market in 
the post Iran-Iraq War era. The US policy of isolation and sanctions against Iran, and 
Washington's pressure on its political allies in the EU to follow suit, also made Iran's political 
leadership keener to strengthen its relations with the EU. Meanwhile, the EU's search for a 
political role in the Middle East peace process and a greater share in the Middle East market, 
prompted it to launch and maintain a critical dialogue with Iran. This dialogue focused 
primarily on five major issues, the Rushdie affair, human rights, terrorism, Iran's alleged 
efforts in developing weapons of mass destruction, and Iran's stance on the Middle East peace 
process.
Iran's determination to develop political and economic relations with the EU created 
substantial room for the Rafsanjani administration to manoeuvre, and also provided more 
flexibility in its foreign policy towards the EU. While Rafsanjani stated that Tehran's relations 
with Europe were not yet ideal, in response to criticism that his administration had gone too 
far in pursuit of closer relations with Europe, he asserted: "Iran's relations with Europeans 
still have left much to be desired".108
106 Rafsanjani in his statement explained Iran's complaints over Western interference in its affairs, including 
support for groups involved in terrorism in Iran. He also cited cases of Western double standards and its political 
approach to human rights and democracy. See MEED, Iran Quarterly Report, 11 March 1993 and Ali Rahmani 
and Seed Teeb (eds.), Goftogoohay-e Iran va Europe (in Persian), [Iran-Europe Dialogue], Tehran: Daftar-e 
Motaleat-e Syasi va Beinolmelali, 1996, p. 10.
107 "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Issues and Stances", The Iranian Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 364, Fall/Winter 1993-94, p. 782.
Daily Iran , 5 November 1996.
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Due to the EU policy of 'critical dialogue', Tehran welcomed an active role for the EU in the 
Middle East peace process and appreciated the EU's, particularly France's, willingness to 
play a role independent of the USA in Middle East affairs.109 Iran's role in negotiating a 
ceasefire between Israel and the Lebanese Hizballah guerrillas in April 1996, in the exchange 
of prisoners and bodies between Israel and Hizballah, (brokered in cooperation with 
Germany, to borrow from French Foreign Ministry spokesman Yves Doutriauxit) can be 
regarded as an important area of cooperation between Iran and Europe as a result of 'critical 
dialogue'.110
The Clinton Administration, accusing Iran of attempting to build nuclear weapons capabilities 
and of supporting terrorism, declared a tightening of its trade embargo on Iran in April 1995, 
and demanded that its European allies do likewise. However the Europeans declined to follow 
suit and maintained their relations. A British Foreign Office spokesman said that London did 
not view complete sanctions as applicable in the case of Iran.111 Criticising Washington in an 
interview, German Economic Minister Guenther Rexrodt said: "we do not believe that a trade 
embargo is the appropriate instrument for influencing opinion in Iran and bringing about 
changes there that are in our interests".112 Grasping the opportunity to replace American firms 
with French companies such as Total, France criticised the damaging US policy of sanctions 
and boycott, and boosted its economic relations with Iran. In July 1995 Total signed a $600 
million deal with Iran to develop the two offshore Sirri oil and gas fields -  a contract which 
had earlier been awarded to the US firm Conoco. Overall, America's economic competitors in 
Europe did not respond positively to the US demand, and many even attempted to take the 
opportunity to fill America's place in trade with and investment in Iran.
This led the US Congress to pass a bill by which a 'secondary boycott' would be imposed on 
European companies investing $40 million or more annually to help develop oil and gas 
resources in Iran -  a bill which was signed by Clinton on 5 August 1996. The Act provoked 
strong protests from the European Union and individual European governments. They argued 
that a 'secondary boycott' against companies doing business with Iran violated international 
law. For example, President Chirac's spokeswoman, Catherine Colonna, said "the bill 
contains unacceptable measures of extra-territorial jurisdiction which violates international 
law".113 German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated that "we will not be dictated to about 
whom we do business with. If the US continues [on this course], we will have to consider 
appropriate steps in Europe".114 Kinkel on another occasion elaborated that on the issue of
199 See, Ali Akbar Velayati's interview, Daily Iran , 24 October 1996.
119 Paul Taylor, "France Warns US Against Iran Trade Sanctions", Reuters, 5 August 1996.
H I "Britain Opposed to Clinton Ban Against Iran", IRNA, 2 May 1995.
112 Reuters, 2 May 1995.
113 "France Concerned About US Legislation on Iran", Reuters, 30 January 1996.
114 "Germany's Kinkel Warns US About Iran Sanctions Law", Reuters, 15 August 1996.
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how to treat Iran, the Germans and Americans had different opinions.115 A UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office spokesman said that "we cannot accept US pressure on its allies to 
impose sanctions under the threat of mandatory penalties on our companies carrying out trade 
with these countries in the oil and gas sectors".116 A statement issued by Ireland on behalf of 
the 15-nation EU said that "the Union reaffirms its determination to act in the appropriate 
international fora, including the World Trade Organisation, in defence of ... the interests of 
member state companies if these are affected by the legislation".117
The European policy of 'critical dialogue' towards Iran, and the EU's refusal to follow the US 
sanctions, contributed to softening the Iranian official view on the Salman Rushdie issue. 
Before the regular EU-Iran meeting, held under French presidency in June 1995 in Paris to 
discuss Iran's stance on different issues, especially on the fatwa, Iran attempted to depoliticise 
the edict. Foreign Minister Velayati raised European hopes when he announced: "Our 
government is not going to dispatch anybody, any commandos, to kill anybody in Europe". 
He added, "this is our determination to expand our relations with Europe".118 Ali Akbar 
Nateq Nouri, speaker of Iran's parliament, stated that "the edict is an irrevocable edict", but he 
asserted that the Iranian government "will not send commandos to kill Salman Rushdie".119 
Mohammad Javad Larijani, Vice-Chairman of Iran's parliamentary foreign affairs committee 
and a member of the National Security Council, said: "There is a better understanding from 
both sides of the issue involved. The world is a better place if we try to act a little bit more 
rationally". He then added, "Salman Rushdie should feel safe about any Iranian government 
involvement in any plot to harm him in any way".120 A well-known Iranian cleric, 
Mohammad Javad Hojati Kermani, even said in his column in an Iranian newspaper: "Imam 
Khomeini never intended nor ordered the government of the Islamic Republic to carry out the 
edict".121 In this context, President Rafsanjani in a news conference stated that this edict was 
in the religious books, even if Ayatollah Khomeini had not issued the Fatwa; it was in all 
books relating to religious jurisprudence going back one thousand years. Describing the 
Fatwa as an Islamic, jurisprudential view, Rafsanjani stated that "the issue was not one of 
implementation at all".122
It was in this line that the EU's Italian presidency, in its statement of February 1996 rejected
115 "Germany Defends Europe's Policy on Iran", Reuters, 6 August 1996.
116 "Foreign and Commonwealth Office - US Sanctions Legislation Against Iran/Libya", UK Government Press 
Releases, cited in Reuters, 5 August 1996.
117 "EU Concerned About US Moves Against Iran, Libya", Reuters, 21 August 1996.
118 "Meeting on Rushdie", Reuters, June 1995.
119  "Rushdie’s Death Would End Problem", Reuters, 1 June 1995.
120 "Iran Set to Drop Rushdie Death Threat", Reuters, June 1995.
121 "Seven Years On", The Times, cited in Reuters, 14 February 1996.
122 "Iran: Hashemi Rafsanjani Holds News Conference", FBIS, NES, 14 March 1996.
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calls for firmer action against Iran, preferring instead to continue 'critical dialogue'.123 While 
this policy angered Rushdie, who attacked the West for not doing enough to resolve the 
case124, it was welcomed by the Iranian daily Tehran Times which suggested that "the EU 
should be given a pat on the back for not submitting to pressures from circles determined to 
disturb Iran-Europe relations".125
However, after 1992, London pursued a more active policy over the Rushdie affair. After the 
release of the last Western hostage from Lebanon in 1992, the British policy of quiet 
diplomacy over the Rushdie affair was transformed into a more active policy. Indicative of 
the new diplomacy was the first public meeting between Rushdie and Prime Minister John 
Major in May 1993. In Rushdie's words, the meeting was "the most important day of the 
campaign against the fatwa”.126 He pointed out, when Britain decided "to get noisy", its allies 
in Europe were expected to follow suit.127
Meanwhile, Hasan Sane'i, Head of the 15th Khordad Foundation, declared in 1992 that in 
addition to paying a $2 millions reward, the foundation would reimburse all expenses 
incurred in killing Rushdie, and in 1997 announced an increase of $500,000 in the reward. 
Henceforth, the Salman Rushdie issue continued to cause difficulty in relations between Iran 
and Britain. Although Rafsanjani attempted to distance his government from Sane'i's 
announcement by stating that the foundation was a private one and did not reflect the 
government's view, the issue had its impact on diplomatic relations.
Realising that Iranian officials were either unable or unwilling to lift the fatwa, the EU on 19 
April 1995 demanded from the Iranian government a formal assurance guaranteeing 
Rushdie's safety within the EU. As one British diplomat confided, London did not insist on 
lifting the fatwa, but demanded assurance in writing from Tehran for Rushdie's safety.128 Iran 
refused to provide written assurance on the grounds that oral pronouncements by officials 
counted as documents in international diplomacy.129 In fact, the EU governments probably 
knew Rafsanjani had no intention of trying to carry out the fatwa, so the demand to put it in 
writing was either an attempt to put pressure on Iran to do something about the foundation 
offering the reward, or was sought as insurance against a change of attitude by a possibly less 
pragmatic post-Rafsanjani leader.
123 "Seven Years On", Op. Cit.
124 Daivid Ljunggem, "UK Author Rushdie Attacks West Over Death Threat", Reuters, 14 February 1996.
125 "Newspaper Says Rushdie Issue Should not Hinder Closer Ties Between Iran and EU", Op. Cit.
12  ^ "British Prime Minister Meets With Rushdie", Associate Press, 13 May 1993.
127 Ibid.
128 Author's interview with a British diplomat, London, 2 April 1996.
129 Author's interview with an Iranian diplomat, Tehran, May 1996.
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While 'critical dialogue' which had commenced in 1992 aimed to resolve the controversial 
issues, or at least to ease tension between Iran and the EU, all of them were still sources of 
tension in Iran-EU relations when Rafsanjani's presidency ended in early 1997. The Mykonos 
trial in Germany is indicative of the failure of the policy of 'critical dialogue'. The trial of five 
people, accused of murdering four senior officials of the Democratic Party of Iranian 
Kurdistan in a Berlin restaurant in September 1992, opened in Berlin on 28 October 1993. 
Finally in April 1997 the long-awaited verdict accused Iran's leaders of ordering the murders. 
Denying any involvement in the murder, Iranian leaders strongly condemned the verdict as 
politically motivated. They claimed that the court’s star witness, the ousted Iranian president 
Abolhasan Banisadr, was the arch-enemy of the Iranian regime. The verdict led all EU 
countries, except Greece, to recall their envoys from Tehran. In addition, Germany expelled 
four Iranian diplomats -  an act which was followed in turn by Iran's expulsion of four 
German diplomats. A more significant development was the EU's decision to suspend 'critical 
dialogue' with Iran. However, Tehran's approach was not to let the US fuel the fire of an EU- 
Iran crisis. Also existing trade relations between such EU countries as France, Italy and 
Germany with Iran, and the involvement of European companies in many infrastructure 
projects in Iran, caused the EU to look for a 'fresh start' with Iran, as German Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel described it. Despite the verbal war and mutual condemnations that 
followed the Mykonos trial, the mutual attraction between Iran and the EU led both to seek 
for an appropriate time to continue their relations in another guise.130
When the EU countries decided to return their envoys to Tehran, not long after the Mykonos 
verdict, the Iranian government announced that the German ambassador would not be 
welcome for a time, then demanded he be the last to return. By this, Iran wanted to show its 
displeasure at being caught out by Germany and, more importantly, to suggest that Tehran 
was in a position to direct Iran-EU relations. While the EU countries acted individually in the 
Rushdie affair, and left Britain behind after Tehran had broken its relations with London, in 
the Mykonos verdict the EU countries, showing solidarity with Germany, demonstrated their 
collective foreign policy and refused to return their representatives to Iran. This remained the 
situation until the end of Rafsanjani’s presidency.
To conclude, as Rafsanjani left the presidency in August 1997, he did not appear to put Iran's 
relations with Britain on a steady course of improvement. Although since 1989 Rafsanjani 
had tried to redesign Iran's foreign policy in such a way as to promote Iran's international 
position, and ease tension in Tehran's relations with the Western countries, Iran's relations 
with Britain once again faced serious difficulties in the wake of Mykonos verdict. This was 
because rapprochement between London and Tehran was based only on a temporary
130 Mohammad Reza Saidabadi, "Iran, EU Look to Fresh Start", The Canberra Times, 19 April 1997.
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convergence of objectives and interests. In fact, only the common desire of Iran and Britain to 
dislodge Iraq from Kuwait brought both sides closer. Meanwhile, Iran in the reconstruction 
era needed better relations with the EU countries, including Britain, in order to materialise its 
economic reforms. At the same time, Britain was keen not to lose its market share in Iran to 
its European rivals, but rather to increase it in Iran's post-war reconstruction era. While these 
mutual interests contributed to enhancing Iran-EU relations generally, and Iranian-British 
ties in particular, the US policy of containment of Iran made the post-Khomeini leadership 
determined to consolidate further its relations with Europe to counteract Washington's policy 
of isolating Iran. However, the weak point in Iranian-British ties in the broad context of Iran- 
EU relations during the Rafsanjani presidency was the absence of a comprehensive and 
strategic plan for maintaining and improving relations. Furthermore, controversial issues such 
as terrorism, the Rushdie affair, Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process, and Iran's 
alleged attempts to build nuclear weapons remained unsolved. In addition, hostile Iran-US 
relations further complicated Iran's relations with Britain.
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Conclusion
Iran's relations with Britain since 1979, especially when compared to other European 
countries, were unique in two aspects. The diplomatic relations were characterised by ups 
and downs, instability, tension and upheavals. At the same time, both countries enjoyed good 
economic relations. This uniqueness stemmed from the involvement of the contending forces 
and factors between them.
The main force was the traditional Iranian perception of Britain as a conniving and 
conspiratorial power. To secure Iran and the revolution from perceived British plots, the post- 
revolutionary leaders opted to limit British representation in Iran. However, this perception 
was rooted in the past when Britain had repeatedly interfered in Iranian affairs. The British 
intervened in Iran and penetrated Iran's economy in the form of concessions in the Qajar 
period. Britain played a major role in replacing the Qajar dynasty with Reza Shah and then 
replaced him with his son Mohammad Reza Shah during the Second World War. It was the 
Anglo-American coup which overthrew the popular nationalist government of Musaddiq in 
1953. Overall, Iranians' view of Britain as a Western power which inhibited Iran's 
development, undermined its independence, and was responsible for all its misfortunes, led 
the post-revolutionary leaders to pursue limited diplomatic relations with it.
The other development which played a significant role in the instability of relations was the 
predominant perception amongst Iranians which identified Britain with the United States, and 
held Britain responsible for US policies towards Iran as well as for its own. The Iranian 
leaders concluded that British policies were designed to support and endorse US strategy 
towards Iran. This conclusion was drawn from the Iranian interpretation of the Anglo- 
American 'special relationship' by which Britain desired to uphold its declining position in 
international politics. Iranian identification of Britain with the USA was such that even British 
policies towards Iran which were premised purely on British national interests were regarded 
as inspired by America. Since Iranian-US relations from the 1979 revolution were 
characterised by confrontation and enmity, and the post-revolutionary leaders regarded 
Washington as their first enemy, Tehran's identification of Britain with the US further 
complicated Iranian-British relations. In this context Britain was perceived as Iran's second 
greatest enemy.
The different roles played by Britain in various organisations and settings, which Tehran 
perceived as anti-Iranian, were also conducive to cool relations between Iran and Britain. The 
most important of them included the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the European
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Union (EU), and Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). British membership in these 
bodies compelled it to pursue policies and stances which sometimes restrained London from 
securing its own national interests. In fact, Britain had "the problem of wearing too many 
hats"1 in its foreign policy towards Iran. Britain's wider responsibilities worked increasingly 
against its own economic and political interests.2 For instance, Britain demonstrated, from the 
Iranian point of view, pro-Iraqi bias in the UN during the Iran-Iraq War. Not unnaturally, the 
Iranian government became more resentful of Britain, and this made a working relationship 
between Tehran and London difficult. At the same time, Britain's European partner, Germany, 
unencumbered with the wider responsibilities which Britain had, was able to maintain good 
political relations with Iran and became Iran's largest trading partner. As another example, 
Britain was not in a position to conform fully with the EU's policy towards Iran in the 1990s, 
because the EU's policy of critical dialogue, which in one form or another was conducive to 
the improvement of relations between Iran and most EU countries, was in contradiction with 
the American policy of sanctions and containment. Thus, Britain's 'special relationship' with 
the United States came at the cost of its political and economic interests in Iran.
The further factor which was a source of tension and instability in the relations was the British 
attitude towards human rights in Iran. While Britain was silent over pre-revolutionary abuses 
of human rights, and moreover, acted as a strong supporter of the Shah's regime, it took every 
opportunity to criticise post-revolutionary Iran's behaviour in this area. Enjoying a powerful 
position in international and regional organisations, London was active in questioning, 
criticising and condemning the Islamic Republic's behaviour, and sponsoring UN resolutions 
against Tehran. The post-revolutionary leaders not only regarded the Western powers' 
criticism of Iran's human rights behaviour as interference in Iran's domestic affairs, but also 
viewed it as a deliberate attempt to tarnish the Islamic image of the revolution and isolate the 
Islamic Republic internationally. Since Britain was the torch-bearer of criticism of Iran's 
human rights record, Iranians naturally were more resentful of it than other European 
countries. The dramatic change between the British approach on human rights before and after 
the revolution deepened Iranian resentment, and reinforced the old suspicions of Britain as a 
meddling, conspiratorial power.
The radicalism and activism of Iran's foreign policy, particularly in the 1980s, also influenced 
the downward trend in Iran's relations with Britain. This was clearly manifested in Iran's 
attempt to export its revolution. The Persian Gulf region and Lebanon were the two main 
areas in which Iran's effort to export the revolution became a primary source of concern for 
the West, including Britain. The main feature of Iran's export of the revolution was its anti-
1 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "The Problem of Wearing Too Many Hats", Parliamentary Brief\ November 1995, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 57.
2 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
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status quo approach. In fact, post-revolutionary Iran's opposition to the developments in the 
Middle East was unacceptable to the British, who saw any changes as detrimental to British 
interests. In this context, Britain, pursuing the policy of 'rejectionism' towards Iran and 
refusing to appreciate even its legitimate grievances and demands, conditioned its 
rapprochement with Iran upon a change of Iran's behaviour and policy. Meanwhile, Tehran 
was not prepared to alter its policies, unless London showed more flexibility and adopted a 
bargaining approach to resolving different problems between the two countries as some other 
European states had already done. This vicious circle, which was predominant in the 1980s, 
made an Iranian-British working relationship impossible.
Furthermore, Iran's domestic politics had a major impact on Iran's anti-status quo foreign 
policy and, in turn, exacerbated Iranian-British relations . The dominance of idealists in Iran's 
power structure in the first ten years after the revolution and their conviction that it was Iran's 
duty to lead and support Islamic movements in the world placed Iran in opposition to the 
Western-dominated international system. However, the idealists' foreign policy and behaviour 
led the Western countries to guard against Iran and concentrate their efforts on weakening its 
economic and political capability. This, in turn, brought to the fore the issues of regime 
stability and the regime perception of foreign threats to the Iranian government. By enhancing 
Iranian radicalism in order to safeguard the revolution and regime from perceived and real 
foreign threats, both issues worked to intensify the idealists' anti-Western approach. This 
process and the idealists' reluctance to improve Iran's relations with Britain acted as obstacles 
to the maintenance or, when favourable conditions prevailed, improvement of relations. Also 
the dynamic interaction between Iran's domestic politics and its foreign policy created a 
situation whereby any sign of willingness of the idealists to improve Iran's relations with 
Britain was interpreted by the pragmatists as a backdown, and an indication of the former's 
weakness in domestic politics.
Finally, it was the Salman Rushdie issue which caused severance of Iranian-British relations 
in 1989 and has remained a major hurdle for improvement in the relations. Viewing the 
Rushdie affair largely as a Western conspiracy orchestrated by Britain, the Iranian 
government regarded its stance on the issue as a matter of principle. While post-Khomeini 
Iranian support of the fatwa on a domestic political level "developed into a barometer of 
political loyalties" to the regime and to Ayatollah Khomeini, on an international level it 
became a symbol of Iranian Islamic honour.3 Britain also regarded its policy over the Rushdie 
affair as a matter of principle. In the sea of mutual distrust, this made the Iranian leaders more 
suspicious of a British hidden agenda. With such principles at stake, neither Tehran nor 
London could negotiate the crisis; it was left open for further conflict.
3 "Rushdie Affair Retains Capacity for Conflict", Menas Associates' Iran Focus, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1993, p. 9.
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Meanwhile Iranian-British relations were occasionally able to recover from deterioration and 
instability. The most important factor conducive to an upward pattern in relations was 
economic. To secure their economic interests, both sides had to reduce tension, and maintain 
or improve relations. Iran’s need of London as the centre for access to the network of shipment 
facilities, financial services and arms purchasing played a major part. Britain's commercial 
and economic importance to Iran was underscored by the presence in London of a large 
number of Iranian banks, and of the National Iranian Oil Company's largest office outside 
Iran. Britain's desire to preserve its traditional market in Iran was also crucial for London in 
maintaining relations. In fact, the driving force behind many of Britain's overtures towards 
Iran and its readiness to resume or improve relations was the desire to prevent complete 
replacement in Iran's market by its European economic rivals.
In a political sense, from the British point of view Iran was influential in the development of 
events in Lebanon. London was convinced that Iran could influence the Lebanese groups for 
release of the British hostages. When the Thatcher government realised the failure of its 
policies of rejectionism towards Iran and refusal to negotiate on the hostage issue, it tried from 
the end of the 1980s to widen its scope of relations with Iran in order to secure the release of 
the hostages. This development contributed to the improvement of Anglo-Iranian relations.
Britain's revision of its rejectionist policy towards Tehran coincided with the emergence of 
pragmatists in Iran. The post-Khomeini leadership's efforts to de-link Iran’s foreign policy 
from that of the 1980s led to Iran's embarking on a process of normalisation with the West, 
especially Britain. The post-Khomeini pragmatists understood realpolitik and the intricate 
mechanisms of the international system. In addition, the Rafsanjani government for the sake 
of its economic and political plans, needed working relations with the West as a whole and 
Britain in particular. Thus, his government pursued a relatively quiet line, based on Iran's 
national interests rather than activism in foreign policy, and consolidated its ties with Western 
countries. This shift manifested itself in Iran's policy over the Kuwait war and also Tehran's 
approach towards Central Asian and Caucasus regions following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. These events helped Iran to recover its position in the world community. As a 
result, Iranian-British relations also improved. Furthermore, the US policy of isolating Iran 
made the Iranian leadership keener to strengthen its relations with the EU, including Britain. 
At the same time, the EU's search for a political role in Middle East affairs and a greater share 
in Iran's market in the era of reconstruction caused it to initiate and maintain the policy of 
'critical dialogue' with Iran. Together, these two developments worked as pull-and-push 
factors.4
4 Mohammad Reza Saidabadi, "Progress and Regress in EU-Iran Relations since 1989", Security Dialogue, Vol. 
29, No. 1, March 1998, p. 124.
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The rapprochement between London and Tehran during the Rafsanjani presidency was based 
only on a temporary convergence of interests, and suffered from the absence of a 
comprehensive and strategic plan for maintaining and improving relations. It would not be 
wrong to say that by the end of Rafsanjani's presidency and following the Mykonos verdict, 
the status of Iranian-British relations was not much different from that of 1980, when Britain 
closed its embassy in Tehran. Behind the aggravated diplomatic relations there were Iranian 
resentments towards Britain which lingered from previous bad experiences. For instance, the 
Iranian Weekly Asr-e Ma in December 1996 wrote: "In the international arena, Britain has 
stood alongside the United States and Israel as the third apex of this evil triangle, has 
continuously acted against the Islamic revolution, and has conspired in mounting the most 
serious resistance to Iran's newly-bom regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran must exercise 
extreme caution vis-a-vis Britain and maintain relations with it only within the limits of 
absolute necessity".5
By the end of the Rafsanjani presidency in 1997, the psychological attitude of the Iranian 
polity as a whole towards Britain remained as mistrustful as ever. Mohammad Musaddiq in 
1951 told Averell Harriman, the American negotiator on the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute: "You 
do not know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not 
know how they sully everything they touch".6 Forty-five years later the Iranian Daily 
Jomhoori-e Islami reiterated major points of Musaddeq's statement. It wrote: "The history of 
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region in particular is replete with British intrigues, 
crimes and betrayals against the nations of this region. The depth and extent of the British 
conspiracies are such that without any doubt, as far as every single burning conflict in the 
Middle East is concerned, Britain both provides firewood for it and lights the match".7 Also in 
this line, the Iranian Weekly Kayhan Havaie warned the Rafsanjani government against any 
improvement in Iran’s relations with Britain and asserted: "Because of the long history of 
British hostile policies towards Iran which have also continued after the Iranian revolution, 
hatred of the British has been deeply rooted in the Iranians' minds. Has not the bitter 
experience of the past relationship obliged us to be vigilant in establishing and maintaining 
ties of any nature with Britain?".8 These three statements differ in their wording, but their 
message is fundamentally the same.
The victory of Mohammad Khatami in Iran's presidential elections in May 1997 marked a 
turning point in Iran's domestic and foreign policy.9 Advocating moderation and tolerance at
5 "Nokati dar Piramoon-e Safar-e Heyat-e Bolandpaya Keshvareman be Englis", Asr-e Ma, 15 December 1996.
6 Vernon A. Walters, Silent Missions, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1978, p. 247.
7 "Hanay-e Birang-e Pir-e Esteamar", Jomhoori-e Islami, 6 November 1996.
8 "In Hama Esrar Baray-e Chist", Kayhan Havaie, 27 November 1996.
9 For a discussion on Iran's presidential elections and the reasons behind the decisive victory of Khatami in it, see 
Mohammad Reza Saidabadi, "Iran Embarks on New Era of Moderation", The Canberra Times, 27 May 1997.
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home and openness to the West through a dialogue between civilisations, Khatami has 
attempted to demonstrate Iran's new outlook to the international community. His initiatives to 
break the impasse in Iran's ties with the EU countries, leading to the exchange of envoys in 
November 1997, coincided with his efforts towards rapprochement with the Arab states in the 
Persian Gulf. These developments are indicative of his new approach towards regional and 
international issues, seeking 'peace, tranquillity and security'. Furthermore, Khatami's call for 
a 'thoughtful dialogue' with the people of the United States has coincided with a campaign in 
the USA for a shift from isolating to engaging Iran. Without doubt this has been the boldest 
foreign policy initiative of his presidency.10 Despite all these developments and Khatami's 
efforts to construct a better relationship with the West, prospects for any dramatic 
improvement in Iran's relations with Britain in the near future are bleak, unless at least three 
major issues are addressed.
The first and most important issue is British policy in the Persian Gulf. Since the conservative 
Arab states of the region are regarded as Britain's traditional allies and friends, Iran views any 
British moves or policy initiatives in the Gulf with suspicion. As long as the British policy and 
stance in this area are seen by the Iranians as pro-Gulf Arab states and anti-Iranian, Iran's 
historical sense of distrust of the British remains strong. Unless and until this perception 
changes, tension and instability in Iranian-British relations will continue.
The status of Iran-US relations is the second significant issue which determines the nature of 
Iran’s relations with Britain. The hostile Iran-US relations will inevitably have an important 
impact on Iran-EU relations. As long as the state of enmity between Tehran and Washington 
continues, future Iranian-British relations, particularly in the light of Britain's 'special 
relationship' with the USA, will be fraught with tension. The third issue to be addressed is that 
of engagement. James A. Bill has explained the linkage between the decrease in foreign 
threats and more political participation and pluralism in Iran.* 11 This appears valid if one 
concludes that there is also a linkage between a decrease in perceived foreign threats to Iran 
and Iran's further integration in the world community. It is obvious that the more the West 
attempts to engage Iran and the less Iran perceives foreign threats, the more Iran's obligation 
to behave as a responsible member of the international community. This development will 
materialise if Khatami's policy initiatives aimed at reducing tension in Iran's regional and 
international relations and at creating a civil society in Iran meet with success. However, this 
will not be realised unless Khatami's policies emerge superior in the factional debate in Iran's 
domestic politics.
10 See Mohammad Reza Saidabadi, "US Must Talk to Tehran, Despite Obstacles", The Age, 24 December 1997.
11 James A. Bill, "The New Iran: Relations with its Neighbours and the United States", Asian Update, 1991, p. 4.
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